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ABSTRACT
The principal aim of this thesis is to take a step towards a fuller 
coverage in this language of the history of Russian materialism and 
atheism« It is divided into Three Parts« The first discusses the transition 
from German idealism in the 1830s to materialism and atheism from the 
l840s onwards amongst the intelligentsia; particular attention is given 
to the vogue for Feuerbach, and it is suggested that his appeal for the 
Russians lay in a materialism which admitted the mental but debarred the 
spiritual, i«e., allowed for a moral critique of Tsarism not only outside 
of, but in opposition to, religion« The first part ends with an analysis 
of Lenin*s Materialism and Empiriocritisism« both to compare his own 
stance with that of Feuerbach, and to understand the presuppositions of 
the historiography of the 'materialist tradition*, which provides a 
framework for Parts Two and Three« These parts seek to establish when 
it makes sense to speak of the origins of a 'materialist tradition' in 
the sense that materialism and atheism are connected with antagonism 
towards the political order« Part Two is a brief rebuttal of the view 
of Soviet historians that the tradition originates with Lomonosov and is 
continued, amongst others, by Radishchev« Part Three claims that the 
tradition may be said to have begun with the Decembrists, and discusses 
the extent to which their materialism and atheism can be seen as a response 
to Alexandrine educational policy and attitudes towards religious u 
organisations and groups, as a result of contact with the West, and as a 
function of their own political ideas. This Part forms the bulk of the 
thesis, and in so doing, evinces its most important secondary aim, to attempt 
as far as possible to explore the historical significance of Russian
materialism and atheism.
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1introduction
The subject of this thesis first began to take shape in my mind 
when as an undergraduate student I was introduced to the remarkable 
philosophical journey of Vissarion Belinsky. It became clear that his 
intellectual development could be seen as an exaggerated and highly 
personal reflection of a transition, quite widespread in both Russia 
and Western Europe, from a conservative or apolitical transcendental
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philosophy to almost what was its diametric opposite, a conjunction of 
materialism and socialism. There seemed on the basis of this general 
phenomenon, and in the particular case of Belinsky, to be a correlation 
of some kind between ontological and political views. It goes without 
saying that connections of this nature, and in particular the connec­
tion between materialism and progressive political views, are axiomatic 
in Marxist philosophy of history; without in any way wishing to adopt 
a hostile posture towards that approach, I have nevertheless preferred 
to confront my subject without the benefit of any strong prior 
theoretical commitment.
It is not however the primary aim of this study to investigate the 
relationship between materialism and radicalism. My first consideration 
has been to take a step towards a fuller coverage of an aspect of 
Russian intellectual history which has not in my view been adequately 
dealt with by Western historians of ideas, namely the history of 
materialist and atheist thought. As far as I know, there is no work in 
English comparable to the wealth of monographs and essay collections 
generated by Soviet authors specialising in this field.^ There are 
probably several reasons for this disparity of attention, but the most 
obvious seem to be following.
The first is what might be called the poverty of Russian 
philosophy. Although care must always be taken to avoid, or at least
2to recognise, the prejudices likely to be instilled by a Western 
European education, it can scarcely be denied that there is no 
Russian metaphysical, epistemological or ethical work of the nineteenth 
century to rank with, for example, Hume's Treatise of Human Nature, 
or Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, in terms of originality or rigour.
Why this is so could itself be the subject of another thesis, but it 
is worth noting that thfere are defects in the most obvious explanation, 
which is that Russia's philosophical backwardness is correlative to 
and consequential upon the political, economic and cultural backward­
ness induced by centuries of Byzantine isolation. In the first place, 
the choice of Kant as an exemplary philosopher brings to mind the 
opposite conclusion, that in the case of Germany, admittedly far less 
isolated from the rest of Europe than Russia, political and economic 
backwardness seemed if anything to promote rather than hinder a 
remarkable efflorescence of original aesthetic and philosophical 
activity. More importantly, Russian could be seen as being philoso­
phically backward not only in relation to certain West European nations, 
but also in relation to its own rapidly increasing strides in, for 
example, literature, music, mathematics and natural science. It may be 
that there was some intrinsic cultural factor inhibiting original 
philosophising; for example, it might be that the modern Russian idiom 
pioneered by Karamzin in the early nineteenth century proved particularly 
apt, for instance, for poetic expression, but, like Latin, lacked the 
morphological mechanisms conducive to the coining of abstract terms 
which, so the argument might run, are characteristic of Greek or 
German. This would impede the generation of other than imitative 
philosophical thought, but would have little or no effect on the pursuit 
of abstraction in music, mathematics and natural science which in diff­
erent ways have their own lingua franca.
3The argument would be more convincing if Russian intellectuals 
from the time of Radishchev had proved more or less indifferent to 
pure philosophy. Not only is that not the case, but at times they have 
exhibited a near mania for philosophical abstraction. This suggests 
that the reasons for the imitative or eclectic nature of Russian 
philosophy are partly institutional. For the sake of the virtue of 
brevity and in spite of the vice of over-generalisation, it might have 
been expected that our non-existent major nineteenth-century Russian 
work of pure philosophy would in the light of West European philosophy 
have been produced by a gentleman of leisure or by a professional 
teacher of philosophy. The Russian nobility did however, as we shall 
see, for a long time regard education, and particularly higher education 
as a plebeian activity, and in any case was a most reluctant consumer 
of any kind of tuition which did not bear the fruits of advancement 
in the military and civilian service hierarchy; it was not until the 
l830s that the sons of the nobility began to attend the new universities 
in any appreciable numbers. We shall also see that after the expiry of 
the spirit of reform during the reign of Alexander I, departments of 
philosophy were often the prime targets of the academic repression 
which characterised most of the remainder of the nineteenth century.
So far were the universities from developing an indigenous philosophical 
culture that it was the very foreigners who had been recruited to make 
up for -the lack of native teachers of philosophy who became the first 
victims of government persecution. Thus in the midst of the nobility's 
general intellectual apathy, and the enforced orthodoxy of the academic 
philosophers, the vital spirit of philosophical enquiry was kept alive 
in the rootless groups of young students, journalists and misfits who 
were the first members of what was later termed the intelligentsia.
It was the minds of these individuals which were obsessed by a mania
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for abstraction, successively of a Schellingian and a Hegelian stamp, 
but it cannot be inferred from this that discussions of a purely 
metaphysical or epistemological nature were paramount. The appeal 
of German philosophy to the generation which followed the Decembrists 
was that it raised questions about the essence of nationhood and the 
meaning of history, questions which the acutely nationally self- 
conscious Russians, forever measuring themselves against the Western 
European nations, were as unavoidable as they were to the Germans with 
their own particular obsession about the French. This is not to deny 
that in individual cases the logic of the Hegelian dialectic acquired 
its own momentum, but as a generalisation, the inception of the Russian 
intelligentsia was marked by a powerful interest in philosophy not so 
much for its own sake, but as means to finding metaphysical solutions 
to practical, that is historical and then political, problems. Not 
only does this underline the connection between ontological and political 
views, at any rate in the Russian context, mentioned earlier, but it also 
diminishes the relevance of the poverty, or unoriginality, of Russian 
philosophy to the question of its importance in Russian history. I 
shall argue at greater length later on that even in an eclectic or 
reactive philosophical culture, it is the choice of ideas which is 
historically significant, and that moreover that logically that choice 
cannot be explained simply in terms of what is chosen. At this point 
though, I would only suggest that given the close relationship between 
philosophical and political views in Russian history, the historical 
significance of the former is guaranteed by the fact that neither can 
be fully understood without recourse to the other.
To say that the poverty of Russian philosophy is a reason why there 
is unequal treatment of Russian materialism and atheism by Soviet and 
non-Soviet authors is to point specifically to an attitude more likely
5to be held by non-Soviet authors, and therefore to attempt to account 
for one side only of the inequality. To offer as a second reason 
preconceptions about the truth of materialism and atheism could of 
course apply to both sides, and it would scarcely be consistent with 
the neutrality avowed in the first paragraph to offer judgements 
about which side’s preconceptions were the strongest. It goes without 
saying that Marxist-Leninist authors* acceptance of the truth of 
historical materialism and the historical importance of earlier 
•metaphysical* forms of materialism is explicit, axiomatic and at 
first sight monolithic. There is, as we shall see, some room for 
debate and difference amongst Soviet historians of ideas over which 
thinkers are to be accounted part of the Russian 'materialist tradition,' 
but what debate there is takes place fully within Lenin's definitions 
of materialism, and categorisations of intellectual history. On the 
other hand, there is no basis for inferring that non-Soviet students 
of Russian intellectual history have not regarded materialist thought 
as worthy of separate study because it is false or vulgar or both, even 
though that view is undoubtedly held by some of that variegated set.
The others may, quite reasonably, not be interested in the philosophical, 
rather than political views, of the intelligentsia; there is, indeed, 
no reason why the political views of the Decembrists, or a Herzen, 
should not be considered with profit in isolation from their metaphysical 
views, but such an approach would at least be historically incomplete, 
and would, in my view, lack an important perspective of the whole object, 
rather in the way that to comprehend Newton's mechanics, one need only 
study the Principia Mathematics, but to understand Newton, one must also 
study his theology. It should also be remembered that the earlier the 
work, the less material the historian will have been able to consult 
which might have suggested the full significance of atheism and
6materialism in Russian history, even though, as in the case of 
T. G. Masaryk's evergreen The Spirit of Russia, which scarcely con­
siders Russian thought prior to Chaadayev, he might have seen it as
one of his most important tasks to account for the importance of
3materialism, atheism and anticlericalism in Russian thought.
Masaryk, though,shared with the historian of materialism F. A. Lange 
a predilection for Kantian criticism which theorectically should have 
rendered him impartial with respect to competing systems of metaphysics. 
The same cannot be said of certain Russian Emigre intellectual historians 
whose preconceptions come closest to mirroring those of their Soviet 
opponents, and in whose works on Russian thought, the balance between 
materialism and idealism is in like manner approximately the reverse 
of equivalent Soviet histories. This is particularly evident in the 
case of N. 0. Lossky and V. V. Zeiikovsky, whose primary aim has been to 
chronicle the various systems of Russian Orthodox philosophers in the 
tradition of V. S. Solov'ev (including, in Lossky's case, himself). 
Zeiikovsky utterly repudiated the Marxist-Leninist interpretation of the 
history of Russian philosophy as the struggle between materialism and 
idealism over the "basic question of philosophy", one of the formula­
tions of which is the relationship between thought and matter, this 
struggle being a reflection of the underlying struggle between opposing 
social classes. Zerikovsky for his part was reluctant to accept 
materialism and atheism as properly Russian;
"The past and present contributions of the Russian emigration 
in the various fields of cultural creativity are evidence that Russia's 
spiritual path, to the extent that it is free, without the pressure of 
state power, remains today what it was before. In this respect the 
sharp outburst of Russian secularism which developed in Russia into 
'active atheism' and an officially organised anti-religious propaganda - 
the whole militant atheism of Neo-Marxism - is, without any doubt,
7a superficial phenomenon, a product of fanatical ideocracy. It did
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not and does not have any roots in the past".
One cannot help thinking that what Zeikovsky said about "free" 
cultural creativity amongst the emigre idealists, as opposed to 
official propaganda, could equally well be said about, for example, 
the materialists and atheists of the 1840s, who were confronted with 
the official ideology of "autocracy, Orthodoxy and nationality". In 
any event, it is indisputable that preconceptions about what counts as 
Russian philosophy, or about the essence of Russian philosophy, be it 
"mysticism", "mystical realism", "realism" or "materialism",^ will 
colour the scholar's approach to materialistic and atheistic thought in 
Russian history.
More specifically such preconceptions will inevitably influence 
the scholar's attitude towards what Soviet historians of ideas have 
called the 'Russian materialist tradition', a concept which has helped 
to direct the approach adopted in this work. Since much of the research 
which sought to establish this tradition was carried out during the 
Stalin era, and is notable for an excess of zeal both in portraying 
some of the best-known Russian thinkers and scientists as progressive 
in social and political philosophy, and materialist in metaphysics, 
and in attempting to derive these views from indigenous sources in 
preference to West European influences, it might be doubted whether it 
can be regarded as characteristic of Soviet philosophy of history in 
general. In fact, the broad view, that the materialist traditon in 
Russia can be traced back into the eighteenth century to the works of 
Lomonosov and Radishchev in particular has survived.*’ This is not to 
be wondered at, since although much of the earlier research is tainted 
with peculiarly Stalinist violations of history, much of the impetus
8for such research comes both from Lenin's conception of materialism, 
which is sufficiently broad (though at some cost, as I intend to 
argue) to accommodate many who might have been surprised by the 
honour, and also from Lenin's own specific reference to the existence 
of such a tradition in his article "On the Meaning of Militant Mat­
erialism", published in the third number of the journal Pod 
znamenem marksizma. He was dissatisfied with the superficiality and 
vulgarisation of anti-religious propaganda, and encouraged the use of 
eighteenth-century atheistic- literature, despite its shortcomings:
"The sharp, vital, gifted and incisive publications of the old 
atheists of the eighteenth century, openly hostile to the ruling 
priesthood, 1 are without a doubt a thousand times more suitable for 
wakening people from religious sleep than the boring, dry expositions 
of Marxism, illustrated by virtually no skilfully selected facts, 
which predominate in our literature, and which (there is no need to
n
hide the sin) often distort Marxism".'
Given that in the same article, Lenin wrote that "there is, fortunately,
within the principal tendencies of progressive social thought in Russia,
8a solid materialist tradition", the findings of subsequent research 
might appear to have a basis in chapter and verse. It would, however, 
be wrong to confuse the atheists of the eighteenth century with the 
Russian representatives of the materialist tradition, of which latter, 
only Chernyshevsky and Plekhanov were mentioned. Oddly enough, to that 
extent, one of the fiercest opponents of the historians of the 
materialist tradition, Zeiîkovsky, we find in agreement with Lenin.
To judge from the composition of his two-volume history, it was only 
towards the end of his studies that Zeiîkovsky was alerted to attempts 
to establish a materialist tradition, and in particular to 
A. A. Maksimov's work, in which, according to Zeflkovsky, he represents 
wrongfully as materialism the views of certain Russian scientists, such
9as the "vitalism" of I. I. Mechnikov and the "naturalism" of
X. M. Sechenov.^ This is Zeiîkovsky's comment on the school of thought
represented by Maksimov:
"Books devoted to a survey of Neo-Marxist philosophy attempt -
in conformity with the current tactical trends of the Soviet regime -
to represent 'dialectical materialism' as a completion and culmination
of the development of the materialistic ideas which have allegedly
manifested themselves e/er more sharply and persistently in the history
of Russian thought. On this interpretation, materialism becomes
virtually a Russian national movement, independent of Western
influences... The first real Russian materialist - besides
Chernyshevski - was Plekhanov, who persistently combined philosophical
'. ,. „10and historical materialism".
There could hardly be a clearer opportunity here for an exercise 
in aurea mediocritas, and indeed I neither share Zeikovsky's belief in 
the superficiality of materialism as a phenomenon of Russian history, 
nor am I convinced by the efforts of Maksimov, Vasetsky, Sidorov, 
Shchipanov, Iovchuk et al., to extend the roots of the materialist 
tradition back into the eighteenth century. It is not however a 
primary purpose of this work to engage in polemics, and the benefit of 
the concept of a 'materialist tradition' is that it suggests a frame­
work in which to begin to ask why materialism has come to attain its 
present significance in Russian society. Talk of intellectual 
'traditions' is, I believe, to be regarded with suspicion, since it 
may draw a verbal veil over the unexplained phenomenon of the per­
sistence of a certain set of ideas, and deflect the attention to an 
exaggerated extent to ideological revolutions only. Nevertheless, in 
this instance, it has seemed helpful to respond to Soviet scholarship, 
and ask when it is proper to speak of the origins of a materialist
tradition in the sense implied by Lenin, and then to judge whether the
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historical conditions adjudged to favour the selection of materialist 
and atheist ideas by progressive social groups may tell us anything 
further about the persistence, or better the continued occurrence, of 
that selection by similar groups in the future. I have to that end, 
included a brief rejection of the notion that any such selection took 
place in the eighteenth century (Part Two), and a much longer invest­
igation of the reasons why this selection took place amongst the 
rebellious army officers of 1825 known retrospectively as the 
Decembrists (Part Three). My intention has been not so much the 
not always difficult refutation of some of the more extreme claims 
made by Soviet scholars during the Stalin era, though this has to be 
done to some extent, but rather to come to grips with some of the 
problems raised by an attempt to locate philosophical ideas in a 
historical setting, using as an example a group put forward as the 
perpetuators of a national materialist tradition. This, and the 
aforementioned step towards a fuller coverage in this language of the 
history of Russian atheism and materialism, are the primary objectives 
of this work. Whether or not my concentration upon the Decembrists 
will go any way to illuminate Zen'kovsky's dim view of the historical 
significance of atheism and materialism in Russia, will depend on one's 
estimate of the importance of the Decembrist movement, and we shall see 
that a polarity of opinion exists on that matter. Zen'kovsky, it Should 
be noted, did not consider the Decembrists' philosophical views in his 
history, and doubtless they were beneath his gaze. But although it 
would be difficult to press the inclusion of such views upon a historian 
who was discriminating about intrinsic philosophical value, when however 
it comes to the question of the general historical significance of 
materialism and atheism, their importance seems to me self-evident 
from the simple fact of the numbing numbers of world's population now
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living under the ideological hegemony of dialectical and historical 
materialism. From this fact alone, there is, I believe, though the 
proponents of both world-views might not thank me for saying so, a 
logical case for equating in terms of their historical significance, 
the origins of both materialism and Christianity. In response to 
Zen'kovsky's reference to Neo-Marxist atheism as a superficial 
product of "fanatical ideocracy", it would of course be ludicrous to 
blind oneself to the obvious coercion and propaganda which has attended 
the dissemination of Marxism-Leninism in the socialist republics and 
people's democracies; national religions, it cannot be denied, have 
been deposed by revolutions, but it would be one-sided not to recognise 
that the eventual success of those revolutions offers more evidence of 
popular support for materialism and atheism than can be said for 
Christianity in, for example, the conversions of the Roman Emperor 
Constantine or of Vladimir, Prince of Kiev.
I have already referred to the purpose of Parts Two and Three of 
this study; the aim of Part One is briefly to discuss certain 
characteristics of what I have termed 'classical* Russian materialism, 
particularly the development of a certain kind of materialism during 
the l840s out of German idealism, and also some related features of 
Leninist materialism. I hope that this Part is of some value in itself, 
though it may also help to throw some light on the presuppositions of 
research on the materialist tradition conducted in the Soviet Union. 
Needless to say, this Part is far from comprehensive, and it would take 
at least a further study of this length to do anything like full justice 
to the views sandwiched by the Decembrist rebellion and the October
Revolution.
Finally, some mention should be made of problems of definition. 
Firstly, I have followed the Soviet practice of grouping together
12
materialistic and atheistic ideas, although there is less justification 
in my case than for a scholar committed to the view that the history of 
philosophy is the history of the struggle of two opposing camps, 
materialism and idealism. According to this view, materialism entails 
atheism, and any rejection of God which did not embrace a materialistic 
world-view, would be reducible to such a view when stripped of its 
inconsistencies. My own belief is that atheism, by which I understand a 
commitment to the non-existence of a powerful supernatural being, as 
opposed to agnosticism, or scepticism with regard to the knowability of 
its existence, can logically co-exist with metaphysical beliefs other 
than materialism! indeed, there need be no other metaphysical stance of 
any kind, if, for instance, the non-existence of God were deduced a priori 
in the same way that His existence has been deduced in the past. There 
are inevitably in these matters of definition borderline cases; one of 
the most obvious with respect to this study is the status of certain 
highly influential systems of objective idealism, such as those of 
Schelling and Hegel, which in their different ways regard the natural 
world as a kind of concrete realisation of an ultimate spiritual reality. 
Whether or not this is atheistic, depends upon the breadth with which 
the deity is defined. This brings to mind the possible status of 
pantheism as a borderline case weakening the link of entailment from 
materialism to atheism: perhaps the opposition of matter and spirit can 
be overcome by supposing nature to be a deity, or even by investing the 
ultimate particles of matter with divine qualities. It is however always 
as well to remember that whatever else borderline cases prove, they prove 
that clear-cut cases exist, and it is these cases which I have chosen to 
lump together under the materialist tradition, a necessary element of 
which is some kind of hostility towards religion and idealism. This is 
no doubt an inexact procedure, but it seems to work at any rate as far as
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the Decembrists are concerned, where in any case the kind of atheism 
and materialism to which they were attracted did not infringe upon the 
problematic borderline areas.
A related problem concerns the extent to which one should as a 
historian of ideas impose one's own definitions upon the thoughts of 
historical figures. For example, if a person regarded himself as an 
atheist or a materialist, this would seem sufficient to guarantee the 
relevance of his ideas to a history of atheism and materialism; on the 
other hand, if the historian had arrived at an explanation for the 
incidence of views which held that everything was either material or 
dependent upon material reality, then it would scarcely make sense to 
include a self-confessed 'materialist' who meant by that nothing other 
than sensory experience is a precondition of all knowledge. I have in 
mind here the tendency not only of Marxist-Leninist scholars, but also 
of earlier thinkers, such as Herzen, to use materialism to cover 
empiricist theories of knowledge."!! There is a problem here for the 
historian to decide whether to disregard this usage as having no bearing 
on his own study, or whether to criticise it if he feels that two con­
flicting connotations are being loaded on to the term. Another problem 
consists in the tendency of defenders of Orthodoxy to be rather indis­
criminate in their applications of "materialism" and "atheism", to the 
extent that they come to signify anything heterodox with respect to 
that confession; clearly this kind of declamation has to be regarded 
with suspicion as evidence for the views it imputes. But even in saying 
that, one is implicitly appealing to connotations of the terms apparently 
other than those inherent in the usage of the defenders of Orthodoxy. 
Rather than allow these difficulties to confound the entire exercise,
I have proceeded in a somewhat pragmatic way; this has involved the 
appeal to the definitions of Leninist philosophical materialism where the
14
validity of the 'materialist tradition' is being discussed; and where 
as is usually the case, a potential 'materialist' has chosen not to 
advertise himself in such terms, I have had to ask of his views whether 
in any broad sense they would happily cohabit with the proposition that 
all reality is in an ultimate sense material. If this were not the case, 
it would seem that materialism is scarcely worth the name. The final 
point I wish to make in relation to definitions is that I have been 
concerned with the historical significance of purely ontological beliefs, 
beliefs about the ultimate nature of reality or being, and not with any 
of their supposed extensions to uncover the basic mechanisms of social 
relations, or the dynamics of historical development. This is perhaps 
an artificial distinction, since a world-view should embrace all the 
phenomena in the world. It does, however, have the merit of helping to 
keep this study within limits, and is also, I believe, justified when it 
comes to a closer consideration of, for example, 'historical materialism!, 
which although it is undoubtedly compatible with materialist metaphysics, 
has in itself no bearing upon the problems of the existence of God or 
the human spirit, or of the ultimate constituents of reality or human 
experience. Exactly the same logical gulf exists between metaphysics 
and those implicit or explicit theories of historical causation dubbed 
•idealist' by Marxist-Leninist theoreticians; to say for example that 
historical progress is promoted by 'enlightenment' or hindered by 
'ignorance', is not necessarily to regard them as immaterial, hypostatised 
agencies.
15-
PART ONE : CLASSICAL RUSSIAN MATERIALISM
The title of this Part has been selected faute de mieux, not only 
because the epithet 'classical' has been well nigh sucked dry of meaning 
in the variety of its applications and its antonyms, but also because it 
engenders the possibility of a confusion with 'classical' Marxism, which 
forms only a later part of the kind of thought which I wish to denote. 
However, the description is more than an arbitrary way of slicing up 
Russian materialist thought. It does, admittedly, have advantages as 
far as this particular work is concerned, in that it forms boundaries 
between on the one hand the so-called 'materialist tradition' extending 
from Lomonosov, through Radishchev and his followers to the Decembrists, 
the existence of which, as I claim in Parts Two and Three, is based in 
part on tendentious arguments; and on the other the jockeying between 
ontological materialism and Hegelian dialectics characteristic of the 
development of Soviet philosophy, which falls outside the scopte of this 
undertaking. For the purposes of this chapter, classical Russian 
materialism is understood to be that class of ideas, other than modern 
Soviet materialism, which was first articulated from the early 1840s, 
and which differs from earlier ideas formed in the eighteenth century 
and during the reign of Alexander I in being undeniably and self­
consciously materialistic. Moreover, the relationship between materialist 
and atheist convictions on the one hand, and radical political views on 
the other, is as clear as it is strong from the 1840s onwards, and I have 
in consequence foreborne from giving the amount of consideration to each 
thinker's political ideas, and to the historical context in which their 
philosophical thought developed, than will be the case to a lesser extent 
in the chapter on the eighteenth century, and to a greater extent in the 
chapter primarily devoted to Decembrism, where the existence of such a 
relationship is in my view more contentious. This is not to say that the 
attempt to ground Decembrist thinking in its political, economic and 
social environment could not with profit be applied to the ideas which
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form the subject of this chapter; this would indeed be my preferred 
method in attempting fully to understand the source and impact of any 
set of ideas and attitudes. To apply the approach to be used in 
Part Three to the span of thoughtwhich is the subject of this chapter 
would, though, expand this work to an extent insufferable to both author 
and reader. In any case, it does not necessarily follow from a commit­
ment to what might be called an 'externalist' interpretation of the 
origin and significance of kinds of thinking, that nothing is to be 
gained from an investigation of the affinities and characteristics of 
sets of ideas conducted rather more independently of the historical 
environment of those ideas than that commitment would seem to demand, 
provided that, for example, any affinities detected between one person's 
intellectual artefacts and those of a; predecessor are not presented in 
such a way that »the latter appears as a complete explanation of the 
former. The critical, or simply descriptive treatment of ideas largely 
in isolation from history may indeed be of value in itself, though it 
could also be argued that any conclusions or generalisations arrived at 
in the process might furnish some material for a grander kind of 
speculation about the relationship between history and ideas across the 
sweep of Russian history, than any I have dared to venture.
That act of faith having been committed, it must at the outset be 
recognised that great care would be needed to prevent an account of the 
development of materialist thought in Russia during the 1840s from 
appearing as an exercise in genealogical intellectual history, by which 
I mean that approach to ideas which would interpret or analyse them in 
terms of their affinities with preceding ideas. This might not on the 
face of it seem a likely model to account for vthe replacement, sometimes 
within the development of one and the same individual, of a transcendental 
world-view by its apparent antithesis, materialism, unless that model 
were, in the way that popular estimations of offspring in terms of parental
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components often are, sufficiently flexible to accept either similarity 
or dissimilarity equally as grist to the explanatory mill (the similarity 
needing no further comment, the dissimilarity being explained in terms of 
a 'reaction' induced by that against which the reaction occurs). My 
own belief is that such flexibility flourishes in the absence of sound 
explanation, a necessary characteristic of which is that it should not 
be able to account for both one set of characteristics and that set's 
antithesis. To be more specific, I should be surprised if purely 
intellectual inputs could throw much light on that which induced 
V. G. Belinsky to adopt socialism and materialism instead of German 
idealism, and to retain those convictions, arguably for the remainder of 
his life, whereas a succession of idealist skins were sloughed off during 
the 1830s. It is doubtful, moreover whether a purely ’internalist' 
explanation could convincingly be given of the period of ideological 
upheavel in which Belinsky was successively induced by Hegelianism to 
accept reality, and then induced by reality to reject Hegelianism. It 
could, however, be argued that the reason why Belinsky was forced to 
reject Hegel was that he never properly understood his works in the 
first place (which would not be surprising, since he did not read German, 
and acquired most of his intellectual stock-in-trade second-hand); had 
he done so, he might never have undergone the 'reconciliation with 
reality' which ultimately revolted him, and might like M. A. Bakunin 
have arrived at radicalism and atheism within a Hegelian framework, by 
subjecting the master's conclusions to the rigour of his own dialectical-' 
logic. Bakunin was such an ardent disciple of Hegel that he departed for 
Berlin in 1840 to attend lectures by Hegelian professors at the University; 
but he also met Young Hegelians, such as Arnold Ruge and Herwegh, who 
undoubtedly opened his eyes to the possible radical implications of 
Hegelianism, and must have constituted a strong influence in his own turn 
to radicalism. It is, however, insufficient to attribute the appeal of 
the negative implications of the Hegelian dialectic to chance acquaintances,
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or to the internal logic of the Hegelian system as a whole, even though 
this sought to explain the development of intellectual history, and 
might even be capable of providing an explanation for its own demise. 
The fact is that Right-Wing Hegelians existed, both in Germany and in 
Russia, and Bakunin was at first in agreement with them. Therefore 
some other factors should be included in any explanation of the remark­
able effect of the radical wing of the inheritors of the Hegelian 
legacy upon this formerly apolitical Russian.
But even if it is accepted that the pairing of materialism and 
socialism in the 1840s within the Russian radical intelligentsia cannot 
be accounted for solely in terms of the internal history of Hegelianism, 
it is difficult to see how the origins of this phenomenon can be 
described in isolation from the philosophical debates of the Moscow 
student circles (kruzhki) during the 'remarkable decade', as Annenkov 
described it. During the 1830s and early 1840s, abstract philosophical 
discussions occupied the minds of educated young Russians to an extent 
and with an intensity probably unparalleled at any other time or in any 
other place in modern European history. There is no simple explanation 
for this. In general terms, a preoccupation with abstractions was both 
necessary in view of the attentions of Benckendorff's Third Section, 
and understandable on the heels of the Decembrist debacle. The German 
idealist philosophy in vogue contained diverse elements, pointing to a 
variety of interpretations of its appeal, all of which may be valid.
On one level, the metaphysics of Schelling or Hegel were received by 
many, including Belinsky and Bakunin, as a kind of secular pantheistic 
religion which provided an intellectually more satisfying alternative to 
the Christianity of the Russian Orthodox Church. On another level, 
growing national self-consciousness amongst the Westernised nobility 
found its expression in an pbsession with questions of narodnost' or
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nationality, and in particular with the existence of an independent 
Russian literature. This goes some way to accounting for the attraction 
of Herder's theory of nationality, whereby each nation is regarded as 
a distinct, organic manifestation of universal humanity, but with its 
own peculiar characteristics, and also for the Schellingian vogue of 
the l820s and early 1830s. Schelling's Naturphilosophie, in particular 
its concern with the problem of the relation of the individual ego to 
the world of nature, and its accordance of prime position to the process 
of artistic creation as the means to reconcile the two, could provide a 
rationale for the existence of politically neutered intellectuals 
alienated from Russian reality.
It is tempting to dismiss the mania for German transcendentalism 
as sheer escapism, reaching its apogee in the infatuation of Bakunin 
and his then disciple Belinsky for Fichte's subjective idealism in 1836.
This rests partly on an unsympathetic interpretation of Fichte as a 
solipsist, a misapprehension based on a failure to recognise his 
distinction between the individual ego and the Absolute Ego, or God.
For Bakunin and Belinsky, the doctrine that the Ich initially posits, or 
creates the nicht-Ich or the external world, did not so much deny the 
reality of an uncongenial world as afford to man a kind of ultimate 
metaphysical control over it. However, there is undoubtedly in all this 
a good deal of consolatio philosophiae and a powerful otherwordly 
impulse, which for Bakunin and Belinsky were equally satisfied in the 
subsequent craze for Hegelian absolutist metaphysics. But although 
Fichte, Schelling and Hegel can all be seen as developing the transcendental 
elements of Kantianism,Hegel's works were remarkable in that they provided 
from about 1837 onwards in Russia the intellectual framework for succes­
sive and antithetical periods of 'reconciliation with reality', and 
rejection of the existing order. As was mentioned above, for Belinsky,
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the student critic of serfdom,his own •reconciliation' took on such a 
conservative character (to the extent that in 1839 he could see a 
profound mystical meaning in the very word Tsar, and preached "uncon­
ditional submission to Tsarist authority") that in his subsequent 
cathartic rejection of it, he repudiated Hegel in toto:
"Most humble thanks, Egor Fedorovich (Hegel), I bow before your 
philosophic nightcap, but... I must respectfully assure you that if I 
should succeed in climbing to the topmost step of the developmental 
stairs I would demand, even there, that you account for all the victims 
of the conditions of life and of history, all the victims of misfortune, 
of superstition, of the Inquisition of Philip II, and so on - and in 
default, would hurl myself headlong from the topmost step. " 1
As was also mentioned above, Bakunin too experienced a 'reconcili­
ation', but with a more consistently Hegelian reality, that is a reality 
other than the world of sense-experience, an absolute Mind or Being 
towards which all individual minds are developing in the course of 
history. The reconciliation, then was between the subjective ego and 
objective reality, which at that time Bakunin equated with God. It 
was the first leader of the student kruzhok which Bakunin eventually 
dominated, N. V. Stankevich, who pointed out that Belinsky's error was 
to confuse actuality, or the reality of immediacy and accident, with 
the reality which is the essence of the Absolute. 2
We have seen that by his emigration, Bakunin became a part of the 
process whereby Hegelian philosophy took on radical form after the death 
of its perpetrator in 1831, a process which viewed in isolation could 
be seen as an extension of the dialectical dynamics of the system 
itself. The postulate that each concept contains its own contradiction 
which is reconciled in a higher synthetic concept, itself involving a 
contradiction until the Absolute (i.e. 'real' or non-contradictory) Idea
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is reached, was applied by Hegel in the spheres of morality, religion,
history, politics and art. Hegel, however, believe^ at any rate in
his later years, that the Absolute Spirit had attained its ultimate
concrete manifestation in philosophical idealism, Christianity,
monarchy and bourgeois culture. To put it simply, the left-wing
Hegelians saw no reason to halt the process at this stage in the
development of European civilisation, and much of the justification of
their standpoint found its expression in Germany in Arnold Ruge's
series of philosophical journals in the late 1830s and the 1840s. It
was in Ruge's Saxon journal Deutsche Jahrbucher that Bakunin's article
"Reaction in Germany" appeared under the pseudonym Jules Elysard.
Bakunin's closing dictum, "The passion for destruction is also a
3creative passion", which would be the motto of Prince Kropotkin's 
anarchist circle at the end of the century, was an exaltation of 
Hegelian legation, i.e. of the critical moment in the dialectic.
There is, however, none of the Hegelian reconciliation, of opposites: the 
negative is supreme, and must completely obliterate -the positive. In 
its socio-political application, this principle manifests itself in 
the anticipation of a revolution which will sweep away all vestiges of 
the old order. Thus we have a second 'reconciliation with reality' in 
the sense that Bakunin now understood better what 'reality' meant in 
Hegelian terms: the present, and the existing order, is real to the 
extent that it represents a stage towards the self-realization of the 
Absolute, but the same can be said of its negation, or its destruction. 
Belinsky recognised that the existence of the executioner was real, 
but none the less repulsive, Bakunin substituted for Belinsky's moral 
rejection a philosophical inversion of Hegel. The Absolute Idea was 
replaced by 'absolute negation'. Contradiction "survives to the end,
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and the energy of its all-pervading vitality consists in the ceaseless
self-incineration of the positive m  the pure flame of the negative".
The fact that the materialism of the 1840s was an inversion of 
idealism rather than a stark repudiation of it is, I believe, instruct­
ive not only for that period, but also for the remainder of the pre­
revolutionary era, since the materialism of Chernyshevsky, Plekhanov 
and Lenin owes much to Hegelianism, albeit mediately by way of Feuerbach 
and Marx. Even A. I. Herzen, to whom Belinsky and Bakunin gravitated 
after their transition to a philosophy of action, and whose radical 
sympathies, by his own account, went back at last as far as an adolescent 
oath, taken with N. P. Ogarev on the Sparrow Hills outside Moscow, to
5continue the Decembrists' struggle, felt duty bound to pick his way 
through the Hegelian labyrinth. Herzen as a student at Moscow 
University had distanced himself from N.’ V. Stankevich's idealist 
philosophical circle, in which Belinsky and Bakunin acquired their 
taste for Teutonic transcendentalism, and his early affinity for the 
precursors of French socialism, particularly Saint-Simon, had run foul 
of Count Benckendorff's Third Section in 1834, when on the slightest of 
evidence,^ he and five fellow students were exiled. On his return to 
Moscow in 1839» he was accused of being behind the times, and although 
in his memoirs he painted a well-known ironical picture of the young 
Muscovite Hegelian going for a walk in the Sokolniky park in order to
7give himself up to a pantheistic feeling of his unity with the. cosmos,
8he nevertheless dutifully ploughed through the Berlin professor's works.
Indeed, elsewhere in his memoirs he wrote that no-one who had not vitally
experienced Hegel's Phenomenology or Proudhon's Contradictions of Political
qEconomy could be regarded as a complete, or contemporary, human being.
This is in no way incompatible with his radical political attitudes, 
because he perceived in the Hegelian dialectic the "algebra of revolution",
4
23
in the same way as Bakunin, whose article 'Reaction in Germany' he
read and described in his diary as "perfect from beginning to end" . 10 
Herzen presented his conclusions from his study of Hegel, and then of
Feuerbach, in two philosophical articles, 'Dilettantism in Science'
(1843) and 'Letters on the Study of Nature' (1845-6), both published
in the journal Notes of the Fatherland. In the first article, Hegel's
influence is clear:
"JfScienceJ itself is a process of nature's self-concentration and
the development of the full self-cognition of the cosmos} by this means
the Universe comes to consciousness after the struggles of material
11being, life, steeped in the immediate".
But Herzen criticised Hegel, who, unlike Hume, lacked "the heroism of 
consistency", the courage to accept the full logical implications of 
his own ideas. He achieved the reconciliation of thought and being in 
philosophy, but what was now needed was the reconciliation of philosophy 
and action:
"It is only in the rational, morally free and passionately energetic
action that man arrives at the actuality of his personality and immortalises
himself in the phenomenal world. In such action, man is eternal in the
transient, infinite in the finite, a representative of both his genus
12and himself, a living and conscious organ of his epoch".
This 'philosophy of action' owes much to Ruge, and also the Polish 
thinker Count Cieszkowski, and Herzen became acquainted with it through 
correspondence with Ogarev, who studied in Germany from l84l to 1846.
The 'action', for most, consisted in political theory, notably of French 
origins (Saint-Simon, Fourier and his disciple Victor Considérant,
Louis Blanc, P. J. Proudhon, and Etienne Cabet); the transition to 
socialism was accompanied by materialism and atheism, though the 
coincidence of these views was not, I believe, axiomatic. The historical
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foundation of this phenomenon would need thorough and separate con­
sideration, though in my opinion much can be learnt from the policies which 
began to mature at the very end of Alexander I's reign (to be discussed 
in Part Three), and which were consolidated, not to say ossified, in 
the thirty-year reign of his younger brother. As for the intellectual 
peculiarities of these metaphysical bedfellows of radicalism, peculiar­
ities with which any historical analysis would have to come to grips, 
some light can be thrown upon them by a consideration of the pervasive, 
though by no means exclusive, influence of the 'anthropological 
materialism' of Ludwig Feuerbach. The indirect influence of Feuerbach 
on the Russian Marxist circles of the 1880s onwards would scarcely need 
to be pressed upon cognoscenti of the development of Marx's thought, 
but there is in addition hardly any broad category of oppositional 
political thought from the 1840s until the appearance of the first 
Marxist groups which does not owe a debt of some kind to Feuerbach. It 
is not so much the fact itself, but what it signifies, which might prove 
instructive across the sweep of Russian materialist and atheist thought; 
suffice it to say at this juncture that the works of Feuerbach, notably 
The Essence of Christianity, appealed to differing extents to a variety 
of Russian radical theorists; Belinsky, Herzen and Bakunin;
M. V. Butasevich-Petrashevsky, N. A. Speshnev and F. G. Tol' of the 
petrashevtsy, the Fourierist group numbering the youthful Dostoevsky 
amongst its members, and which was exiled in thb wake of 1848 revol­
utions elsewhere in Europe; N. G. Chernyshevsky, N. A. Dobrolyubov and 
M. A. Antonovich, the radical journalists of the 1860s; and even if the 
mention of Herzen, Bakunin and Chernyshevsky were not in itself enough 
to connect Feuerbach's name with the narodniki of the 1870s and 80s, 
one of the foremost spokesmen of narodnichestvo, P. L. Lavrov, was at 
least sympathetically disposed towards Feuerbach. But not only can the
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Young Hegelian's philosophical participation in the history of -the
Russian intelligentsia be extended, at a pinch, beyond his death in
1872, but it can also be traced back beyond the three men of the 1840s
so far discussed to N. V. Stankevich, the transcendentalist mentor of
Bakunin and Belinsky, and the most immaterial of men, if we accept the
13admittedly questionable hagiography of later intelligenty. I am 
referring here to some brief references to Feuerbach in Stankevich's 
correspondence to Bakunin after his departure for Germany three years 
before his premature death in 1840. He likened Feuerbach to the old 
Schelling without Fantasterei, and alluded to his deep respect for Hegel, 
but the Russian was unconvinced;
"He has a mighty nature, there is something full and whole in his
essence, but this fire, this force has sometimes led him too far, so that
l4he is inconsistent".
15Despite some of the more extreme Soviet interpretations, this is 
hardly grounds to see Stankevich as an imminent materialist. From the 
fact, however, that Feuerbach's thought held some kind of appeal for 
men as remote both from each other and from materialism and atheism as 
the idealist Stankevich, and the Neokantian critic of materialist and 
other metaphysical systems, Lavrov, at least two inferences may be drawn. 
The first is that this phenomenon suggests the inadequacy, though it does 
not provide in itself a refutation, of the notion that Russian thought 
can be analysed in terms of intellectual influences from abroad. The 
second, and this is apparent from the extract from Stankevich's corres­
pondence, is that Feuerbach's own standing as a materialist and atheist 
is not at all clear, atleast so far as his position at the time of the 
writing of The Essence of Christianity, his most famous and influential 
work in Russia, is concerned. The fact that Feuerbach were not a 
materialist at that stage would not necessarily diminish his importance 
in the history of materialism; Feuerbach started as a Hegelian, and his
26
inversion of Hegel may be seen as an important determinant in the eventual 
acceptance of materialism and atheism by the erstwhile Russian Hegelians 
already mentioned. He could, in other words, be seen as the midwife of 
both Russian idealist-parented materialism, and, to stretch the metaphor 
even further, of his own later 'medical* materialism. If, however, as 
I wish to argue, the 'materialism', such as it was, inherent in his 
earlier position, held more appeal for the radical intelligentsia, than 
the also fashionable 'scientific materialism' of Buchner, Vogt and 
Moleschott from the 1850s onwards, then some of the problems of definition 
referred to in the Introduction might raise their heads, and the way be 
opened for a swashbuckling polemicist armed with a stringent definition 
of materialism^ to explode the entire Russian materialist tradition, 
rather than abbreviate it, as I shall seek to do. These questions can 
hardly be clarified without a closer look at Feuerbach's thought.
It would be impossible within the limitations imposed upon this 
Part to convey the complexity of the cycle of intellectual history 
represented by Kant's reaction to Hume's empiricism, the elaboration of 
the noumenal world of Kantian criticism by Fichte, Schelling and Hegel, 
and the return to empiricism by the Young Hegelian Feuerbach; this is a 
loss, since without this context, the reason why the German philosophers 
set themselves the questions that they did is likely to be as mystifying 
as the answers which they provided. It will nevertheless have to suffice 
to say that Feuerbach first came to prominence in that turn of the wheel 
which saw some of the Hegelians exchange their idealist interpretation 
of the metaphysical implications of Hegel's dialectic for materialism or 
atheism. He made one of the earliest contributions to the debate over 
the compatibility of Hegel's works with Christianity, and in particular, 
beliefs in a personal God and personal immortality: in 1830 his anonymous 
Thoughts on Death and Immortality rejected these Christian beliefs as 
egoistic and individualistic, and therefore incompatible with the 
universality of the Absolute Spirit. The fact that the explanation of
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religion remained the central aim and core of his philosophy, at the 
expense, despite his liberal leanings, of any contribution to political 
thought, may constitute an important factor in the rapid waning of his 
star in Germany after the failure of the 1848 revolutions, though it is 
worth keeping in mind that it may also have contributed to his relatively 
more prolonged appeal to the Russian radicals, for whom the rejection of 
absolutism almost inevitably involved a critique of the Orthodox Church. 
That appeal resided in more than the presentation of Hegel's philosophy 
of religion in a pantheistic or atheistic light, in which Feuerbach's 
Essence of Christianity was preceded by the work of his contemporaries 
D. F. Strauss and Bruno Bauer. Feuerbach, for what it is worth, liked 
to deflect charges of atheism by saying that the question of the exist­
ence or non-existence of God is nothing but the question of the existence 
or non-existence of man, once the language of religion has been trans-
17lated out of "the Oriental language of imagery into plain speech".
There is no doubt, though, that the consistent Russian disciple of
Feuerbach must be accredited an atheist in the senses in which that term
is normally used; the question remains as to whether an adherent of this
'religion of man' is as such a materialist. It should be remembered that
a distinction has already been made between this kind of world-view, and
the scientific materialism of Buchner, Vogt and Jakob Moleschott.
There is no doubting Feuerbach's materialism at one stage of his
intellectual career in the second sense, for, as is well known, Moleschott
attended Feuerbach's series of public lectures on the essence of religion
given at Heidelburg from December 1848 to March 1849, and the latter,
having befriended the physiologist, was won over to his views. In a
review of Moleschott.'s The Science of Foodstuffs published in I85O
(a review, incidentally, whose notoriety and vulgarity have incensed
many a historian), Feuerbach's aphoristic flair finally secured him that
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kind of immortality, however dubious, which he was prepared to admit:
•'From this we can see immediately how much ethical and political
significance the science of foodstuffs has for the nation. Food becomes
blood, bliod becomes heart and brain, the stuff of thoughts and attitudes.
Human sustenance is the basis of human education and attitudes. If you
want to improve the people then give it, in place of exhortation against
l8sin, better food. Man is what he eats11.
In case the distinction between Feuerbach's metaphysics and German 
scientific materialism seems unreal thus far, it should be stressed 
that the Russian reader of The Essence of Christianity could hardly have 
inferred from the magnum opus this later gastronomical philosophy.
Indeed, although Feuerbach had already elaborated a critique of the 
presuppositions and method of Hegelian, and all speculative idealist 
philosophy in a number of writings predating The Essence of Christianity, 
the reader might have gained the opposite impression from his opening 
remarks on the essential nature of man, in which he distinguished his 
position from that of the "obtuse materialist" who saw man as an animal 
with consciousness superadded:
"Reason, Will, Love are not powers which man possesses, for he is
nothing without them, he is only what he is by them} they are the
constituent elements of his nature, which he neither has nor makes,
the animating, determining, governing powers - divine, absolute powers -
19to which he can oppose no resistance".
The reader would not have been misled by Feuerbach's emphasis, if he 
had had the advantage of the author's statement of his opposition to 
idealism in the preface to the second edition of 1843s
"I unconditionally repudiate absolute, immaterial, self-sufficing 
speculation, - that speculation which draws its material from within.
I differ toto coelo from those philosophers who pluck out their eyes 
that they may see better; for m£ thought I require the senses, especially 
sight, I found my ideas on materials which can be appropriated only
2 9 .
through the activity of the senses. I do not generate the object from
the thought, but the thought from the object; and I hold that alone to
20be an object which has an existence beyond one's own brain".
Although this passage makes clear one of Feuerbach's eventual objections
to idealism, that it starts by asking how matter can arise out of mind
or spirit (whereas the converse should be the first question), it offers
no entailment in terms of a materialist monism, but rather opposes
empiricism to rationalism as a means to knowledge. Nevertheless, he
soon went on to explain that in rejecting the omnia mea mecum porto of
speculative philosophy, he was attaching himself to the direct opposite
of the Hegelian philosophy, "to realism, to materialism in the sense
above indicated". This sense can be none other than that contained in
the quoted passage, and yet it is clear that Feuerbach's opposition to
Hegel was just as much ontological as epistemological, and that the
unique claim which he made for his 'philosophy of the future' lay in
its choice of ultimate metaphysical principle:
"This philosophy has for its principle, not the substance of
Spinoza, not the ego of Kant and Fichte, not the Absolute Identity of
Schelling, not the Absolute Mind of Hegel, in short, no abstract, merely
conceptional being, but a real being, the true Ens realissimum - man;
its principle, therefore, is in the highest degree positive and real.
It generates thought from the opposite of thought, from Matter, from
existence, from the senses, it has relation to its object first through
21the senses, i.e. passively, before defining it in thought".
But even though in his critiques of speculative philosophy and religion, 
Feuerbach demolished all Mankind's metaphysical usurpers and dismissed 
them as projections, objectifications or hypostatisations of human 
attributes, the nature of the anthropological Absolute thus far remains 
unclear, and the nature of its metaphysical realm could logically be
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dualist, as well as materialist. It shortly becomes evident that man 
is not totally subject to the laws of matter, in Feuerbach's discussion 
of the human understanding, which, he explained, was the ens realissimum 
of the old 'onto-theology', and by which alone, man is free and 
independent :
" To be without understanding is, in one word, to exist for another, - 
to be an object: to have understanding is to exist for oneself, - to be 
a subject. But that which no longer exists for another, but for itself, 
rejects all dependence on another being. It is true we, as physical 
beings, depend on the beings external to us, even as to the modifications 
of thoughti but in so far as we think, in the activity of the under­
standing as such, we are dependent on no other being. Activity of 
thought is spontaneous activity... The understanding alone enjoys 
things without itself being enjoyed; it is the self-enjoying, self- 
sufficing existence - the absolute subject - the subject which cannot 
be reduced to the object of another being, because it makes all things
objects, predicates of itself, - which comprehends all things in itself,
22because it itself is not a thing, because it is free from all things". 
Although Feuerbach contrasts the independence of the understanding with
the interdependence of physical life, it seems from the context that he
is at least as anxious to stress the exclusivity of thought as a
predicate of an individual subject, and consequently not of a superhuman
23entity. It should also be noted that in a footnote, Feuerbach 
explained that in applying such expressions as "self-subsistent essence" 
to the understanding, he was not using them in his own sense, but showing 
from the standpoint of onto-theology how metaphysics was resolvable 
into psychology. It would be very od<J, though, if in the light of this 
small note, we should discount all of what Feuerbach expounded at some 
length on the nature of the human understanding.
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The implication in Feuerbach's interpretation of the God of 
metaphysical theology that there are elements in man distinct from the 
material or physical was reinforced when he explicated the anthropological 
essence of the Christian God:
"Love is God himself, and apart from it there is no God. Love
makes man God and God man. Love strengthens the weak and weakens the
strong, idealises matter and materialises spirit. Love is the true unity
of God and man, of spirit and nature. In love common nature is spirit,
and the pre-eminent spirit is nature. Love is to deny spirit from the
point of view of spirit, to deny matter from the point of view of matter.
24Love is materialism; immaterial love is a chimaera".
Love must have "flesh and blood" for Feuerbach, but that is not to say 
that man is flesh and blood alone; evidently, by 'materialism' something 
more is meant. The difficulty of reading Feuerbach literally can readily 
be appreciated when in his explication of the human significance of the 
mystery of the Trinity, he appeared to re-state his initial definition of 
the spiritual essence of man:
"God the Father is God the Son Thou. The _I is understanding,the
Thou love. But love with understanding, and understanding with love is
25mind, and mind is the totality of man as such - the total man".
One could still be persuaded on this evidence that Feuerbach regarded the 
spirit of man as his essence, and that it operated independently of 
material or natural causation. Even if this inference were justified, it 
would plainly be inconsistent with many of the work's later judgments.
For example, in rejecting what he took to be an implication of personal 
immortality in the Christian sense, that heavenly existence was entirely 
supernatural and sexless, he opposed the abstraction of mind from body: 
"But just as little as the real man can abstract himself from the 
distinction of sex, so little can he abstract himself from his moral or
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spiritual constitution, which indeed is profoundly connected with his 
natural constitution. Precisely because he lives in the contemplation 
of the whole, he also lives in the consciousness that he is himself no 
more than a part, and that he is what he is only by virtue of the con­
ditions which constitute him a member of the whole, or relative whole. 
Everyone, therefore, justifiably regards his occupation, his profession, 
his art of science, as the highest, for the mind of man is nothing but 
the essential mode of his activity... In brief, the occupations of 
men determine their judgment, their mode of thought, their sentiments...
In general, whatever a man makes the essential aim of his life, he 
proclaims to be his soul; for it is the principle of motion in him".
The reader should, on the basis of these words, discard the immaterial - 
ist interpretation just suggested, though it is not clear that the view now 
accepted of man's spirituality as a function of the whole man's activity 
can be squared with Feuerbach's earlier assertion of the spontaneity of 
the human understanding. We were presented with what seemed the logical 
impossibility of the understanding's being a predicate, and therefore 
of its operations being determined by anything external to it; the author, 
it must be said, at least confronted this paradox, even though he did 
not explicate it:
"Man is what he is through Nature, however much may belong to his 
spontaneity; for even his spontaneity has its foundation in Nature, of 
which his particular character is only an expression. Be thankful to 
Nature' Man cannot be separated from it".^
On the same page, Feuerbach alludes to the reviewer who tears a passage 
from its context that he may hand it over to ridicule, and I may have 
been guilty of the first, without wishing the second, though to talk of 
spontaneity having a natural foundation seems logically akin to
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attributing a cause to the uncaused. The source of Feuerbach's difficulty 
was that to substantiate his idée maîtresse that the God of religion and 
theology was the alienation of mankind from its own essence, he needed 
to tie man to nature to an extent necessary to render impossible the 
independent existence of the hypostatised essence, but also in such a way 
as to chart a course between the Scylla of gross matter and the Charÿbdis 
of pure spirituality: •
"In the first instance, the mind is occupied with the separation 
of the soul from the body, as in the conception of God, the mind is first 
occupied with the separation of the essence from the individual; the 
individual dies a spiritual death, the dead body which remains behind is 
the human individual, the soul which has departed from it is God. But 
the separation of the soul from the body, of the essence from the individual* 
of God from man* must be abolished again* Every separation of beings essen­
tially allied'is painful* The soul yearns after its lost half, after
its body; as God, the departed soul yearns after the real man. As,
therefore, God becomes man again, so the soul returns to its body, and
28the perfect identity of this world and the other is now restored".
The central idea of Feuerbach's 'Materialism' is, then, the unity of body
and soul, but not the materiality of soul, "for as man belongs to the
essence of Nature, - in opposition to common materialism; so Nature belongs
to the essence of man, - in opposition to subjective idealism; which is
also the secret of our 'absolute' philosophy, at least in relation to
Nature. Only by uniting man with Nature can we conquer the super-
29naturalistic egoism of Christianity".
I have preferred to devote some pages to an attempt to understand
the function of Feuerbach's earlier 'materialism', and to the problems
implicit in it, rather than devote the space to sifting the works of each
Russian thinker claimed to have been influenced by him for signs of that
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influence. The latter is easily enough done in a superficial way, 
by establishing a favourable attitude to Feuerbach at some stage of 
the thinker's development, and citing quotations, indicative of 
materialism and atheism, at random from their writings. For example, 
there can be no doubt that the appearance of The Essence of Christianity 
in 1841 takes its place alongside Bakunin's acquaintance with Arnold 
Ruge in opening the eyes of the dutiful Russian student of the orthodox 
Hegelian Werder to the existence of the small circle of heterodox Left 
Hegelians. But although Bakunin could at one stage regard Feuerbach as 
one of the greatest thinkers of his time, he soon left him behind as his 
destructive urge fed upon the new philosophy. Of all the Russian 
intelligenty, Bakunin was sui generis, and for all his voracious appetite 
for ideas, can least of all be quantified in terms of his intellectual 
debts to those with whom he came into contact (though the same cannot be 
said of his financial debts). And yet because in many ways he was the 
most unlikely of materialists, in that he had been the most enthusiastic 
inhabitant of Hegelian spiritual levels and the least avid consumer of 
the world of flesh, his own espousal of materialism is the most exaggerated 
manifestation of its utility for Feuerbach and his Russian followers, and 
of the dualism which lies concealed beneath its monist exterior. Feuerbach's 
avowal of the unity of man's moral and physical constitution was necessary 
to buttress his anthropological version of religion, but he did not, in 
liberating man from theological illusion, wish thereby to enmesh him in 
physical necessity. By emphasising spiritual qualities (love, reason, 
will)i and man's essentially social behaviour in contradistinction to 
animal behaviour, in his attempt to elevate man from what he took to be 
his abasement in religion, Feuerbach threatened the monism which was the 
foundation of his anthropological edifice, and raised all the difficulties 
about the interaction of logically distinct substances which so exercised
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Malebranche and Leibniz in their endeavours to salvage Cartesian 
dualism. Not that such niceties troubled Bakunin; in retrospect, an 
inexorable continuity can be discerned in his successive philosophical 
and political standpoints: starting with a desire to liberate the self 
from the constraints of the material world, he moved on to conspire 
towards the liberation of the Slavs from the Habsburg yoke, until 
finally all mankind was to be delivered from enslavement by divine and 
temporal authority in an orgy of destruction. Matter was Bakunin's 
final metaphysical absolute, and he took full advantage of materialism's 
atheistic implications, while at the same time investing the funda­
mental substance with all the spontaneity, energy and creativity which 
he required for his own creed of revolution and individualism. He no 
more wished himself, and by extension the rest of mankind, to be forced 
to submit to scientific law than to dogma or decree. This is, though, 
to present him as more of a systematist than his writings permit; although 
he was given to outbursts of the most abstract theorising, these were 
generally the evolutions of a volatile substance reacting with historical 
events. It would be possible by the selection of quotations to present 
him either as the most hard-nosed of reductionist materialists or the 
most transported of mystics; this, I believe, is partly the erratic 
manifestation of the inherent dualism to which I have referred, though 
it attests also to the related survival of his formative Fichtean and 
Hegelian romances, and to the devotional character of his own atheism. 
Thus while it would be vain to seek to summate Bakunin's philosophical 
stance in a few apt phrases from his own pen, one can scarcely forebear 
from mentioning his refutation of God's existence, which is nothing if 
not characteristic. Oddly enough, he unwittingly echoed the conclusion 
of the Decembrist Baryatinsky’s poem about God (to be discussed in Part 
Three).
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"For if God is, he is necessarily the eternal, supreme, absolute
Master, and if such a Master exists, man is a slave. Now if he is a
slave, neither justice nor equality nor fraternity nor prosperity is
possible for him. Therefore if God existed, he could be of service to
human liberty in one way only - by ceasing to exist... I reverse
Voltaire's aphorism and say: If God really existed it would be necessary 
30to abolish him".
Bakunin's militant atheism did not assert itself until after his 
decade of imprisonment and exile (1851 - l86l), and it became most 
prominent in his views towards the end of his life, for example, in 
his activities on behalf of "federalism, socialism, and anti-theologism" 
in the League of Peace and Freedom (1867-69), and in his work God and 
the State, composed after his participation in the Lyons disturbances 
of 1871, by which time Feuerbach's ideas had long ceased to be of 
relevance to him. There is a closer affinity between the materialism 
of The Essence of Christianity and the various pronouncements on the 
relationship between mind and matter, and between man and history, made 
by Herzen, an affinity which survives the Russian's evident indebtedness 
to Feuerbach in his afore-mentioned philosophical articles, notably his 
Letters on the Study of Nature. Perhaps more consistently than in 
Bakunin's case, Feuerbach's religion of man served to assert for Herzen 
man's freedom from objective standards, physical laws, universal logic 
or historical necessity. Initially, this was expressed as a rejection 
of one-sidedness, even where in his most Hegelian work, Dilettantism 
in Science, he had yet to resolve the co-existence of his affirmation of 
the value of morally free action with the logical determinism of the 
Absolute Spirit, and could argue that "we may predict the future, because 
we are the premisses on which its syllogism is based, - but only in a 
general abstract way". Nevertheless, though he praised Hegel for
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his achievement in reconciling thought and being in science (i.e. 
philosophy), what was now needed was the reconciliation of science and 
actions
"... thought must be clothed with flesh in order to descend into 
the bustle of life, to reveal itself in all the splendour and beauty of
transient being without which there can be no exciting, passionate and
32fascinating action".
For the time being, Herzen was prepared to accept that moral freedom
lay in the recognition of necessity, and in the Letters on the Study
of Nature was primarily concerned to argue for the unity of thought
and being, mind and nature, and to reject as equally one-sided idealism
on the one hand, and on the other empiricism and materialism, which in
many cases he hardly differentiated, or at any rate saw as extensions
of each other. He rejected Hobbes, Locke (whose epistemology Herzen
characterised by the sensationalist tag nihil est in intellectu guod non
fuerit in sensu, overlooking the fact that ideas of reflection, as well
as sensation, were sources of knowledge for the English empiricist) and
Hume, who according to Herzen had taken materialism to its logical
extreme, and had "compelled materialism to confess the impossibility of
actual thought from its one-sided point of view". At this point in his
development, Herzen rejected "materialism, which understands nothing
but substances and bodies, and, for that very reason, understands neither
substances nor bodies in their real meaning." As for empiricism, he
accepted that experience stimulates consciousness, but not that it
produces it, "because consciousness.is not a tabula rasa but an actus
purus, the activity not external to the object, but on the contrary, its
innermost interior (vnutrenneishaya vnutrennost1), for in general thought
and object constitute not two different objects, but two moments of
33something whole".
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Herzen's attitude towards materialism at this juncture maybe 
likened to Feuerbach's middle course between "common" or "obtuse 
materialism" and subjective idealism. The appeal of Feuerbach for 
Herzen was, I believe, that the former's philosophy of man both 
satisfied Herzen’s rejection of one-sidedness, and provided a rationale 
for his belief in man's absolute freedom, and his lack of religious 
faith, which are almost the only remnants of his former beliefs to 
survive the disillusionment he underwent during his first-hand 
experience of the 1848 revolutions. Herzen drew away from religion 
during the 1840s, despite a flirtation with the mystical ideas of 
Boehme, Swedenborg and Eckartshausen, introduced to him during his 
exile at Vyatka in the l830s by the artist and architect A. L. Vitberg. 
Herzen played this episode down in his memoirs: "I was not destined to 
rise into the third heaven, I was born a completely earthly creature".^ 
He traced his rejection of Christianity to the kruzhok of his days at 
Moscow University, when "the religion of death" and of "flagellation 
and mortification from fasting and prayer" gave way to Saint-Simon's 
religion of life and beauty, and "réhabilitation de la chair". Else­
where in his memoirs, he described Christianity as that "complete 
apotheosis of death; contempt for earth, contempt for the body, has no 
other meaning"; he also recounted how in 1846 it was over religious 
convictions that a split occurred between himself and the liberals, 
notably T. N.Granovsky, amongst the ' Westerners ', evidence, it may be 
noted, for a correlation between degrees of political and religious 
heterodoxy which will be put more fully to the test in Parts Two and
35Three. The most vivid statements of Herzen's Feuerbachian materialism, 
beliefs in moral autonomy and historical indeterminacy, and rejection of 
religion and the Church can be found in the collection of essays entitled
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From the Other Shore, written largely during and after the 1848 
revolutions :
"There is no future, it is made up of the totality of a thousand 
conditions, necessary and contingent, and the human will, which 
provide unexpected dramatic denouements and coups de théâtre.».
In history everything is improvisation, everything is will, everything 
is ex tempore... There will be no liberty in the world until every­
thing religious and political is transformed into something human and 
simple, subject to criticism and negation. Mature logic hates 
canonised truths, it demotes them from the ranks of the angels down to 
the people's level, it makes plain truths out of sacred secrets...
In history it seems to man that the will is free to do what it wishes.
All this is the bitter trace of dualism, from which we have long seen 
double and wavered between two optical illusions... Had we not known, 
from the age of five, that history and nature are completely separate, 
we would have no difficulty in understanding that the development of 
nature passes imperceptibly into the development of man; that these are 
two chapters of a single novel, two phases of a single process, very 
far from one another at their perimeters, but extremely close at the 
centre. We would in that case not be surprised to find that a share of 
all that happens is subject to physiology and obscure urges... Could 
you, for example, convince me that the spirit of man is alive after 
death, when it is so easy to realise the absurdity of this division of 
body and spirit?... Everything about us is in flux, everything is 
unsteady... we shall find no haven but within ourselves, in the 
consciousness of our unlimited freedom, of our autocratic independence... 
Of man's dependence on his environment and epoch there is no doubt.
It is all the stronger since half the ties have been fastened behind the
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back of the consciousness, here can be found the physiological link 
against which the mind and the will can rarely fight, here is the 
hereditary element, the thing we have carried with us from birth, 
like the facial features, and which links the last generation with 
the line of its predecessors, here is the morally physiological 
element, upbringing, which instils into man a sense of history and 
his own times, and finally, there is the conscious element... Man's 
moral independence is as irrefutable a fact and reality as his 
dependence on environment, with the only difference that they stand 
in inverse relationship: the greater the consciousness, the greater 
his independence; the lower the consciousness, the closer his link 
with the environment and the more his personality is absorbed by it... 
The morality of all religions is based on obedience, i.e. on voluntary 
slavery, and that is why they have always been more harmful than any 
political system. The latter is marked by violence, the former by 
the corruption of the will... Dualism is Christianity elevated to 
logic, Christianity freed of. tradition and mysticism. Its chief method 
consists of dividing into fictitious opposites that which is in reality 
indivisible, for example, the body and the spirit, in antagonising 
these abstractions and artificially reconciling that which is joined in 
an inseparable whole. Such is the Evangelic myth of God and man 
reconciled by Christ translated into philosophical language... The 
church made its peace with the soldiery as soon as it became the church 
of state; but it has never dared to admit such treachery, it has always
realised how much falsity there is in this union, how much hypocrisy".
Herzen, like Feuerbach, was not immune from the scientific
materialism of the l850s, as can be seen from his Essay of Conversations
with Young People, but although he was on friendly terms with Karl Vogt,
he argued against his kind of reductionist materialism in his corres-
37pondence with his son Sasha. Once Belinsky had passed the apogee of
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his absorption in German idealism, he was reconciled with Herzen, and
paralleled his intellectual development during the 1840s until his
untimely death in 1848. As Herzen recorded, "the news of the revolution
of February found Belinsky still alive, he died taking its glow for the
3 8flush of rising dawn". The young literary critic's repudiation of
Hegel, however emphatic it may have been, was not initially as decisive
as his letter to Botkin suggested, and although, as Annenkov remembered, ^
he was soon introduced to The Essence of Christianity by Herzen and
Ogarev, his idealism continued to emerge in his published articles; it
seems that he became a decided materialist and atheist only during the
last two or three years of his life. This materialism can be inferred
from his 'Review of Russian Literature of 1846', where he equated the
human mind with the "brain's mass, where all mental functions originate,"
and attributed to modern chemistry the capacity to trace the physical
process of moral development in the embryo; "a psychology which is not
based on physiology is as inconsistent as a physiology which ignores
40the existence of anatomy". These sentiments smack more of Vogt than
of Feuerbach in his prime, and there can be no denying the increasing
receptivity of the intelligentsia to scientific materialism, particularly
in the later 1860s. Nevertheless, in Belinsky's case, these phrases
sit rather awkwardly in the very article in which they appear, let
alone against the background of his intellectual development, and in
conjunction with his affirmation of the uniqueness and independence of
man's personality. It should be remembered though that like Herzen and
Bakunin, Belinsky developed an increasingly fervent and moral attachment
to atheism, and could write to Herzen that he saw in the words "God" and
4l"religion" - darkness, gloom, chains and the knout. This negative 
passion sometimes impelled, albeit often briefly, the Russian radicals
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to a fashionable reductionist materialism which appeared incompatible 
with their positive passion for man's free will and revolutionary- 
activity. To satisfy both passions, Feuarbach's materialism was more 
appropriate in that, as Walicki has already pointed out, it performed 
an "ethical function":
"The most essential similarity between the author of The Essence
of Christianity and Herzen and Belinsky lies precisely in the fact that the *42
materialistic solution of 'the basic problem of philosophy' was for all
three of them the ultimate result and not the starting point. The
starting points were: Man, his personality and his moral autonomy in
relation to all alienated deities: the patriarchal personified God as
well as the Hegelian impersonal Spirit... Belinsky and Herzen, while
opposing idealism, tried not to break away from dialectical historicism.
However, they did not reach the point of making materialism 'historical*
nor the dialectics - 'materialistic': they fell back on materialism
(identified with naturalistic materialism) as a storehouse well supplied
with arguments against the hypostatisation of universals, but turned their
42back on it when contemplating sociological and historical matters".
This is a way of saying that neither Herzen nor Belinsky were historical 
materialists, but it does not follow from that that their materialism was 
of no consequence in their attitudes to society and history, for although 
they were not persuaded that social and historical development was 
governed by scientific laws, their materialism nevertheless enjoined 
their own moral protest against their social and political environment.
It seems to me that Walicki did not recognise the idealist element 
in Feuerbach's materialism, and only made the point I am applying to 
the Russian adherents of Feuerbach in the case of Herzen, whose stand­
point he characterises, quite rightly, I believe, with reference to his
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philosophical articles of the 1840s, as a synthesis of Hegel and 
FeMerbach:
"The fusion of materialism with dialectics was to produce a 
philosophical formula for an autonomous rational personality realising 
itself through free and creative action".
Walicki later referred to "a specific distribution of functions" between
idealism and materialism in Herzen’s philosophy: "idealism called for
a rationalisation of acts, materialism, on the other hand, stressed that
personality cannot be reduced to the universality of reason, rationalism
(idealism) within the framework of the ’philosophy of action’, represented
the general; materialism fought for the rights of the individual beingj
idealism was to place the individual in society and history, materialism
was to bring him back into the world of nature and vindicate 'the natural
43immediacy' of human being".
Although Valicki's article contains many valuable insights, I cannot 
make use of these conclusions without altering some the terminology.
In the first quotation, I should change "dialectics" to "idealism", 
and apply the proposition to the metaphysical viewpoint of The Essence 
of Christianity. Otherwise the fusion of materialism with dialectics 
would, as, I think, the quotations from Herzen demonstrate, ultimately 
squeeze the autonomous personality in a vice composed of physical 
necessity and universal logic. This vice, I would also argue, exists 
potentially in Marxism, and it was partially in the same opposition to 
vulgar materialism by means of which Feuerbachian man was exempted from 
causal strangulation, that that philosophy outstripped even Hegel and 
Feuerbach is satisfying the intellectual needs of the Russian radical 
intelligentsia, which found in dialectical and historical materialism 
not only a vindication of their political opposition, but a theory of 
religious and ecclesiastical bankruptcy, and a justification of
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revolutionary activity. I shall touch on this again when we come to 
consider Lenin's Materialism and Empiriocriticism, but to return to the 
second quotation from Walicki, I should change "idealism" for "objective 
idealism", and instead of "materialism", speak of "the idealist element 
in Feuerbach's materialism, or belief in the unity of man", except 
perhaps in the last juxtaposition of materialism and idealism.
44The prolonged appeal of Feuerbach in Russia, and to some extent 
the notable success of Marxism, can,I believe be put down to the peculiar 
nature of the intelligentsia itself, a peculiarity which stems from the 
historical development of the interrelationships of the different 
social estates in pre-revolutionary Russia. More detailed discussion of 
these interrelationships will be deferred until Parts Two and Three, and 
I shall only say here that the peculiarity resides in the development 
of the dvoryanstvo as a service class, with an ethics of service, rather 
than as a landowning class, with a basis of local political powerj the 
nature of Russian agriculture and of the Russian economy as a whole, 
together with the autocracy's role in it, conditions which not only 
defined the special role of the nobility, but also the chronic weakness 
of the Russian middle classes; the tension between the increasing 
inefficiency and obsolescence of servile agriculture and industry (the 
foundations of autocracy) and the difficulties of changing those 
institutions because of the autocracy's suppression of political debate; 
as a consequence of the previous condition, the almost unrelieved 
defensive stance of the autocracy from about the middle of the reign of 
Catherine the Great, which ultimately, towards the end of the reign of 
Alexander I, after a century of secularism, saw the ideological reunion 
of monarchy and church, the Orthodox Church, it must be added, being for 
historical reasons particularly suited to the justification of state
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control. The absence in Imperial Russia of economic interest groups 
opposed to the autocracy, the service ethics of the dvoryanstvo, and 
the censorship of political debate, all contributed to a political 
opposition reared upon philosophy, with a distinctively moral, rather 
than economic, critique of the status quo, and with a distinctively 
economically disinterested class composition. Given therefore, that 
this alienated group of dvoryane and raznochintsy looked to philosophy 
for a justification of moral protest and a weapon against the alliance 
of throne and altar, it becomes easier to see the particular appeal of 
the 'materialism' of The Essence of Christianity. The conclusion is 
at best a surmise, even for the period in which I have attempted to 
describe, on the intellectual level, how the idealists of the 1830s came 
to adopt FeUerbachian materialism, since no historical analysis of the 
kind to be offered in Part Three has been attempted here. As for its 
extension across the entire span of what I have termed "classical 
Russian materialism", including pre-revolutionary Marxism, this is not so 
much a conjecture, as a proposition to be tested against further research. 
In the first place, the premise that Feuerbach's appeal was prolonged 
has not been fully substantiated, and more work would be required on the 
purely ideological plane in connection with the Petrashevsky circle, 
Chernyshevsky, Dobrolyubov and Lavrov. In Chernyshevsky's case, his 
partial debt to Feuerbach is not in doubt, and can easily be seen in 
his most significant philosophical work The Anthropological Principle 
in Philosophy (i860); but for all his adherence to the characteristic 
Feuerbachian belief in the basic unity of the heterogeneous moral and 
material phenomena of man's nature, he came consistently closer to a 
reductionist materialism than Bakunin, Belinsky or Herzen:
"The principle underlying the philosophical view of human life with 
all its phenomena is the idea of the unity of the human organism, an 
idea elaborated by the natural sciences; the observations of physiologists,
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zoologists and physicians have driven away all thoughts of dualism 
in man. Philosophy sees in him what medicine, physiology and chemistry 
see... It is positively known, for example, that all the phenomena of 
the moral world originate from one another and from external circum­
stances in accordance with the law of causality, and on this basis all 
assumptions that there are any phenomena that do not result from 
preceding phenomena and from external circumstances are regarded as
false... The phenomenon that we call will is itself a link in a series
• • 4«;of phenomena and facts joined together by causal connection".
There is little enough support here for the view that Chernyshevsky
took advantage of an implicitly dualistic 'materialism' in order to
salvage free will; rather, he sought to derive his moral prescriptions
from a fairly routine utilitarianism, which held that all men are
46egoists, and all altruistic acts disguised egoism.
There is, I suppose, no logical reason why scientific materialism 
and utilitarianism should not have performed the same dual antitheological 
and ethical function as Feuerbachian materialism, though one wonders 
whether 'man' as conceived by the former would have seemed worth the 
liberating to the Russian radicals. In any case, to present 
Chernyshevsky as representative of the former combination of views, is 
to accept a superficial and one-sided version of his ideas, or at least 
to portray him as far more consistent a thinker than he really was. A 
closer reading of his works reveals a far less "crudely" materialistic 
or deterministic world-view than the above quotations imply; indeed his 
belief in the qualitative difference between mind and body, and the view 
that "quantitative difference passes into qualitative difference"^ could 
be depicted as part of a strand of Russian thought from the Decembrist 
Yakushkin to Lenin. But far more obviously consistent with Feuerbachian 
materialism was Chernyshevsky's younger collaborator on The Contemporary.
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N. A. Dobrolyubov, whose "rational egoism" and dislike of moral systems 
was more in keeping with man's moral autonomy, and whose own materialism 
was clearly differentiated from the 'vulgar' variety, as he wrote in 
his article of 1858, The Organic Development of Man in Connection with 
his Mental and Moral Activities:
"We find ridiculous and pitiful the ignorant pretensions of crude 
materialism which degrades the lofty meaning of the moral side of man 
by attempting to prove that a man's soul consists of some kind of very 
fine matter. The absurdity of such arguments has been proved so long 
ago, and so irrefutably, it so directly contradicts the findings of the 
natural sciences themselves, that at the present time only the most back­
ward and ignorant of men do not despise such materialistic arguments".^ 
There is, in any event, no need to attempt to force the men of the sixties 
into a particular philosophical mould merely to substantiate a rather 
simplistic theory of the intellectual appetite of the Russian intelli­
gentsia in general; there is no intention, at least, in this work, to 
turn a blind eye to the complexity of circumstance which surrounds the 
formation and development of each individual's ideas. Although it may 
be a useful generalisation to observe a tendency amongst Russian radicals 
to opt for the kind of 'person monism' described in this Part, and to 
offer reasons for it, it will scarcely be surprising to find thinkers 
like the positivist Lavrov, whose 'anthropologism* seems not quite to fit 
the bill, or like D. I. Pisarev, who seems to constitute a clear counter—  
example, a consistent manifestation of Chernyshevsky's periodic affirm­
ations of reductionist materialism, determinism and utilitarianism. But 
even in the case of Pisarev, who placed more faith than any in the power 
of the natural sciences (he was one of the first to introduce to the 
Russian reading public Darwin's theory of the origin of species by 
natural selection in his article of 1864 Progress in the Animal and
4 8 .
Vegetable Worlds), who was the leading Russian exponent of the 
reductionist materialism of Karl Vogt, Georg Buchner and Jacob 
Moleschott, rather than Feuerabach's philosophy of man, and could 
aver that "a man thinks only with his brain in the same way as he 
digests food only with his stomach or breathes only with his lungs'1^  - 
even he found room in his "realist" world-view (though whether it was 
realistic is another matter) to affirm man's freedom and independence, 
at any rate in an article of l86l:
"To emancipate one's own personality is not so easy and simple as 
it may appear; we have many intellectual prejudices, much moral timidity, 
which hamper our desiring, thinking and acting freely* we of our own 
free will constrain ourselves by our own influence on our personality; 
in order to escape this influence and live by our own reason and 
pleasure, we need a considerable amount of natural or acquired strength, 
and in order to acquire this strength, we must, perhaps, go through a 
whole course of moral hygiene, which will end not in man's approaching 
the ideal, but in his becoming an individual, obtaining the rational 
right and recognising the blessed necessity of being himself" . '50
The philosophical trappings of narodnichestvo are rather too 
variegated to be described here, though it might be mentioned in passing 
that if it is permissible to talk in general terms of the commitment of 
the radical intelligentsia to an antireligious materialism and a 
revolutionary voluntarism, then it might be argued that within the move­
ment as a whole, the 'nihilists' of the l860s leant most of all towards 
the former, and the 'subjective sociologists' of the 1870s, P. L. Lavrov 
and N. K. Mikhailovsky, leant most of all towards the latter. The 
argument might then run on that a balance more like that struck in 
Feuerbach's philosophy of man was achieved in the philosophical foundation
49
of Marxism-Leninism. Whether the historical conditions briefly outlined 
at the start of this discussion still hold by the l890s, and would 
favour a similar balance, would be the subject of further study: clearly 
the picture is to some extent complicated by rapid industrialisation, the 
decline of the nobility after the emancipation of the serfs, and the 
rise of a large professional intelligentsia. I shall confine myself to 
a brief consideration of Lenin*s major contribution to the philosophical 
basis of Marxism-Leninism, Materialism and Empiriocriticism, both from 
the point of view of any affinities with Feuerbach's philosophy of man, 
and also to throw some light on the preconceptions of Soviet research 
on the Russian "materialist tradition", research which provided some of 
the stimulus for the writing of Parts Two and Three.
Lenin's book was written in 1908, and is something of a theological 
tract, being an orthodox defence of philosophical materialism as expounded 
by "the not unknown collaborator of Marx" Engels, and an intended 
refutation of the attempts by A. A. Bogdanov, V. Bazarov, A. V. Lunacharsky, 
P. S. Yushkevich and others, to replace it with some version of the 
phenomenalist epistemology or empirio-criticism of Ernst Mach and Richard 
Avenarius. Lenin was particularly incensed by the revisionists' heretical 
characterisation of a materialism which combined empiricism and realism 
as being dualist in the Kantian sense, in that it cleaysd sensible 
appearances from unknowable "things-in-themselves". Lenin replied by 
identifying Machist phenomenalism with Berkeleian subjective idealism. 
Without becoming too involved in this particular dispute, we may note 
that the kind of dualism with which the Machists charged materialism 
enabled Kant to reconcile moral autonomy and man's free will with 
scientific necessity, the same function performed by the different kind 
of dualism which, I have argued, exists in FeUerbachian materialism.
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It is, however, the parallel between Lenin's materialism and the latter 
which is of concern here, and despite the lapse between the waning of 
FeUerbach's star and the appearance of Lenin's book, the parallel is by- 
no means far-fetched 5 indeed, Lenin complained that Mach ignored the 
great materialists (Diderot, Feuerbach, Marx and Engels), who dis­
associated themselves from the 'vulgar' materialism of Vogt, Buchner 
51and Moleschctt. Against the Machists' rejection of objects existing 
independently of sensations, Lenin marshalled a number of quotations 
from Feuerbach which convey what for purposes of brevity and distinction 
might as well be called his "refined materialism"; for example:
"Of course, the products of fantasy are also products of nature, 
for the force of fantasy, like all other human forces, is the last 
analysis (zuletzt) both in its basis and in its origin a force of nature, 
but nevertheless, man is a being distinct from the sun, moon and stars, 
from stones, animals and plants, in one word, from all those beings 
(Wesen) which he designates by the general term: Nature, - and, con­
sequently, man's ideas (Bilder) of the sun, moon and stars and all the 
other beings of nature (Naturwesen), although these ideas are products
of nature, are yet other products, distinct from their objects in
. „ 52nature".
Again, having called upon Feuerbach to testify against the Kantian 
•thing in itself', he adduced a quotation from Albrecht Rau, a disciple 
cf Feuerbach, which encapsulates refined materialism:
"For the materialist a distinction between a priori knowledge and 
the 'thing in itself' is quite superfluous: he nowhere breaks continuous 
connections in nature, he does not regard matter and spirit as funda­
mentally different things, but as sides of one and the same thing, and
therefore does not need any special devices in order to bring the spirit
together with objects". 53
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None of this necessarily makes Lenin himself a refined materialist. 
His esteem of Feuerbach could be seen as more of an obligation than 
an affinity, since Marx "was able through Feuerbach to take directly 
the materialist road against idealism"; in any case, his esteem was 
not unqualified, since he repeated Engels*charge of "pusillanimity" 
for Feuerbach's occasional repudiation of materialism in general because 
of the errors of particular schools of materialist thought.^ The 
criticism, however, displays their agreement in rejecting 'vulgar' 
materialism. Feuerbach, as we have seen, in his 'refined' period 
distinguished between the mental and the material, even though they were 
aspects of the indivisible nature of man. Lenin followed Engels in
repudiating the notion that the brain secretes thought in the same way
55as the liver secretes bile ; he later went into Engels' critique in 
more detail, explaining that the fault of Buchner, Vogt and Moleschott 
was that none of them advanced beyond the limitations of eighteenth- 
century French materialism. These limitations, which are met with 
constantly in the literature of the 'materialist tradition', were that 
the views of the old materialists were mechanical (they "applied 
exclusively the standards of mechanics to the processes of chemical 
and organic nature"), metaphysical, meaning "anti-dialectical", and 
idealist in the realm of the social sciences (they did not understand 
historical materialism). Feuerbach himself would presumably stand 
accused of the second and third, and it is in the first that he finds 
agreement with Engels and Lenin. But it does not follow from that that 
Lenin's opposition to vulgar materialism was motivated by a desire to 
preserve man's moral autonomy. At one point, he appeared to approve of
I
Hans Cornelius' charge that materialism destroys freedom of the will, 
moral value and responsibility, and reduces man to an automaton* ^
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though in fact he accepted the theory of freedom by Engels out of 
Hegel:
" 'Freedom does not consist in an imaginary independence from the 
laws of nature, but in the knowledge of these laws, and in the possibi­
lity based on that knowledge of systematically making the laws of nature 
work for particular ends. This is in relation both to the laws of 
external nature and to the laws which govern the bodily and spiritual 
existence of man himself - two classes of laws which we can distinguish 
from each other at most in our ideas but not at all in reality. Freedom 
of the will therefore means nothing but the capacity to take decisions 
with knowledge of the matter... Freedom therefore consists in control 
over ourselves and over external nature, a control based upon knowledge 
of the necessities of nature...'
Engels takes the knowledge and will of man, on the one hand, and 
the necessity of nature, on the other, and instead of giving any 
definitions, simply says that the necessity of nature is primary, and 
the will and consciousness of man secondary. The latter must inevitably 
and necessarily adapt themselves to the former".
One can hardly imagine the mature Herzen, who originally accepted Hegel's 
concept of freedom, making these statements, and yet despite their over­
riding determinism, there is no question of man being reduced to a 
puppet; he is more like the puppeteer who must learn to manoeuvre the 
puppet within his own, and the strings', limitations. There is still 
a remnant of dualism in the concepts of the human will as opposed to 
external nature, and knowledge, decision-making and control as opposed 
to natural necessity. This is perhaps freedom as conceived by the 
conspirator who seeks to understand reality in order to change it, as 
opposed to the publicist who seeks to detach himself from the reality 
which he finds so repugnant.
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Having come this far, it is as well to remember the reservations 
already made about any extension of the earlier theory (of the dual 
function of Feuerbachian materialism in the views of Russian radicals) 
to cover the success of Marxism in Russia, in the absence of a thorough 
examination of historical developments during the periods in which both 
sets of ideas became popular. The same reservations should equally 
be made about the absence of any careful consideration of the political 
views which accompanied the two varieties of materialism; it could, for 
instance, be argued that ’refined' materialism with its emphasis on 
moral autonomy was a natural bedfellow of utopian socialism, which 
prescribed how society ought to be changed; dialectical materialism, 
with its stress on natural necessity, complements scientific socialism, 
which predicts how society will change. The argument is, however, 
easily refuted by pointing to the numerous diversions of opinion over 
the most fitting philosophical basis for Marx's philosophy of history 
(materialism, idealism, Christianity, Kantianism, existentialism, 
phenomenology and so on), and it is still in principle open to speculate 
that the "Machists" notwithstanding, the fusion of dialectics and 
materialism elaborated by Engels, and initially rejected by Lenin, took 
root in Russia not only because of changes in Russian society, but also 
because of certain persistent peculiarities of Russian history by dint 
of which talk of a Russian materialist tradition makes sense. Walicki 
has already pointed out the significance of the fusion of materialism 
and dialectics in Herzen’s world-view, and we know that Herzen found in 
Hegelianism "the algebra of revolution". Zen'kovsky has argued that the 
importance of the dialectic in Marxism-Leninism was that it justified 
the ’leap' (Zusammenbruch) into the dictatorship of the protetariat
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The problem, then, in any attempt to portray Leninist materialism as 
representing a continuity in classical Russian materialism, apart from 
any investigation at the historical level, revolves on the intellectual 
plane around the tension between the human will and natural necessity.
Any attempt to resolve that problem in isolation would in my 
opinion be unreal, and I will pass on to a discussion of those concepts 
and doctrines embodied in Materialism and Empirio-criticism, within 
which Soviet historians of the 'materialist tradition' have operated.
The categories utilised for the critique of pre-Marxist materialism 
have already been mentioned, and what will now be considered are those 
features of Leninist materialism which may have contributed to the 
development of a sixth sense for the detection of materialist leanings 
in pre-revolutionary thought on the part of many Soviet scholars. In 
the first place, it must be kept in mind that Materialism and Empirio- 
criticism was a highly polemical work, not to say one side of a slanging 
match in comparison with the studied politeness of academic circles; 
what we learn of Leninist materialism is what emerges from a prolonged 
joust, much of it aimed against phenomenalist theory of knowledge. 
Consequently, much of Lenin's effort was concentrated upon establishing 
a truly materialist epistemology, an important result of which has been 
the confusion of metaphysical and epistemological views in Soviet 
historiography. Lenin himself led the way in this confusion by defining 
matter in such a way that its content was epistemological rather than 
ontological: for him the truth of philosophical materialism resided not 
so much in what the world is made of, but whether or not it exists beyond 
our consciousness:
"...the basic proposition not only of Marxian materialism but of 
every materialism... is the recognition of real objects outside us, to 
which objects our ideas 'correspond'... Matter is a philosophical
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category which signifies objective reality, which is given to man 
in his sensations, and which is copied, photographed and reflected by 
our sensations, while existing independently of them... Natural 
science leaves no room for doubt that its assertion of the existence 
of the earth before mankind is the truth. This is quite compatible 
with the materialist theory of knowledge: the existence of that which 
is reflected independently of that which reflects (the independence of 
the external world from consciousness) is the basic premiss of 
materialism... To be a materialist means to acknowledge objective 
truth, which is revealed to us by our sense-organs... For the sole 
'property' of matter with whose recognition philosophical materialism 
is bound up is the property of being an objective reality, of existing 
beyond our consciousness... The electron is as inexhaustib1e as the 
atom, nature is infinite, but it infinitely exists, and it is this 
sole categorical, this sole unconditional recognition of its existence 
beyond the consciousness and perception of man that distinguishes 
dialectical materialism from relativist agnosticism and idealism.
The functions of Lenin's definition are clearly brought out in the 
last quotation; not only is materialism distinguished from idealism 
and scepticism, but matter is made impregnable to advances in theoretical 
physics. Lenin cites approvingly Engels' assertion that with each epoch- 
making discovery in the realm of natural science, materialism has to 
change its form, but the fact is that on the basis of the definitions 
given above, provided the objective reality of nature is accepted (a 
fact which in any case is accepted by "every healthy person who has not 
spent some time in a lunatic asylum or studied the science of idealist
philosophers"), then its materiality is not subject to verification, but
x , 61is a tautology.
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This epistemological materialism (or more accurately, empiricist 
theory of knowledge with a realist metaphysical commitment, as in 
Locke’s case) has more than one ramification. In the first place,
Lenin's claim that all A's (materialisms) are B's (imply realism) 
has led to the logical error in Soviet scholarship that any B (affirma­
tion of the objective existence of external nature) is held to imply 
A (materialism). This inference is tacitly validated by the additional 
clauses, not - B (the denial of the existence of nature independently 
of the senses) is C (idealism), and one of Lenin’s (by way of Engels) 
most significant bequests to the historians of the materialist tradition, 
the doctrine that all there really are in the history of philosophy are 
A's (materialism) and C's (idealism):
"In his Ludwig Feuerbach, Engels declares that the fundamental 
philosophical tendencies are materialism and idealism. Materialism 
regards nature as primary, spirit as secondary, it places being first 
and thought second. Idealism believes the converse. This basic 
distinction between the 'two great camps' into which the philosophers 
of the 'various schools' of materialism and idealism are divided 
Engels puts as the corner-stone, and he directly charges with 'confusion' 
those who use the terms idealism and materialism in any other sense... 
Between the one and the other, Engels places the adherents of Hume and 
Kant, who deny the possibility of knowing the world, or at least of
/T  Q
knowing it fully, naming them agnostics11.
Lenin, however, refused to accept 'agnosticism' as an independent 
position, regarding it as concealed idealism, and it is that view which 
has remained a feature of Marxism-Leninism. The 'two great camps' 
represent antagonistic social classes, and Lenin did not refrain from 
drawing certain conclusions from the Russian Machists1 attempts to 
smuggle idealism into Marxism:
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"... behind the epistemological scholasticism of empirio-criticism 
one cannot fail to see the struggle of parties in philosophy, a struggle 
which in the last analysis reflects the tendencies and ideology of the 
antagonistic classes of modern society. Recent philosophy is as 
partisan (partiina) as it was two thousand years ago. The contending 
parties are at the heart of the matter, concealed by a pedantic 
charlatanry of new terms or by a weak-minded impartiality, materialism 
and idealism. The latter is merely a subtle, refined form of fideism, 
which stands fully armed, has vast organisations at its disposal and 
steadily continues to influence the masses, turing to its own advantage 
the smallest vacillation of philosophical thought. The objective class 
role of empirio-criticism boils down to servile assistance to the 
fideists in their struggle against materialism in general and historical
/ " O
materialism in particular". J
The metaphysical standpoint which most obviously subverts the 
diarchy of materialism and idealism is dualism; but this is rejected 
in Marxist-Leninist textbooks as half-hearted, and generally leading 
to idealism, or else inconsistent, in that in regarding matter and spirit 
as logically distinct, it is unable to explain either how bodily changes 
affect consciousness, or how thought results in bodily motion.^ On 
the other hand, the definitions of matter and materialism already 
selected from Lenin's book strictly speaking imply a dualistic world-view, 
for since matter is defined as that which exists independently of the 
mind, then the mind itself cannot be regarded as material. This 
inference was quite acceptable to Lenin, who as we have seen distanced 
himself from 'vulgar' materialism; he upbraided Joseph Dietzgen for 
appearing at one point in his writings to equate thought and matter:
"That both thought and matter are 'real', i.e., exist, is true.
But to call thought material is to make a false step towards the
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• 65confusion of materialism and idealism".
Dietzgen's view that the concept of matter must be broadened to cover 
all the phenomena of reality, including man's mental powers is also 
dismissed:
"That the concept of matter must also include thoughts... is a 
confusion, for if such an inclusion is made, the epistemological 
contrast between matter and spirit,idealism and materialism, a con­
trast upon which Dietzgen himself insists, loses its meaning. That 
this contrast must not be 'extreme', exaggerated, metaphysical, is 
indisputable (and the great merit of the dialectical materialist 
Dietzgen was to emphasise this). The limits of the absolute necessity 
and absolute truth of this relative contrast are precisely those limits 
which define the, tendency of epistemological investigations. To operate 
beyond these limits with the opposition of matter and spirit, physical
and psychical, as though with an absolute opposition, would be a great
66mistake".
In other words, the contrast between non-material mind, and matter, is 
posited in opposition to 'vulgar' materialism, but the gap between the 
two has to be restrained in order that dialectical materialism be 
distinguished from dualism or even idealism. But without a commitment 
to the validity of dialectical logic, it is difficult to see how Lenin's 
theory bridges the gap between material and non-material phenomena any 
more successfully than dualism. On this point there is little by way of 
araumentation in Materialism and Bmpirio-criticism:
"Sensation depends on the brain, nerves, retina, etc., i.e., on 
matter organised in a definite way. The existence of matter does not 
depend on sensation. Matter is primary. Sensation, thought, conscious­
ness are the supreme product of matter organised in a special way...
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The psychical, consciousness, etc., is the highest product of matter
(i.e. the physical), it is a function of that special complex portion
of matter which is called the human brain... In Ludwig Feuerbach also
we read that 'the general laws of motion of the external world and of
human thought are identical in substance but differ in their expression
only insofar as the human mind can apply them consciously'... And
Engels reproaches the old natural philosophy for having replaced 'the
as yet unknown but real interconnections' (of the phenomena of nature)
6 7'by ideal and fantastic ones' ", '
The extent to which an act of faith enables dialectical materialism to 
hold its ground is clearly demonstrated by the latter quotations from 
Engels.
The final Leninist determinant of the historiography of the
^materialist tradition' to be considered here is in fact an extension of
his equation of materialism and realism, in accordance with which the
vast majority of natural scientists are herded into the 'materialist'
pen. This 'natural-scientific materialism' is instinctively held by
the mass of scientists, and is indeed nothing more than the 'naive
realism' to which, we have already been told, only the insane and
68idealists are immune. It will be seen in Parts Two and Three how 
useful this concept is in extending the longevity and scope of the 
'materialist tradition', and it is as well to raise the objection now 
that this kind of connotational extravagance threatens to bankrupt the 
entire philosophical enterprise. Apart from the internal difficulties 
so far discussed, the equation of materialism with empiricism and 
realism leaves open the possibility that 'materialists' may accept 
the existence of God and anticipate the immortality of their soul.
These beliefs, however, cannot be held by materialists, since they 
are proper only to the idealist side of the great philosophical divide.
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Therefore either the definition of materialism, which helps to swell 
the ranks, or the doctrine of the two great camps, which helps to 
identify the enemy, must be given up.
In summary, then, the establishment of a materialist tradition 
in Russian thought has been based upon the following Leninist doctrines: 
the equation of materialism with empiricism and realism; the existence 
in the history of philosophy of two opposing camps, materialism and 
idealism; the partisan nature of philosophy, which holds that materialism 
and idealism are the world-views of antagonistic social classes. These 
doctrines have led Soviet scholars into two kinds of excessive zeal, the 
first being the tendency to recruit 'progressive' natural scientists, 
and empiricist epistemologists (transformed as 'materialistic 
sensualists'), to the materialist ranks, the second being the attribution 
of materialistic leaftings to many of the better-known opponents of 
Tsarist autocracy. It might be worth adding that the confusion of 
materialism and sensationalism, although largely inspired by the defini­
tions and epistemological preoccupations of Materialism and Empirio- 
criticism, is not justified by all that Lenin wrote in that work.
He quoted Hegel's affirmation of empiricism and materialism as distinct, 
though related (in the sense that materialism is the "development" of 
the principle of empiricism), and for his own part recognised that the 
standpoints of empiricism or sensationalism (Lenin distinguished between 
the two, though Soviet scholars rarely do) give rise to both subjective 
idealism (Berkeley) and materialism (¡Diderot):
"Starting from sensations, one can follow the line of subjectivism, 
which leads to solipsism ('bodies are complexes or combinations of 
sensations'), or one can follow the line of objectivism, which leads to 
materialism (sensations are images of objects, of the external world).
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Once again, it could be argued here either that by making empiricism 
and sensationalism neutral with regard to materialism and idealism, the 
doctrine of the camps is undermined, or that by forcing a commitment 
either to idealism or materialism by sheer breadth of definition, the 
distinction, between the camps is removed. Be that as it may, of the 
two kinds of zeal mentioned above, no better examples could be found 
than the two best-known representatives of the 'materialist tradition* 
in the eighteenth century, M. V. Lomonosov and A. N. Radishchev, and 
it is mainly to them that we shall turn in Part Two.
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PART TWO: THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY
Although the history of the Russian Orthodox Church up to and including 
the time of the Great Schism includes notable heresies, and internal 
confrontations, the very fact that issues at stake tended to be liturgical, 
moral and political (such as the purity of the liturgy, the possession of 
land by the Church, and the Church’s relationship with the State), rather 
than the often profoundly theological debates which further split the 
Western branch of Christianity, helps to explain why it was that not until 
the eighteenth century did social and cultural developments permit even 
the possibility of philosophical system-building independently of 
ecclesiastical dogmata, let alone in violation of them. The process by 
which secular philosophy was enabled to take root in Russian culture was 
given an impetus of critical significance during the reforming years of 
the reign of Peter the Great. This is not to say that the first Russian 
Emperor by an act of will singlehandedly pitched an Asiatic Muscovy into 
the mainstream of West European civilisation, for the seventeenth century 
was notable for expansionist aspirations and for the growth of foreign 
trade and international diplomacy, as well as for the importation of 
foreign technique. The segregated "German settlement" .(Nemetskaya sloboda) 
in the east of Moscow, revived in 1652, provided contact with Western 
culture not only for the adolescent Peter, but also for progressive 
seventeenth-century aristocrats such as Fedor Rtishchev, who in the face 
of great opposition organised a school at the Andreevsky Monastery outside 
the capital. The confirmation of serfdom in 1649 can scarcely be 
construed as a progressive measure, though it can to some extent be seen 
as a complement to the rise of the dvoryane, a phenomenon which is closely 
related to the State's increasing need for their service function as the 
administration of the realm became more complex and as military duties 
grew.These demands might in their turn have been expected to stimulate 
more educational experimentation, but the fact remains that at the outset
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of the eighteenth century, the only existing educational establishments 
numbered a few church schools, and two institutions of higher education, 
the Kievan Academy in the newly-annexed Ukraine, together with the 
philologically named Slavonic-Greek-Latin Academy formed in Moscow in 
1687 out of two opposing ‘Latinist* and ‘Hellenist* schools. For the 
purposes of this work, it is worth noting that at that time any expressions 
of doubt at the Moscow Academy in relation to the dogmata of the Orthodox 
Church were punishable by deportation to Siberia, and unfavourable 
comparisons of the True Faith with other creeds risked the stake. 1 In 
general, the Westernising tendencies mentioned above did not penetrate to 
the core of Muscovite consciousness, which was xenophobic and antirationalist, 
and much of the credit must go to Peter's brutal purpose in his attempt to 
hasten those social forces which resulted in the complete reversal of this 
attitude amongst a section of the metropolitan dvorianstvo during the 
course of the eighteenth century, thereby, albeit unwittingly, facilitating 
the entertainment of secular metaphysical beliefs.
Whatever the ultimate cause or causes of the first manifestations of 
materialist and atheist thought in Russia, it is difficult to see how these 
can operate independently of the following social factors, which attain a 
special prominence in Peter's reign: (i) the promotion of education (ii) the 
spread of Western philosophical and scientific ideas, and (iii) the increased 
subservience of the Orthodox Church to the State. Moreover, when it comes 
to the question of the origin of the Russian ‘materialist tradition* in 
the Marxist-Leninist sense of the development of an ideology by progressive 
groups in opposition to the idealism of the ruling classes, then 
consideration must be given to the extent to which Russian historical 
conditions in the eighteenth century were conducive to the growth of 
articulate political opposition.
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To start with education, the reforms within that sphere grafted on
2to Russian society by the 'crowned revolutionary', in Herzen's phrase, 
were doubtless motivated sooner by a need for technically more efficient 
and advanced state service than by a desire to people the realm with 
cultivated gentlemen of refined manners (notwithstanding the oft-quoted 
decrees penalising the traditional Muscovite beard and dress). The 
technical schools in the two capitals were intended to staff the army and 
the navy, and the ill-fated provincial 'cipher' schools lay stress in their 
curricula upon the teaching of mathematics. In practice, the new 
institutions met with almost universal resentment and widespread evasion, 
despite a decree in 1714 which made a certificate of education obligatory 
for noblemen if they wished to marry. Peter had neither sufficient 
resources nor qualified personnel even to make the success of his 
educational measures obligatory by law, and his failure set a precedent 
for the remainder of the century. In some cases, educational innovation 
took root, notably the founding of the St. Petersburg Kadetsky Korpus in 
17 3 1, intended for the education of future army officers, the decree of 
1737 which led to the foundation of seminaries for the training of priests, 
and the establishment in 1755 of Moscow University, with its associated 
gimnazii (one at Moscow, the other at Kazan). The universities would 
eventually become the focus of political discontent, from the 1830s onwards, 
and even the theological seminaries would produce radical raznochintsy, 
such as Chernyshevsky and Dobrolyubov, in the 1850s and l860s. For the 
time being, the only disquiet fomented by these institutions, especially 
as far as the rank-and-file nobility was concerned, was the prospect of 
attending them, and it was this attitude, as much as lack of teachers and 
equipment, which stunted the development of the ambitious project spawned 
by Catherine's Commission on Schools, and set up in 1782. The resultant 
system of elementary and high schools grew somewhat, but only to the extent 
that by the year of Alexander I's accession, less than 20,000 students were
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being taught in them. The most important reason for the unpopularity of 
the new schools amongst the nobility was that years spent in education 
were years less of advancement within the service hierarchies; and in any 
case state service itself still enabled the young nobleman to attain a 
passable level of technical'skills,. and moreover to some extent familiarised 
him with Western culture.
One by-product of the steps taken to staff the new educational 
institutions was the increased dissemination of Western ideas in Russian 
society, brought about by the influx of foreign teachers to the schools, 
of foreign professors and scientists to the University of Moscow and the 
St. Petersburg Academy of Sciences, and of foreign tutors for the children 
of the wealthier noble families. But contact with West European culture 
was facilitated not only by the immigration of foreign teachers, 
technicians and traders, but also by the practice of sending a small 
number of students abroad. In Peter’s reign, the purpose of these 
excursions was the study and acquisition of foreign techniques, but by 
the time of Catherine II, several students, for example Radishchev at the 
University of Leipzig, were being given the opportunity to obtain a broad 
grounding in contemporary European thought. Travel abroad was part and 
parcel of military and diplomatic service, but in addition, one of the 
provisions of Peter Ill’s Manifesto of l8 February 1762 relieving the 
nobility of the obligation to serve the state, was that passports should 
not be denied by the College of Foreign Affairs to anyone who, after his 
release from service, wished to visit other European countries. The 
development of the printing of books (the first textbook on arithmetic to 
be printed appeared in 1703), and the encouragement of journalism under 
Peter were necessary conditions of the widespread dissemination of the 
writings of leading Western thinkers and scientists, but it was not until 
the reign of Catherine the Great that familiarity with Western ideas became 
an end in itself. Catherine herself conducted a literary and mutually
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congratulatory correspondence with Voltaire and other representatives of 
the European Enlightenment, and her own satirical journal Vsyakaya 
vsyachina, which appeared first in 1769* opened the door to a comparative 
flood of journalistic and publishing activity in the 1770s and 1780s. The 
outstanding figure in this field was the freemason N.I. Novikov* who 
responded to Catherine’s journal in the same year with the first issue of 
The Drone (Truten*)* and went on in his publishing ventures to try to 
lead the nobility to devote part of its recently acquired leisure time to 
reading not only French novels* but also serious ethical* religious and 
political works. Novikov was free to publish a wide range of religious 
works* from the patristic writings of Augustine* Lactantius* Gregory of 
Nazianze to the works of English Puritans, nonconformists and freemasons* 
such as Milton, Bunyan* Johrf Mason, William Derham and William Hutchinson.
Works of pure mysticism, such as those of Jakob Bohme, were usually
4circulated in manuscript form only, on pain of confiscation. Although the 
philosophe most readily identified with the intellectual history of 
Catherine’s reign was the opponent of materialism* Voltaire, the new 
Russian reading public also had access to the works of Montaigne, Bayle, 
Fenelon* Montesquieu, Diderot, d'Alembert, Rousseau, Condillac and 
Condorcet. The popularity of such thinkers is certainly testimony to a 
sceptical attitude in Russian society towards traditional religious 
belief and practice, though of those mentioned, only Diderot arrived at 
materialism in his later years. No complete translations of any of the 
works of the materialists d'Holbach and La Mettrie was permitted by the 
censors, although we know that the sensationalist Helvetius' De 1’Esprit 
was available in the original; parts of that work appeared in the journal 
Innocent Exercise in 1763» In the journal Mirror of Light (1786-7) extracts 
from d’Holbach's Social System appeared, as well as an article expounding 
his social philosophy, although the author of the article, who signed 
himself ’N.D.' was criticised by G.P. Makagonenko for excluding d’Holbach’s
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anticlerical attacks. Oddly enough, it was not until the xenophobic 
reign of the Emperor Paul that extracts from Baron d'Holbach's 'Bible of
atheism', Systeme de la Nature appeared in The St. Petersburg Journal (1798),
. 5published by I.P. Pnin and A.F. Bestuzhev.
The fact that both mystical and materialist works could not be
published in full, but only if at all in anonymous segments, demonstrates
that although the rise of a secular literature and reading public had
destroyed the Church's intellectual monopoly, the hierarchy was still able
to exercise considerable control over the availability of Western
philosophy and science. This was least of all true in the reign of the
Peter the Great, whose enthusiasm for science led to the foundation of
the St. Petersburg Academy of Sciences in 1726, a year after his death; the
Academy became responsible for.the censorship of secular literature, whereas
after Peter, the Holy Synod's jurisdiction was in principle confined to
*
theological works. Had this arrangement remained as stated, there might 
have been no friction between scientific discovery and the eternal truths 
of the Bible and ecclesiastical tradition. As it was, Russia sidestepped 
the acrimony of Galileo's confrontation with the Roman Catholic Church 
over the truth of Copemicanism, and this was in no small measure the 
result of Peter's sponsorship of heliocentric ideas, in the form of 
Huygens' cosmotheoros, which appeared in translation in 1717. But as the 
century wore on, the Church gained sufficient influence to delay the 
publication of Kant's theory of cosmogony, which like Laplace's later 
nebular hypothesis, gave a naturalistic account of the origin and 
development of the solar system; the Russian translation of Buffon's 
Histoire Naturelle which appeared during the 1780s did not include his 
well-known essay on the degeneration of animals? it may also have been fear 
of the censure of the Church which led Caspar Wolff to give up his 
researches in embryology.^
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But although the Church circumscribed public intellectual debate,
the manner in which it did so was often perfunctory and ill-informed, and
it was not until the very end of Catherine II*s reign in 1796 that an
attempt was made to control private opinion by the suppression of the
private printing-presses, and by the establishment of a uniform system of 
7censorship. It is at this point that Russia and the other European 
absolutist regimes begin to strike out on a path markedly different from 
some of their West European neighbours; but as far as the eighteenth 
century is concerned, the limitations imposed upon metaphysical speculation 
in Russia were not untypical, and we need not be surprised to learn that 
throughout this period, open avowals of materialism and atheism were not 
permitted. What is more peculiarly Russian during the eighteenth century, 
and equally as important to any consideration of the significance of those 
kinds of thought at the historical level, is the apparently dramatic 
upheaval of Church-state relations initiated by Peter’s legislation of 
1721, through which the Church was absorbed into the collegiate system, 
and the Patriarchate replaced by a lay procuratorship general. It is 
easy enough for the dazzle of the Petrine reforms to obscure their 
Musoovite background, but the meekness with which the hierarchy submitted 
to its assimilation cannot be understood in isolation from the history and 
traditions of the Orthodox Church. This is not the place to go into it, 
but it can at least be mentioned in passing that Peter's assertion of 
temporal supremacy could be seen as no more than an episode in a process 
stretching from the debate between the followers of Nil Sorsky and Joseph 
of Volokolamsk over the virtues of church property in the first half of 
the sixteenth century, and the resultant Josephite justification of 
autocracy in the doctrines of Moscow as the third Rome and the divine 
right of kings; the Great Schism in the seventeenth century over the 
Patriarch Nikon’s attempt to purify Orthodox ritual of Russian deviations 
from the Greek, followed by the departure from the Church of the Old
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Believers, who represented one of the most vigorous and independent 
spiritual forces in Russia; the failure of Nikon to galvanise the Church 
into the adoption of a papocaesarist stance; beyond Peter's Dukhovny 
Reglament and Holy Synod to the seizure of all ecclesiastical lands by 
the command of Peter III and his wife and successor Catherine the Great.
It will be seen in Part Three that the process was taken further by Alexander 
I, but that the subordination and assimilation of an ailing Church by a 
thriving monarchy very soon became a mutual dependence once the optimistic 
thrust of autocracy had spent itself. The immediate cause of Peter's 
action may have had much to do with his own leanings towards Protestantism, 
and his animosity towards his Orthodox son Alexis, but the fate of the 
national Church under the Romanov dynasty as a whole stemmed partly from 
its own traditional renunciation of the world, which could mean in practice 
either submission to the state, or the hesychast asceticism of Nil Sorsky, 
and in the eighteenth century Paissy Velichkovsky and St. Tychon of Zadonsk.
Since one of the presuppositions of the 'materialist tradition' is the 
partisan nature of philosophy, in that materialism is the world-view of 
progressive social classes faced with the ruling ideology of idealism, it 
should be noted that although Orthodoxy had dedicated itself to the 
vindication of the political status quo before the reign of Peter, and 
although its services would again be called upon at the end of the reign of 
Alexander I, for much of the intervening period, the throne was not strongly 
identified with any denomination in particular, and rather promoted secular 
knowledge than defended theism. Peter the Great allowed a measure of 
religious toleration, although repressive measures were taken against the 
Jews and the stareobryadtsy (which latter were subject, amongst other things, 
to double taxation, a burden not unconnected with their later entrepreneurial 
flair). The persecution of the' Old Believers was continued during the 
incunbencies of the Empresses Anne and Elizabeth, but so long as Catherine
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the Great was prepared to pay lip-service to the secularist rationalism 
of the French and German Enlightenment, a policy of inter-confessional 
equality was pursued. This is not to say that a degree of religious 
toleration provided for any questioning of the government's conduct of 
ecclesiastical affairs, for when Arseny Matseevich, the Archbishop of 
Rostov, raised the only significant voice of protest against the 
secularisation of church domains in 1764, he was tried by the Holy Synod, 
unfrocked, sent to a monastery and finally held in solitary confinement 
in a Siberian prison. However, as has already been shown by the range of 
the publishing activities of the freemason Novikov, a wide spectrum of 
religious, as well as philosophical and political ideas was accessible to 
the educated Russian public, until the accumulated effects of the 
Pugachev Rebellion of 1773-4, the American Declaration of Independence and 
the French Revolution led the Empress to slough off her liberalism. The 
masonic lodges had been introduced into Russia in 1731» and had become 
particularly active during the 1770s and 80s, but were suppressed as 
the monarchy turned to reaction. Novikov's publishing activities were 
terminated in 1791» and in the following year Catherine had her erstwhile 
opponent in satire locked up in the Schlusselberg Fortress.
Novikov's fate was shared by A.N. Radischev, whose attack on serfdom 
and officialdom, and advocacy of civil rights in his Journey from St. 
Petersburg to Moscow, published in 1790, prompted Catherine to dub him 
"worse than Pugachev". Novikov was not a radical in the usual sense of 
that terra, since he was not critical of political and social institutions, 
holding instead a belief characteristic of Russian freemasons that 
desirable social change could only be brought about by changes in the 
hearts of individual men. Nevertheless, the serious masons' commitment 
to a living out of the moral implications of Christian love and charity, 
manifested in the striving for moral self-perfection and participation in 
philanthropic works, constituted an element in the consciousness of
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educated Russians which was likely to promote aversion to the abuse of 
man under the existing order, notably in its grossest institutionalised 
form, serfdom. But those who were not attracted to the ritual of the 
lodges could call upon the secular ethics of natural law theory, which 
had deliberately been introduced into Russia by Peter the Great; he had 
ordered the translation of the works of Hugo Grotius and Samuel Pufendorf, 
mindful of the value of natural law in the justification of absolutism, 
and in the provision of an ethics of service for the dvoryanstvo. Natural 
law theory continued to be promoted by government institutions, and 
especially by the German academics who were to be found in such numbers 
in the new educational establishments; it was, however, a two-edged weapon, 
as the history of political thought testifies, and attempts to derive 
sovereignty from consent and contract brought with them a rationale of 
political revolt. Much of Radishchev's critique of autocracy and serfdom 
was derived from that source, though whether he was a revolutionary or 
merely a harbinger of doom is a matter for debate. Whichever is the case, 
it can hardly be denied that he had much in common with the Decembrists 
and the first representatives of the radical intelligentsia, in a number 
of ways, notably in his description of autocracy as a state affairs most 
contrary to human nature, in the introduction to his first book, a 
translation of Mably's Observations sur l'histoire de la Gr^ce; in his 
praise of Cromwell and Washington in the ode Liberty; in his 
anticlericalism as expressed in that ode,.and in the Journey; in his 
affirmation of the greatness of man and equality of all men; in his 
concern with metaphysical problems, notably in his treatise On Man, his
g
Mortality and Immortality. All this makes Radishchev a likely candidate 
for inclusion in the 'materialist tradition* which holds that materialism 
is an ideological weapon, and he will accordingly be given separate
consideration
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Before the existence of materialism and atheism in eighteenth-
century thought is considered both in itself and, as demanded by the
presuppositions of the materialist tradition, as an expression of class
antagonism, it would be as well to discuss in general terms the likeliest
source and form of political opposition amongst the various »estates’
(sostoyaniya). The most openly rebellious estate during the eighteenth
century was the peasantry, which bore the brunt of the financial and
physical burden of the growth of the Russian Empire, and saw the bargain
by which the nobility had secured its rights over them in exchange for its
own obligations to service gradually eroded in the nobility’s favour after
Peter I’s death. It is easy enough to exaggerate the miserable condition
of the peasants: not all of them were enserfed, and of those that were,
notably those working outside the profitable 'black earth* regions of the
south and south-west, many paid their landlord in rent (obrok) rather than
labour (barshchina){ nevertheless in the era of serfdom, the vast majority
of the peasants and therefore of the entire population, were tied to the
land, and enjoyed no legal rights. It would be easy, too, to overestimate
the gulf between the peasantry and the nobility engendered by the Petrine
reforms, since these affected most of all the richer, metropolitan
minority; however, so far as they were concerned, in their everspreading
adoption of foreign culture, manners, dress and even language, they must
have seemed increasingly like a race,rather them a class, apart. Finally,
it might also be easy to exaggerate the number and importance of peasant
9uprisings throughout the era of serfdom, but the violence and importance 
of the revolt of Stenka Razin in the second half of the seventeenth 
century, the rebellions in Astrakhan and of the Don Cossacks in the reign 
of Peter the Great, and the Peasant War of 1773-4, cannot be gainsaid. 
These uprisings were doomed to failure because of poor organisation, lack 
of adequate munitions and the scattered nature of the rural population in 
the outer regions in which they originated, but what is more interesting
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about them for these purposes is the conservatism of their objectives.
In general, the peasants had no argument with Tsarism, and indeed both 
Razin and Pugachev justified their authority by claiming to be the 
rightful monarch} amongst the aims of the Pugachev rebellion were the 
return to the old faith and the old dress and beards of the pre-Petrine 
era. There would be no point in perpetuating the misconception of the 
nineteenth-century populists that the communal rural institutions, the 
mir and artel*, contained the seeds of socialism; rather they were a 
bulwark for the peasants against any kind of social or economic 
(especially agricultural) innovation. It is therefore not only because 
of the almost universal illiteracy of the peasantry that one looks in 
vain for any kind of articulate, dissenting ideology in their periodic 
convulsions. For all this, it was the peasantry which produced M.V. 
Lomonosov, the so-called founder of the Russian materialist tradition. 
Whether or not this description is justified, and whether or not he was 
quite the da Vinci of Russian hagiography, his outstanding contributions 
to science and literature cannot be ignored. He was untypical of the 
peasantry as a whole, in that he came from a literate family: his father 
was a well-to-do fisherman and trader from the delta of the Dvina in the 
north, an area which had escaped the Tartar invasion and was relatively 
free of serfdom. Lomonosov was in many ways unique in his own right, but 
was also in his social background far removed from the 200,000 peasants 
who were in open rebellion, after Peter III»s Manifesto of 1762 had 
exonerated the nobility from their obligation to service, but had done 
nothing to satisfy the peasants' traditional claim to the ownership of the 
land they worked. 10
A more radical kind of opposition, in the political and economic 
sense, might in the light of West European history have been expected to 
have found its source amongst the Russian merchants and artisans; but the 
political weakness and conservatism of the middle classes is a chronic and
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well-known theme of Russian history. The aetiology of their malaise could 
doubtless be extended to the relative unprofitability of agriculture, which 
itself prevented the accumulation of sufficient surplus agricultural produce 
to allow the spontaneous development of largescale manufacturing, though 
oddly enough it contributed to the traditional peasant occupation in 
smallscale rural crafts and industry (promysly). The fact remained that 
the low level of purchasing power of the majority of the population stunted 
the domestic market, and the merchants were mainly engaged in exchanging 
raw materials for the imported luxuries desired by the nobility. In 
consequence the Russians were outstripped by other European nations in the 
production of manufactured goods, and when the Romanov rulers conceived a 
military and political need to consume more of these goods, native 
production had to be stimulated by government grants, licenses, initiative, 
and even coercion, and facilitated by the import of foreign technique, 
management and investment. Furthermore, the crown’s attempts to stimulate 
the merchant class were always complicated by its own interests, and also 
those of the nobility. It always sought to make a monopoly of the most 
profitable exports and the imports in greatest demand; furthermore, the 
nobility's rights of ownership over the serfs perpetually hindered the 
merchant factory owner's access to hired labour, and he often had to make 
do with convicts and runaway serfs. Peter the Great in a decree of 18 
January 1721 extended to merchants the right to purchase villages populated 
with serfs, provided that the villages remained permanently attached to 
the factories for which the serfs were required;** he also abolished a 
number of the royal monopolies, and introduced a protective tariff on 
imports. His attempts to create an independent entrepreneurial class 
failed, however, as under his successors, the dvoryanstvo set about 
consolidating its privileges and divesting itself of all its obligations 
to state service; the crown recovered many of its monopolies, and by 1762, 
the nobility had acquired exclusive rights to the ownership of serfs, thereby
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enabling the noble factory-owner to outstrip his merchant counterpart.
It might seem from this brief account that the merchants had plenty to
grumble about, but the fact that they relied so heavily on government
concessions to maintain their own social position, and on government
legislation to protect them from foreign competition, contributed to, or
at any rate reinforced, their well-known conservatism of dress, manners,
religion and politics. Generally speaking, the bearded, xenophobic and
often illiterate merchant was not associated with radical political views
or with religious heterodoxy. An exception in some ways was I.T. Pososhkov,
whose Book on Poverty and Wealth advocated free trade for merchants, and
criticised the nobility for its treatment of peasants and ruinous taste
for imported luxuries; but his views were no more than a reflection of
Peter's policies, and he was deeply religious man and supporter of the
monarchy. It is significant that shortly after Peter's death, Pososhkov
12was arrested and spent his last days in prison. An even sharper 
contrast with the overall picture has been claimed for the religious 
views of the■Kárzhavin brothers, to be considered later.
None of the Russian thinkers discussed in Part One came from the 
kind of comfortable middle-class background that produced Marx and Engels, 
and for that matter Feuerbach (though of those mentioned in passing, Botkin 
was the son of a tea-merchant), and it will be seen in Part Three that the 
overwhelming majority of the Decembrists were of sons of dvoryane. The 
first generations of the radical intelligentsia were largely drawn from 
noble families, or else were raznochintsy, the d^class'e sons of priests, 
non-noble civil servants and army officers, impoverished noblemen, and so 
on. The latter were in a sense genuine misfits, but it is less easy to 
understand how it was that the nobility would produce a succession of 
outstanding opponents of its own class interests (Radishchev, Pestel', 
Herzen, Bakunin, Kropotkin, Lenin, to name but a few). It might seem 
strange to look for some of the reasons in a discussion of the eighteenth
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century, since after Peter had opened up the hereditary nobility to 
plebeian merit, and confirmed service of the state as its primary 
function, the nobility had seemingly made a number of successful attempts 
to cut its ties to the throne. To all intents and purposes, by the time
of Catherine the Great's Charter of the Nobility of. 1785, it could indeed/
be said that "the only obligation of a Russian gentleman was to shave his
13face.” But beneath a succession of favourable decrees lay a more complex 
reality. By the seventeenth century, the new class of dvoryane. formerly 
servants and military retainers of the Grand Duke of Moscow, had swamped 
the traditional landowning aristocracy of boyars and princes. The 
foundation of their ascent was the receipt of estates in return for state 
service; these estates were split equally between male heirs on the 
occupant's death (in theory they returned to the crown), and the consequent 
dissection of the estate led to the pursuit of fresh land grants, thereby 
reinforcing the system of state service. The service function of the 
nobility was confirmed firstly during the reign of Fedor II by the 
destruction of mestnichestvo (which allowed the status of serving members 
of a family to be determined by that of its head). Secondly, in an 
attempt to exploit personnel to the maximum, Peter I decreed in 1712 that 
social status and personal rights were to be dependent on state service 
alone, and laid down an appropriate structure in 1722 by the promulgation 
of the Table of Ranks, which provided the opportunity for a commoner to 
achieve ennoblement on attaining the eighth grade of the fourteen-grade 
service hierarchy.
The new openness end service orientation o£ the nobility was resented 
by the old aristocracy, and the suspicion between the two groups to a large 
extent explains their failure to translate an apparent political supremacy 
into a limitation of the autocracy, notably when the attempt by the Supreme 
Privy Council in 1730 to impose an •aristocratic- constitution upon the 
new Empress Anne was almost unanimously opposed by the dvorvane. Even so,
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the nobility proceeded to acquire well nigh absolute power over their 
serfs, and to have what was permanent compulsory state service under 
Peter successively reduced under Anne and Elizabeth, until the obligation 
was removed by Peter I H  in 1762. But what seemed like the triumph of the 
nobility was partly a hollow concession, because the great majority of 
the nobility would have been unable to support themselves outside of state 
service, and partly an expression of the crown's decreasing need for the 
service of an estate which was traditionally so averse to education. At 
any rate so far as the bureaucracy was concerned, the state was turning 
increasingly to literate foreigners and native plebeians. Resentment of 
the bureaucracy, and particularly of foreigners, certainly played its part 
in the Decembrist movement, and might be put down as a contributing factor 
to the increasing incidence of noble revolutionaries. I would argue, 
though, that a more important source of noble disaffection lay in the very 
means by which the state had so successfully prevented the nobility from 
converting its economic position into political power. In the first place, 
by making the service function paramount, and sponsoring an ethics of 
service, the state, as has already been suggested, sowed the seeds of the 
moral rejection of its own institutions. But although this was hardly 
likely to be a general characteristic of a class which had a vested interest 
in those institutions, the very nature of state service and of the rewards 
of state service conspired to produce a large number of rootless 
individuals whose only sense of 'solidarity* was with their peers. To take 
the rewards first, the state consistently pursued a policy of small, 
scattered land grants, which prevented any noble family from building a 
local power base, a phenomenon which was reinforced by the system of 
inheritance already referred to. As for the service pattern of the 
nobleman's early life, his childhood would be marked by the long absences 
from home of his serving father; he himself would then possibly leave the 
estate to attend a boarding-school in one of the capitals or in a provincial 
centre. His own period of service would in all probability include frequent
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transfers from place to place, and from one type of service to another 
and he was likely to be rewarded by an estate far away from that of his 
parents. The social upshot of all this was that allegiance to family or 
locality was minimally developed, and this fact, in conjunction with the 
orientation towards the capitals and national issues engendered by the 
nature of state service, prevented the transformation of the nobleman's 
role into that of a gentleman farmer or local politician. The allegiances 
that did exist largely centred on shared school or service experiences, and 
this goes some way towards an explanation of the predilection of young 
educated noblemen for intellectual discussion groups, which played a 
critical role in the Decembrist movement, and in the intellectual development
4
of the first Russian socialists.
The first radical critique of Russian society was in many ways an 
epiphenomenon of the service function of its foremost class. But it has 
not up to this point been shown that the rejection of serfdom and autocracy 
is in ..any way likely to include the rejection of God, a critique of the 
Church, or be accompanied by a 'progressive' metaphysics. Although it 
would be wrong to disassociate the state from the Church in eighteenth- 
century Russia, that period is marked by a relative diminution of the 
Church's role in political and intellectual life, and in the person of 
Catherine, the autocracy could even be seen as recommending for a while a 
measure of anticlericalism in court circles. Thus, even though Peter had 
more or less reduced the Church to a branch of the state administration, 
this was an expression of the crown's endorsement of secularism and of its 
relative independence from Orthodoxy} consequently it is less true of this 
century than of the next to say that the expression of atheistic and 
materialistic views was eo ipso a challenge to the political authorities, 
or that any attack on the monarchy automatically involved a critique of the 
national Church. It could then be argued in advance of any consideration 
of metaphysical beliefs in eighteenth-century Russia that to extend the
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'materialist tradition' back to the time of Lomonosov is to do violence 
to the historical record. This observation is not the same as an a priori 
refusal to admit the existence of materialism and atheism in that period, 
but merely an opinion that any 'partisan' significance which they might be 
held to have is at most minimal in comparison with the juxtaposition of 
radicalism and materialism which appeared first amongst the Decembrists, 
and which became commonplace within the radical intelligentsia. It would 
almost have been a statistical oddity had there been no evidence whatsoever 
of atheism or radicalism in eighteenth-century Russia, given the qualified 
official toleration of Voltairian freethought, and the circulation of 
manuscript copies of some of Voltaire's more acerbic anticlerical and 
anti-Christian tracts, and d'Holbach's Christianisme devoil^.1^ In general 
terms, such metaphysical daring as can be found (and it must always be kept 
in mind that because of censorship, the historian is never able to assess 
the true extent of political and metaphysical views which exceed the 
limits of a government's toleration) takes it place in a wide range of 
views which reflect the intellectual backwardness of the Church, the 
promotion of secular learning by the state and the ..imitative enthusiasm 
of the Russian intellectual neophytes. The range includes freemasonry, 
natural law theory, natural theology, mysticism, and above all 
Voltairianism, with its deism, irreverence towards tradition, castigation 
of organised religion, advocacy of civil liberties, and preference for a 
benevolent, secular monarchy. Any attempt to account for particular 
predilections would, I suggest, call upon factors other than political 
antagonisms, class friction or economic interests.
The origin and strengthening of the materialist tendency in Russian 
thought in the eighteenth century is based by Soviet historians upon the 
scientific researches of M.V. Lomonosov, the philosophical views of certain
pyosvetitely of the second half of the century such as Ya. P. Kozel'sky and
D.S. Anichkov, and of A.N. Radishchev, and to a certain extent official
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records and anonymous manuscripts, such as The Mirror of Atheism
(Zertsalo bezbozhiya) and Moral Letters to Friends (Pis»ma nravouchitel'nye
k druz'yam). The title of founder of the Russian materialist tradition has
15been awarded to Lomonosov, and this designation is a good example of the
minimal requirements needed by a scientist to be classified as a »natural -
scientific materialist». Much is made of Lomonosov's claimed discovery of
the law of the conservation of mass and energy as early as 1748, and his
rejection of phlogiston theory as early as 1744, not to mention his
anticipations of the kinetic theory of heat and atomism, and his advanced
16work in astronomy and geology 5 there is however in his conception of 
nature in terms of matter and motion, and his attribution of that natural 
world to an "all-wise architect and omnipotent mechanic", as well as his
derivation of the existence of God from the immutability of matter, nothing 
which would appear out of place in the voluminous writings of Robert Boyle 
dedicated to demonstrate how conducive the new experimental philosophy was 
to Christianity. Lomonosov, incidentally, read some of the works of 
Boyle whilst he was a student of Marburg University, and although I have 
no intention of becoming involved in the exaggerated priority claims made 
on his behalf, particularly in Stalinist literature, there seems no more 
reason to single out Lomonosov as a precursor of Dalton in the field of 
atomic theory than there does in the case of Boyle and his corpuscular 
philosophy. It would not, though, be justified to infer from a superficial 
similarity between Lomonosov and Boyle that they held the same views on 
the relationship between science and religion; the former was less 
concerned to try to derive the existence and attributes of God from the 
natural world, and was more, like Galileo, concerned to demarcate the 
areas proper to science and theology respectively. He felt that every­
one was obliged to avoid or to explain conflicts between science and 
religion, the "two blood sisters, the daughters of the supreme parent»!, and
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adhered to the doctrine of the two Books, the first, nature, to be
studied by physicists, mathematicians and astronomers, and the second,
the Holy Scriptures, for the use of prophets, apostles and church
leaders. Like Galileo, Lomonosov was particularly concerned that
biblical texts should not be used in experimental matters:
"The mathematician reasons incorrectly, if he wishes to measure the
divine will with a pair of compasses. So does the teacher of theology,
if he thinks that one can learn astronomy or chemistry from the psalter".^ 
I have argued in Part One that the broad definition of materialism implied
by the Marxist-Leninist equation of naive realism with natural-scientific
materialism is incompatible with the doctrine of the two great camps in
philosophy, and this difficulty has resulted in much talk in the
historiography of the materialist tradition of thinkers and scientists
holding materialist positions with certain idealist inconsistencies,
oscillating between materialism and idealism, or clothing their
materialism in deistic form. It is of course open to those with a less
generous definition of materialism to speculate about the true beliefs
of scientists who profess to believe in God, even though they exclude
Him from participation in natural phenomena when seeking scientific
explanation (I have chosen a tendentious formulation, to show how rich a
field this is for tendentious speculation). But if the possibility of
Lomonosov's materialism is to be admitted on the available evidence, then
all the philosophers and thinkers identified with the expulsion of
Aristotelian .teleology and Renaissance naturalism from scientific
enquiry - Bacon, Descartes, Galileo, Boyle and Newton, to name the
summits of the range - would have to be placed in the materialist line,
the sincerity of their beliefs in God and an immortal soul notwithstanding.
But although the anticlericalism of Lomonosov's Gimn borode has been
emphasised in Soviet scholarship, amongst his other poems, apart from the
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laudatory odes dedicated to the succession of Russian monarchs from 
Anne to Catherine II, were his own versions of the psalms, the speech 
of God to Job, and his Evening Meditation on the Divine Majesty. 18
This critique of the 'materialist tradition' unfortunately does not 
permit, in isolation from modern claims made on his behalf, any attempt 
to convey the remarkable nature of Lomonosov's achievements in the 
infancy of indigenous Russian science and letters, and we must pass 
shamefacedly on to the 'enlighteners' of the second half of the 
eighteenth century. Rather less shamefacedly, I will forego a detailed 
consideration of the philosophical views of figures such as D. S. Anichkov, 
P. A. Slovtsov, Ya. P. Kozel*sky and P. S. Baturin, not because they are 
of no historical interest, but because any connection mooted between 
their ideas, and materialism and atheism, is clearly tendentious. 
Furthermore not all Soviet scholars are prepared to follow the judgements 
of I. Ya. Shchipanov, a pioneer in the historiography of the 'materialist 
tradition , and a leading scholar in this particular area of study. He 
has been able to detect in the somewhat run-of-the-mill recycling of 
moderate French and German Enlightenment epistemology contained in 
Kozel'sky's Filosofskie predlozheniya (1768), both 'materialistic 
sensualism' (in that he argued that all human knowledge began with 
the senses), and 'materialism clothed in deistic form' (in that he 
accepted the existence, greatness, wisdom and omnipotence of God) . 19 
Much, too, is made of Baturin's repudiation, produced anonymously on his 
own printing-press in Tula, of Louis Saint-Martin's mystical work 
Des Erreurs_et_de_la Vgrit^; Baturin’s opposition of a mechanistic view 
of nature to Saint-Martin's idealism is not unusual for its time, and 
of the anonymous works of that year, it seems better timed and directed 
than Radishchev's Journey. A more likely subject for speculation is 
P. A. Slovtsov, a seminarist who was twice arrested for seditious ideas
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and finished his life, having by then renounced his vows in exile 
in Siberia. The best evidence for materialist views in his poem 
Materijra, which extols the variety of inanimate and animate nature, the 
»'infinite chain of beings'», is not so much the content of the poem, as 
the way in which he felt called upon to clarify his position in a 
footnote, so that he should not be taken to be denying spiritual beings,
or the Creator, and should not be "reproached with meddling in material-
20ism'*. By far the most clamour was raised by a dissertation, read by
D. S. Anichkov in August 1769, entitled A Discourse based on Natural 
Theology concerning the Origins of Natural Religion, in which the can­
didate attempted to show how the polytheistic beliefs of pagan peoples 
had their origin in 'fear*, 'apparition' and 'wonder', though he stressed 
the distinction between such beliefs, and the belief of the most enlightened 
peoples in the omnipotent and all-wise Christian God. On publication, the 
dissertation contained a number of references to Lucretius' poem 
De Rerum Natura, and a list of propositions derived from the preceding 
discourse, including the following:
"All the perfections ascribed to God originate from human thoughts, 
and therefore they do not conform to His essence, and cannot be proof of 
his perfections".^*
Although Anichkov always included revelation as a source of knowledge, his 
naturalistic approach incensed some of the professors at Moscow University, 
and most of the copies were seized and burned. Nevertheless a second 
edition, with suitable excisions, including the aforementioned propositions, 
was published. On the basis of his published work, he seems to have 
been a sincere believer who wished to reconcile his beliefs with the 
empiricism then in vogue:
"experience demonstrates to us that we enter the world without any 
understanding of anything, but then we gradually acquire ideas of material
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bodies, from which we ultimately abstract concepts of immaterial
things, i.e. : our mind, by means of an innate capacity comes to know
invisible things from the visible, abstracts general concepts from
particular things, reasons about the future on the basis of the present,
and gains an understanding of immaterial things from the existence of
material entities. In this way, for example, from the existence of
visible things, which cannot themselves bring about their own existence,
we conclude that there is undoubtedly to be found such a being, upon
which they would depend, as upon a primary cause. In the same way,
from the wonderful order discerned between objects in the
visible world we conclude that God is one and all-wise; we receive the
idea of spirit, when, having excluded all those properties, which we
observe in bodies, such as division into parts, figure and so on, we
22add to it reason and will".
This passage is taken from Anichkov's Speech on the Properties of 
Human Knowledge and on the Means by which the Mortal Intellect is
23Protected from Errors... delivered in 17705 later in the same piece , 
he attempted to describe the close relationship between body and soul, 
a philosophical enterprise which was to form the subject of a subsequent 
address, his Speech on the Various Means of Explicating the Very Intimate 
Union of the Soul with the Body. In this work, delivered in 1783, he 
opposed those who deny the existence of material bodies, the idealists, 
and those who believe that thought is material, whom Anichkov describes, 
perhaps euphemistically, as "monists". He went on to a discussion of 
three kinds of dualistic account of the relationship between spirit and 
body, the Cartesian, under which he included the occasionalism of 
Malebranche, the Leibnizian doctrine of pre-established harmony, and 
the view which he favoured himself, the Peripatetic belief in the union
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of body and soul by means of a physicus influxus. 24 He also described
this" standpoint . as »'Aristotelian-scholastic", and used Aristotelian
terminology to convey the notion that body and soul were two completely
different but imperfect entities which combined to form a third, man.
He was aware that in calling the spirit the form of the body, in the
Aristotelian sense, he might be seen to be casting doubt upon the
immortality of the soul, particularly as he had already emphasised the
necessity of physical organs in perception; the inference, however, was
resisted, the immortal life of the spirit being raised above the level
of sense-perception, and the departure of the soul from the body being
compared with the release of a prisoner from jail. J At that point any
glimmerings of an affinity with Feuerbachian materialism are extinguished.
Even so, it cannot be denied that Anichkov was inclined to walk rather
near to the bounds of acceptability, a fact which provides scope enough
for the exercise of a predisposed imagination. Indeed Shchipanov
speculates that Anichkov, Kozel'sky or S. E. Desnitsky may have been the
author of Zertsalo bezbozhiya, one of a collection of hand-written essays
dating from the end of the eighteenth century, and discovered in Kostroma
in I94l. The essay consists of a number of rather superficial attempts
to show how God's existence runs counter to experience, conscience, and
right reason, and in particular attempts to demonstrate His non-existence
from His imperfections. The essay ends in a way reminiscent of Bakunin,
but without his passion or panache:
"It is true that God is imperfect. For to have limits to the
actions of one's reason and will, not to be the creator and architect
of the world - that means to be imperfect. An imperfect being is not
God. For imperfection is incompatible with perfection. Consequently,
26there is no God..."
8 6 .
Another anonymous manuscript, Moral Letters to Friends, written in
1773 - 74, has been invested with much significance by Yu. Ya. Kogan
in his work on eighteenth-century Russian atheism. It was found in a
collection of manuscripts owned by the merchant F.F. Mazurin, and
although Kogan admits its clear masonic origin, he is still able to
detect in it "materialist and atheist positions, albeit terminologically 
27inconsistent." It would be unfair to criticize Kogan's judgements 
without a careful consideration of the manuscript itself, and I will 
only comment that the confidence with which the positions mentioned
above are inferred would only be possible with a commitment to the 
Leninist presuppositions of the 'materialist tradition', particularly 
the doctrine of the two camps. Consequently, even though the Letters' 
author is committed to the existence of God and indulges in Pythagorean 
number mysticism and Hermetism, his affirmation that "everything that 
exists is material", including the soul, which is regarded as a very
fine kind of matter, and his not uncharacteristically masonic rejection
of traditional Christian doctrines, such as the divinity of Christ,
and the notion of God as the creator of the world ex nihilo ("I do not
know which brainless head thought up the quite ridiculous and irrational
proposition that God produced the world from nothing"), are summated
and described as a pantheism "under the lid of which lie atheistic and
28
materialistic contents." Rather less theory-laden inferences of the 
existence of atheistic sentiments can be drawn from official records of
blasphemy (bogokhul'stvo) trials conducted during the eighteenth
century} indeed, the glimpses they afford of an element of the popular
consciousness, however fragmentary they may be, are better evidence for
the existence of a broadly defined and partisan' 'materialist tradition'
in that period, than the scientific and literary works which are
predominantly drawn upon in support of that claim. For example, the old
soldier Mikhail Shchukin was charged with the observation that "there is
no truth either in God or in the Tsar", and the merchant Sidor Korol’kov
in an "atheistic letter" wrote: "I revolt against the heavenly and
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earthly Tsar." Similar sentiments were attributed to the merchants 
V. N. and E. N. Karzhavin in an anonymous denunciation sent to the 
Secret Chancellory in St. Petersburg from London in 1756; in this case, 
the Karzhavins were accused of slandering the heavenly Tsar and the 
earthly (not to say earthy) Tsaritsa Elizabeth, and her ministers, 
with the result that Vasily Karzhavin was imprisoned (his brother 
Erofey was in Paris at the time). These brothers were by no means 
typical of the kupechestvo; they were both relatively highly educated 
(Erofey embarked upon a comparison of the Russian and Greek languages 
when in Paris, and translated Swift's Gulliver's Travels in the early 
1770s), and their father was a leading 'priestly' Old Believer. The 
case for the Karzhavins' atheism rests entirely on the anonymous 
denunciation, which handwriting checks showed to be the work of Petr 
Dement'ev, a runaway Old Believer merchant whose acquaintance the 
Karzhavins had made in London, and between whom relationships had soured.
This, and the fact that the Karzhavins had renounced staroobryadchestvo 
might have seemed enough to deter the historian from hasty conclusions; 
but Kogan turns the uncertainty to his own advantage, and argues that 
the fact that Vasily Karzhavin denied Dement'ev's accusions and affirmed
his Orthodox belief, does not necessarily mean that he was sincere in
. • 30so doing.
This kind of special pleading is eloquent testimony to the 
inadequacy of the foundations upon which the edifice of the eighteenth- 
century 'materialist tradition' has been erected, and Kogan himself has 
noticed some of the cracks:
"When reading some, even the most radical works of the Russian 
Enlighteners of the l8th century, one cannot fail to notice in them the 
presence of deistic or other kinds of departure from consistent
29
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materialism and atheism. Precisely this characteristic can be seen,
for example, in some of Lomonosov's statements in his work
The Appearance of Venus on the Sun (1761) in the spirit of the doctrine
of the 'two truths' and also his two poetic Meditations on 'divine
majesty' (1743), where in accordance with deism, he speaks of the
'untold wisdom of divine activity'. Declarations of a deistic kind
are to be found in the works of Anichkov, one of whose speeches is
actually entitled: This World is a Clear Proof of the Wisdom of God.
We find this kind of departure in the works of Kozel'sky. Finally, they
are met with in Radishchev, for instance in A Journey from St. Petersburg
to Moscow, in the chapter Bronnitsy, where meditating about God, the
traveller reaches the conclusion that the 'immutable law of nature' is
31nothing other than the result of a divine creative act".
Having thus disarmed the critic of the 'materialist tradition', Kogan
locks him up in the category of "diplomatising lackey of clericalism",
having charged him with falsification of the actual materialistic and
atheistic content of the world-view of the progressive Enlighteners of
the eighteenth century. "Lomonosov, Radishchev and Kozel'sky were
32undoubtedly materialists". Undoubtedly, because no other conclusion 
is possible according to the presuppositons of the 'materialist tradition' 
it is, however, without the benefit of such presuppositions that attention 
will now be turned to A. N. Radishchev.
The work for the anonymous publication of which Radishchev was 
initially sentenced to death, A Journey from St. Petersburg to Moscow, 
was concerned with social and political questions, rather than 
metaphysical problems, though it is clear from the extract from his ode 
Freedomn(Vol'nost') which he included in the book, that in accordance 
with the requirements of the 'materialist tradition', he could be
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interpreted as having connected rthe two :
"The power of the Tsar protects the faith,
Faith (vera) confirms the power of the Tsar;
Together they oppress society;
One seeks to enchain reason,
31The other strives to erase the will"
To engage for a moment in that potentially distorting talk of 
'precursors' and 'anticipations' which is part and parcel of the in­
dependent logic of 'traditions', it can nevertheless hardly be over­
looked that the poet's condemnation of the unholy alliance of Church 
and state is echoed throughout the following century amongst Russian 
radicals. Whether or not, though, the sentiments in these lines amount 
to atheism or anticlericalism depends, in part upon whether he was using 
•faith' in a national or universal sense. No judgment can be made 
in isolation from consideration of the treatise he devoted "to meta­
physical and epistemological questions, but it might be worth mentioning 
that in her comments on her copy of Radishehev's Journey, the Empress 
Catherine expressed the opinion both that the author was not a true 
Christian, and that he was probably a Martinist; furthermore it can be 
seen from a letter she wrote to Prince Golitsyn in 1791 that the 
appellation 'Martinist' was not a general term of abuse. She advised 
him not to send his children to a German school "for nowadays in many 
of them the academics are divided into two classes, equally harmful
to society: on the one hand, there are outright atheists, on the other,
34hypocritical Martinists".
Radishchev's treatise On Man, his Mortality and Immortality was 
begun only twelve days after his arrival in January 1792 at his place of 
exile, Ilimsk, and seems to have provided him with some consolation for
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the absence of his friends. The format of the work follows Moses 
Mendelssohn's Phaedon, oder tiber die Unsterblichkeit der Seele. a free 
version of Plato's dialogue which was published in Leipzig in 1767, 
whilst Radishchev was a student there. Any attempt to locate Radishchev 
in one or other of the 'two great camps' would have to cope with the 
eclecticism of the work, which draws upon Locke, Leibniz, Rousseau, 
d'Holbach, Caspar Wolff, Maupertuis, Herder, Helvetius and Joseph
35Priestley, to name a few. The contents of the work have already been 
adequately summarised in this language, and there is nothing that I 
can add to the impression that any uncommitted reader (if any such 
there are) would gain, that Radishchev's treatise represents a careful 
consideration of certain arguments for and against the mortality of 
the spirit, followed by an unequivocal declaration in favour of the 
latter. It is, of course, reasonable to observe that he took the 
former arguments seriously, and to infer from their context in his other 
writings and his life in general that he found them attractive; but it is 
difficult to avoid tendentiousness in speculating about his 'real' 
sympathies, even though one accepts that he might have thought twice 
about committing his 'true' religious thoughts to paper after the ordeal 
of imprisonment. It must also be borne in mind that the quasi-dialectical 
presentation of the treatise, in which arguments for and against the 
soul's immortality are often presented categorically, lends itself to 
witting or unwitting misrepresentation of the argument of the entire 
treatise. Thus, Soviet scholars are wont to concentrate upon Book One,. 
in which Radishchev considers the similarities and differences between 
man and the brutes, calling upon physiological data on the way, and 
Book Two, in which the case against the spiritual nature and immortality 
of the soul is put forward; on the other hand Allen McConnell, who regards 
Radishchev as a deist, but is undogmatic about the meaning of the 
treatise ("of Radishchev*s desire to believe in the soul's immortality
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there can be little doubt, but whether he really did so believe is open 
to question" ), quotes out of context the argument that since the soul 
xs necessary to unify our perceptions, and being in consequence itself 
a unity is therefore indestructible, it follows that "it must be con­
cluded that the soul, upon the destruction of the body, will be 
indivisible, consequently it is immaterial, and therefore, immortal".3'’ 
Although McConnell points out that Radishchev had used this argument 
before, in this case it is mentioned by Radishchev's materialist 
spokesman, who immediately proceeds to offer his refutation of it. It 
might be as well to demonstrate how two distinct metaphysical standpoints 
can be culled from this treatise; first of all, the fervent theist:
"It seems to be characteristic of man in accordance with his sensible 
constitution, and perhaps of animals in general, to have an inner sense 
of right and wrong. Do not unto others what you would not have done to 
you, if it is not a rule proceeding from the sensible constitution of 
man, then it is perhaps inscribed in us by the finger of the Eternal...
Man alone amongst all the earthly creatures has succeeded in knowing 
that there exists an All-Father, the origin of everything, the source 
of all forces... the concept of the Supreme Being is in him... It is 
true that when reason and especially the heart are unclouded by passion, 
the entire flesh and all the bones feel a power over them, which trans­
cends them. Name this what you will, but Hobbes and Spinoza felt it, 
and if you are not a monster, O Man! you must sense your Father, for 
he is everywhere; he lives in you, and what you feel is a gift of the 
All-loving... and setting out upon the path of enlightenment with the 
aid of social life, linking action to causes beyond the limits of the 
visible and the invisible world, man realised by the strength of his own 
reasoning what before he could only sense, that there is a God."3® 
Secondly, the materialist:
"... you think by means of a bodily organ, how can you have any
conception of anything other than materiality?.... And so, if the
brain and head are necessary for thought, the nerves for sensation, how
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can one so foolishly dream that the spirit can act without them?.. And
so, 0 mortal man! Abandon the empty dream that you are a part of the
Deity. You were a phenomenon necessary to the world in accordance with
eternal laws. Your end has come, the thread of your days has broken,
time has ended for you, and eternity has begun.
It might even be possible to present Radishchev as a representative
of the third kind of philosophy allowed by Engels, agnosticism. At one
stage he asserts that "reason is nothing other than a supplement to our
experiences, and it is impossible to be certain of the existence of
things otherwise than through experience", an epistemological axiom
from which he goes on to deduce both that "matter in itself is unknown
to man, but some of its properties are accessible to the senses, and on
his knowledge of them rests all his philosophising about matter", and
that since spirits are inaccessible to the senses, knowledge of their
40existence can only be "probable, not certain". Clearly Radishchev, 
like Locke and unlike Hume, was unwilling to take his presuppositions 
to their logical conclusion, for he added a footnote to his assertion 
about spirits saying that "speaking of spirits, I meant only the so- 
called human soul"; and earlier: "we sometimes know of the existence of
things without experiencing from them any changes in our power of
4lcognition".
Any option for the second of these positions as Radishchev's true
world-view would have to leap-frog more than one obstacle. Firstly, all
of the above quotations are taken from the first two Books of the
treatise, which are the most favourable to materialism. Book Three, which
sets out to refute materialism, begins by stating that arguments favouring
the soul's mortality had been presented to make the weak side, if there
were one, more obvious: "Let us try to restore man to that true radiance
42for which he seems to have been created". Book Four, which includes
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speculations on the possible nature of the after-life, ends thus:
"you determine your future with the present; believe, I repeat, believe,
eternity is not a dream».43 Secondly, the majority of the statements of
a materialist nature in Book Two are sanitised by quotation marks, and
when the hypothetical spokesman has finished, the author rounds upon
his creation, calling him a cruel tyrant, worse than Tiberius, Nero or
44Caligula. Thirdly, Radishchev, for what it is worth, dissociated 
himself from philosophers who would liken man to a plant, and obviously had 
in mind La Mettrie. G. P. Makagonenko'attempted to allow for such 
obstacles by averring that "without taking into account that the tract 
was preceded by a long struggle between Novikov's practical, and'
Schwarz's masonic-mystical and ecclesiastico-religious, points of view, 
it is impossible to understand correctly the political orientation of 
Radishchev's philosophical statement"; despite its deistic limitations, 
the tract represents "the developed basis of materialism as the only 
world-view which gives man the powerful weapon of the knowledge of
46nature, society and himself". Such perspectives are not confined to 
Soviet historians, for the poet Pushkin, in his suppressed biography 
of Radishchev, concluded that "although Radishchev takes up arms against 
materialism, he is still seen as a student of Helvetius. He sooner 
expounds than rejects the.arguments of pure atheism". It should, though, 
be remembered that Pushkin himself took "lessons in pure atheism" . 4 '7
Assuming for the sake of argument that McConnell was wrong in 
suggesting that Pushkin, who found the treatise trite and lifeless in 
style, did not bother to read beyond the first two books, one could 
speculate that he might have been impressed by the argument that the 
independent existence of the soul was inconceivable, since feeling and 
thought are dependent upon bodily organs, and not so impressed with
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the confusion of logical problems and matters of fact in one of the 
rejoinders, that to deny on those grounds the possible independence of 
the spirit from the body, is like an Egyptian who has lived all his life 
beside the Nile denying that water could ever be hard.^ On the basis 
of the evidence, the safest conclusion with regard both to Radishchev's 
political stance and to his metaphysical views, is that he is a tran­
sitional figure between decorative Voltairian freethought and Decembrist 
political action in the history of dvorianstvo attitudes. In his 
liberalism, moral and economic rejection of serfdom, hostility to 
autocracy, anticlericalism, rational doubts about religion, but over­
riding emotional need to believe, he is reminiscent of the more 
moderate wing of the Decembrists, the Northern Society, and to 
N. I. Turgenev, in particular. We shall now turn to the Decembrists, but 
by way of recapitulation, the fact that Radishchev had articulated views 
antagonistic to the interests of his own class may be seen as the first 
manifestation of the kind of dvoriantsvo dissent which was described 
earlier, in default of a more convincing explanation at the level of 
individuals, as an epiphenomenon of that estate's service function; it 
might also be argued, albeit perversely, that the fact that the evidence 
is against any ascription of materialistic or atheistic convinctions to 
Radishchev, supports the view that in general (the fragmentary evidence 
of the bogokhul'stvo trials apart), such either overtly atheistic views 
or metaphysical freethought as can be found in the eighteenth century are 
not so much the companions of a critique of the political, economic 
and social order, as, again, an epiphenomenon, this time of a state-led
secularism
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PART THREE: THE REIGN OF ALEXANDER I AND THE 
DECEMBRIST MOVEMENT
Introduction
We have seen evidence that materialistic and atheistic sentiments 
existed amongst the non-noble estates in eighteenth-century Russia, 
and also that a member of the nobility as cultivated as Radishchev 
was prepared to take such notions seriously. This in itself is 
scarcely enough to support a claim that a Russian 'materialist 
tradition' extends back into the eighteenth century. In any case, 
if it is to be argued that materialism is the metaphysical soulmate 
of a political ideology opposed to the existing semi-feudal and 
Orthodox order, then the absence before Alexander's reign of any 
such recognisable and systematic political ideology makes it, in 
terms of that argument alone, out of the question that such a 
materialist heritage should exist. Nevertheless, it is of 
circumstantial interest that amongst the educated nobility, liberal 
political views were accompanied by a fashionable scepticism, which 
if it touched upon metaphysics at all, was most often deistic. And 
where, in the case of Radischev, that liberalism was so sincerely 
and insistently stated as to approximate to a reformist political 
stance, we find that problems to which materialists offer solutions 
weigh heavily with him. This, as far as it goes, is at least 
consistent with the thesis that the stronger or more extreme the 
political opposition to a regime which in some way justifies its 
authority on the basis of a theistic ideology, the more likely it 
is that that opposition will be associated with materialism and
atheism
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It cannot be doubted that this thesis applies to Marxist 
revolutionary groups and political parties, and that fact in 
itself may throw some light on the tendency of many Marxist- 
Leninist historians to look for materialistic leanings in 
earlier radical movements. It may however be that the 
fundamental position of materialism in the Marxist philosophical 
edifice is no more than contingent upon the peculiarities of its 
own historical development. The primary theoretical concern of 
the following Part will be to consider the prevalence of 
materialist and atheist thought amongst the Decembrists, whose 
plans for reform, expressed within a recognisable framework of 
beliefs and values, set them aside from the palace conspirators 
of the preceding century's crises of succession. As well as 
describing some of those ideas, I shall consider those historical 
events and developments during the reign of Alexander I which 
may help us to understand the appeal of such ideas to the 
conspirators•
Even though the twin threat to Catherine's Russia posed by 
internal peasant revolt, and the transatlantic voyage of 
republicanism into Europe, had been enough to strip the liberal 
veneer from her policies, Alexander nevertheless in his accession 
manifesto declared his resolution to govern in accordance with his 
grandmother's; ''laws and heart'!* The well-known "liberal beginnings" 
of the first decade of the nineteenth century added to the 
Alexandrine melting-pot the vital historical ingredient of rising 
expectations, which, after the national sacrifices of the 
Napoleonic campaigns grew throughout the army into a sense of 
unremitted debt. The frustration engendered by the barren outcome
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of Alexander's flirtations with constitutional projects for 
Russia grew into bitter resentment upon the apparently 
preferential granting of a constitutional charter to the Poles, 
and according to I.D. Yakushkin, it was in direct response to 
this act that a group of future Decembrists planned regicide. 2 
The constitutional carrot continued to be dangled before the 
nobility as late as 1818, when the Tsar announced to the recently 
established Polish diet his desire to spread "liberal institutions" 
over all the regions entrusted to his care.^
It scarcely needs a proponent of the Great Man Theory of 
History to agree that under an unlimited monarchy the deeds, 
personality and beliefs of one man form an unusually powerful 
determinant in the course of events and on the climate of opinion. 
Both the upheaval of Peter's reforms, and later on, Nicholas I*s 
thirty-year feat of historical marking time, are unthinkable 
without a Tsar possessing or lacking ordinary human qualities to 
a remarkable degree. Although Alexander had little of the 
unswerving and irresistable sense of purpose of a Peter, or the 
constant and immovable sense of duty of a Nicholas, this very 
inconsistency and infirmity of purpose unmistakably flavours his 
reign. It may be that Alexander's vicissitudes of policy reflect 
a basic duality within his own personality, and that the elements 
of this duality stem from his youth, where his instruction in the 
spirit of the French Enlightenment by his Swiss tutor clsar Laharpe 
was set against a predilection for Prussian militarism discovered 
at the Emperor Paul's estate Gatchina. Be that as it may, the 
development of the Decembrist secret societies cannot be fully 
appreciated in isolation from Alexander's personal role. Given
his impressive appearance, and the traditional feeling amongst 
the army officers of loyalty towards the monarch, heightened amid 
the patriotic fervour at the outset of the Napoleonic Wars to a 
near-idolatrous reverence, there is in the early history of the 
Decembrist movement, alongside formal aspirations towards the 
liberalisation of the Empire's political and economic institutions, 
something akin to the emotions of a spurned lover.
Consideration of the Tsar's personality alone will take us 
only so far, particularly in view of his own impressionability, 
which brought alternately to the fore the influences of his early 
liberal friends and advisers, such as Prince Adam Czartoryski and 
Count Paul Stroganov, and then of reactionaries and mystics like 
Arakcheyev, Prince Alexander Golitsyn and the Metropolitan Serafim 
of St. Petersburg. But the political and philosophical views of 
the Decembrists were more than a reaction to the Tsar's character 
and choice of advisers, and at the risk of a certain schematicism 
with regard to this rich and seminal period in European history, I 
propose, as in the first section on the eighteenth century, to 
examine historical events find social conditions which may throw 
some light on the reasons why some thinking Russians were attracted 
to the kinds of world-view of primary concern here. I shall deal 
with reform, expansion and subsequent oppression in the field of 
education; the continuing interaction between West European and 
indigenous ideas; the role of the Church, of mysticism and religion, 
particularly during the years of reaction, and finally the 
development of conditions promoting clandestine opposition to the 
government•
Section I Education
We have already seen how, during the eighteenth century, 
attempts to prod the nobility out of its mediaeval slumber with 
an educational stick were met with resentment and evasion by the 
intended beneficiaries, and perhaps more importantly, how the 
development of an educational system suitable at the very least 
for the growing bureaucratic and military appetite of the Empire 
was impeded by inadequate resources and a shortage of qualified 
teachers. Although towards the end of the period the demeanour 
of the educated dvoryanin, comparative rarity though he was, 
differed marvellously from the pathetic incomprehension of his 
Petrine prototype, even so, at the turn of the century, elementary 
and secondary education was, despite Catherines early attempt at 
a national system, practically non-existent. Amongst the first of 
Alexander’s reforms was the establishment, as part of the 
reorganisation of the old collegiate state machinery, of a separate 
Ministry of National Education, headed by Count Zavadovsky, the 
former president of Catherine's Commission for the Establishment 
of Schools. On January 26 of the following year, 1803, the 
Preliminary Regulation concerning National Education was published. 
This was a landmark in the history of education under the Romanovs, 
in the sense that the four-tier framework of institutions which the 
regulation laid down, was scarcely modified throughout the duration 
of the Empire.
The regulation called for the establishment of an elementary 
school in every parish, or prikhod, or two combined} two levels 
of what we should term secondary schools were to operate, the first 
in every district, or uezd town, and the second in the capital of
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each province or guberniya. The provincial schools, or
gymnasia, were intended amongst other things to provide .
training for future entrants to the universities, which,
as well as teaching the arts and sciences at the highest
level, were given jurisdiction over all the schools in the
region, or okrug to which they belonged. In practice, three
new universities at Kazan', Khar'kov and eventually
St. Petersburg were founded after the publication of the
regulation, making six in all. Moscow University was the
only operative school of higher education at the time of
Alexander's accession, for although the university at Dorpat
was founded by Paul in 1798 to reconcile the Baltic Germans
to his prohibition of study abroad, it was not until 1802 that
it was opened by Alexander. This year also saw the founding
2of the Polish University at Vilna.
The increase in the number of public educational 
institutions in the early years was accompanied by a stimulation 
of literary and scientific activities which augured well for an 
enhancement of the intellectual life of the country. The 
universities were authorised to sponsor learned societies, such 
as the Society of Russian History and Antiquities, the Society 
for the Comparative Study of the Medical and Physical Sciences and 
the Society of Naturalists, all founded at Moscow University 
within two years of the granting of its new model charter in 1804. 
In addition to the learned societies' journals, the university 
presses also published periodicals such as the Messenger of Europe 
at Moscow University, as well as textbooks and numerous 
translations of Western works. The private printing-presses which
had been closed down by Paul were re-opened, and his prohibitions 
on the import of Western books and study abroad were rescinded.
New life was breathed into the Russian Academy, the Free Economic 
Society and the Academy of Sciences. The last-named body was 
granted in 1803 a new charter which amongst other things encouraged 
it to renew relationships with foreign learned societies, and to 
publish an annual volume of scientific works.
The failure of the Academy to fulfil its promise in the first 
quarter of the nineteenth century in many ways epitomizes the 
sterility of Alexander's educational reforms within his own lifetime 
The Academy suffered successively from a shortage of funds stemming 
from the Napoleonic Wars, a reluctance of eminent foreign scholars 
to come to Russia in the fiercely nationalistic climate which 
surrounded the French invasion, and a strongly antiscientific and 
generally anti-Western sentiment which prevailed in the years of 
reaction. The second and third factors impinged upon the 
universities in an acute form. At the very outset these
institutions were hamstrung by the chronic shortage of qualified _
teachers, but those foreign teachers brought in to fill the breach 
were often incapable of mastering the Russian language, which was 
at any rate still a difficult medium for advanced scientific and 
literary discourse. This was compounded by a sharpening of the 
perennial strife between the foreign and indigenous professors, 
occasioned by the latter chauvinism of the reign. After 1815, 
certain of the universities were destined to become the guinea 
pigs for the some of the most obscurantist experimentation in 
Russian educational history. Although this can be seen as the 
high tide of militant antirationalist Christianity beginning with 
the multiplication of the Russian Bible Society, it was, by way
of historical irony, to a large extent brought about by an 
adverse report on the German universities, the very 
institutions which had provided the model for the proliferation 
of their Russian counterparts.
The freedom and autonomy guaranteed by the model charter 
of 1804 did not however go untouched by the spirit of reaction 
before the appearance of A.S. Sturdza's Memoire sur 1 ♦ £t at actuel 
de l'Allemagne. The first victim in the Universities was the 
former monk Johann Baptist Schad, who was appointed professor at 
Khar'kov University on the recommendation of Fichte and Schelling. 
But whereas his association with the latter was initially 
advantageous, it would bring about his downfall as circumstances 
rapidly changed. In l8l4 Schad survived a jealous colleague's 
denunciation of his Schellingian views, but by l8l6 Prince A.N. 
Golitsyn had been appointed Minister of Education. Golitsyn was 
also procurator of the Holy Synod, and was allegedly Alexander's 
first mentor in Bible Study in the darkest months of 1812. In any 
case, Schad's supposedly Schellingian metaphysics of liberty and
natural law theory were now unacceptable, and at the end of l8l6
3he was actually deported.
Systematic harassment of academics really began in 1820, the 
year in which M.L. Magnitsky was appointed superintendent of the 
Kazan school district, thereby giving him effective control of 
the local University. Magnitsky had earlier been a friend of 
Mikhail Speransky, Alexander's adviser on internal affairs until 
his downfall in 1812 and subsequent exile, a fate shared by 
Magnitsky himself. It was in very different guise that he returned 
to favour in 1817 as governor of Simbirsk, from which position he
conducted a campaign against what he perceived as the atheism 
and immorality rife at Kazan University. Magnitsky's remarkable 
inroadsinto professorial freedom have understandably exercised a 
horrible fascination for many general historians; but for our 
purposes, the Magnitsky era is of great significance, because it 
depicts a connection alleged by the authorities between atheism, 
materialism and revolution, and demonstrates a felt need by the 
same authorities to defend autocracy on an intellectual level by 
an appeal to Christianity. According to Magnitsky himself:
'.'The present war of the spirit of evil cannot be stopped by 
armies, for against a spiritual attack, an equally spiritual 
defence is needed. A prudent censorship, together with the estab­
lishment of national education on a basis of faith is the only
stronghold against the depths which are inundating Europe with
4unbelief and degradation."
It may be doubted whether such sentiments are fully consistent 
with Magnitsky's initial recommendation, written in the report to 
the Ministry of Education which preceded his appointment as curator 
of the Kazan educational district, that Kazan University should be 
"publicly destroyed". A clearer notion of his spiritual defence 
can be obtained from the directives which he issued to Kazan from 
St. Petersburg. The teaching of philosophy was henceforward to be 
based on Paul's Epistles to the Colossians and Timothy, and the 
principles of political science to be derived largely from Moses, 
David and Solomon. Magnitsky was particularly suspicious of 
philosophy and political science, which he termed the "dreamy 
sciences", and ordered that the teaching of these subjects should 
stress the limitations of human reason in comparison with divine 
omniscience. The same applied also to the "exact" or "reAl sciences
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which as well as natural science and mathematics also included 
theology and law. Divine omniscience was again to be demonstrated 
in the teaching of physics, together with »'the limitations of 
our senses and instruments for the understanding of the wonders 
which eternally surround ,us.^ Fuchs, the professor of anatomy, 
aware perhaps of the kinds of ontological inferences that, for 
instance, F.J. Gall and G* Spurzheim^ could draw from early 
nineteenth-century research on the brain and nervous system, 
prefaced his course at Kazan University in the following manner:
"The aim of anatomy is to discover in the structure of the human
body the wisdom of the Creator, who has created man in his own
image and likeness. Our body is temple of the soul, and it is therefore
necessary to know it and to keep it pure and unviolated; on the intimate
link of body and soul one must beware, not'to fall into awful materialism..."^
Though Magnitsky scarcely emerges from the evidence provided thus far as a
champion of scientific progress, it cannot be argued that a belief in the
divine origin, design and sustenance of the universe, coupled with
an adverse estimation of the powers of human reason are in
themselves inimical to the methods of modern scientific enquiry as
it is commonly understood, notwithstanding the rigorous scepticism
and rejection of traditional authority which appear to underlie
n
them. Indeed there is almost a tradition of literature0 which 
seeks to show that the development of the physical sciences in the 
latter part of the seventeenth century was in some sense facilitated 
by ascetic Protestant evaluations of the study of nature as being 
to the greater glory of God and the relief of man's estate. Add to 
this the obvious inadequacy of man's reason in comparison with the 
Creator's omniscience, and the replacement of an eternal Platonic 
world arranged in accordance with a rational necessity, by a
subject universe dependent on the infinite will of the Hebrew 
God, and by a process of ideational generation there emerges the 
modern experimental scientist in whose suspicion of hypotheses 
lies the transformation of the world. At any rate the statistics 
suggest that in Western Europe a disproportionate number of 
Protestants have been engaged in scientific research, and it can 
plausibly be inferred that there is more to the relationship 
between Protestantism and science than the mere discarding of the 
Aristotelian yoke entailed by the Reformed theologians' return to 
the Word and Works of God. Nevertheless this biblicist rejection 
of revelation through tradition was extended by Protestant leaders 
like Melanchthon to literalism with regard to the truth of the 
Scriptures, an exegetical standpoint which in his case served as 
an impasse to Copernicus' heliocentric cosmology. What was also 
needed was an alternative set of exegetical principles in the 
vein of Galileo's Letter to the Grand Duchess Christina either 
to separate the provinces of the Bible and of Nature, or to 
reconcile apparent differences over matters of fact by arguing 
that in the Bible they were accommodated to the understanding of 
its original audience. But if, as we have already seen, Russia 
had its Galileo in the shape of Lomonosov, clearly Magnitsky was 
no disciple of Calvin's teaching that the Bible is a book for 
laymen.-
For historical reasons the Russian Church did not view the 
Bible through Neoplatonic or Aristotelian spectacles, and hence, 
as we have seen, there was no opposition to heliocentric cosmology 
of the kind which Galileo encountered in the Catholic Church's 
defence of the Church Fathers' Ancient Greek perception of the 
universe. Furthermore, throughout the eighteenth century, and
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indeed during the first decade of Alexander's reign, the 
monarchy enthusiastically sponsored science as the instrument of 
Russia's Europeanisation and modernisation. It has been suggested 
that Newton's ahistorical mechanistic 'absolutism' had more appeal 
for an autocrat than subsequent theories of change, such as the 
nebular hypothesis of Kant and Laplace, Wolff's theory of epigenesis, 
Buffon's transforraism and Lyell's historical geology. Leaving 
aside any deliberation over the discrepancy between what Newton said 
and the many interpretations of his disciples, it cannot be 
overlooked that the growth of an evolutionary or historical 
perspective in several branches of science runs parallel with a 
decline in the optimistic dynamism generated by the Petrine reforms, 
and a growing preoccupation from about the middle of Catherine's 
reign with external and internal subversion. That the conduct of 
scientific instruction and research during the eighteenth century 
was impeded more by intrinsic inadequacy and material wants than 
by ecclesiastical censure says more for autocratic self-confidence 
than any mature theological reconciliation between the Revelation 
of God and the revelations of scientists. Thus when a defensive 
autocracy allowed the unsophisticatedconservative elements of the 
Orthodox Church and the mystical religious fringe full rein in 
the scientific world, the result was a bull-in-a-china-shop 
episode in Russian intellectual history which almost makes the 
trial of Galileo and the Darwinian debates conciliatory by 
comparison.
But lest the academic be accused of over-reacting to 
intellectual injury, it should be stressed that Alexander's reign, 
as in so many other ways in Russian history, marks a turning-point 
in the history of materialist thought, and the period of reaction
is the fulcrum. As Bertrand Russell comments in his Introduction to 
Lange's The History of Materialism entitled 'Materialism, Past and 
Present•s
"Accusations of materialism have always been brought by the 
orthodox against their opponents, with the result that the less 
discriminating opponents have adopted materialism because they 
believed it to be an essential part of their opposition ... 
Historically we may regard materialism as a system of dogma set 
up to combat orthodox dogma. As a rule, the materialistic dogma 
has not been set up by men who loved dogma, but by men who felt 
that nothing less definite would enable them to fight the dogmas 
they disliked. They were in the position of men who raise armies 
to enforce peace.
The extent to which one is prepared to accept Russell's 
generalisation may depend upon one's sympathy with his beliefs 
that materialism is philosophically unable to cope with the facts 
of consciousness and that its scientific basis has in any case been 
demolished by relativistic physics. In other words, although or 
because Russell is at one with the materialists' opposition to 
dogmatic Christianity, he feels that excuses must be made for them. 
Nevertheless, one point that he makes may throw some light on the 
significance of the Alexandrine spiritual reaction. Materialism 
is dogmatic, in the sense that it makes a claim which, although 
largely based on scientific knowledge, transcends it in every sense 
of the word. If it is in the nature of science (if not of scientists) 
to be undogmatic, and to adhere to any paradigm only insofar as it 
appears to conform with observable data, then materialism itself is 
unscientific, in that it claims universality, and more so, in 
that it implicitly predicts scientific discoveries in its own
favour. We have not yet reached a stage in the development of 
scientific knowledge where no one inexplicable phenomenon in 
nature would stand in the way of the sceptic's acceptance of 
materialism; it can indeed be argued that in the light of modern 
subatomic physics, the possibility of such a stage has disappeared 
for good. This raises a number of questions. Why, if the link 
between science and materialism is so dubitable, has materialism 
appeared so attractive, as it undoubtedly has at certain times?
Why again has its imputation alarmed so many natural philosophers 
and clerics if its dubiety is so manifest? Russell suggests that 
the answer to the former is the unexplained fact in the latter, 
and in the case of the Alexandrine reaction, this explanation, as 
far as it goes, seems at least consistent with what we know. It 
is difficult to imagine that, for example, the crudity of 
Magnitsky's assault on supposed atheism and materialism was an 
equal and opposite reaction to rampant godless freethought in the 
universities. The problem for the historian is though, as it is 
with all unorthodox thought, that it inevitably shuns public 
disclosure, and that such overt or covert expressions of it that 
we have are by inference only the tip of an iceberg. Therefore 
it can be an arbitrary judgment as to the extent to which 
heterodox opinions are a response to official attitudes, or if 
not, whether the reactions of the existing order are exaggerated 
or not.
It might also be added that the scepticism necessary to 
dissolve the connection between science and materialism (at any 
rate in the nineteenth century) could also be turned against 
dogmatic Christianity itself, and that this may account for the 
cleric's horror of materialism. Be that as it may, Magnitsky's
branding of natural science, philosophy and political science 
as atheistic and materialistic, would, if Russell is right, 
serve to recommend them as such to his enemies within Decembrist 
circles.
Magnitsky's regime was not unique in the last years of 
Alexander's reign. In 1819 the study of theology was made 
obligatory in all universities, and a special decree called for 
the expulsion of those professors whose views were found 
incompatible with religion and morality. We have already seen 
how Schad of Khar'kov University incurred the wrath of Golitsyn’s 
Academic Committee, set up in l8l6 to censor scholarly works5 
similarly Professor A.S. Lubkin of Kazan University incurred 
opposition, despite the fact that his Metaphysics contained a 
realist rebuttal of Kant's apriorist treatment of time and space. 
The irony was that although Kant's critical philosophy was 
reviled by Magnitsky for its corrosive effect on theological 
arguments, Kant's doctrine of the unknowability of 'noumena' or 
'things-in-themselves' accorded more with Magnitsky's emphasis 
on the limitations of human powers in understanding the mysteries 
of the world than Lubkin's rationalist optimism with regard to the 
ability of the human intellect to arrive at the essence of things. 
It was rationalism above all which was the common factor in the 
dismissal of Kunitsyn, Arsen'ev, Raupach, Hermann and Galich 
from the new University of St. Petersburg. This professorial 
purge was initiated by Magnitsky's soulmate Dmitriy Runich, who 
in 1821 succeeded Count Uvarov as curator of the new University 
of St. Petersburg. One of Galich's offences was to believe, like 
Lubkin, that the essence of matter was accessible to human reason, 
though unlike Lubkin, his rationalism derived from Schelling's
Naturphilosophie, The removal of Kunitsyn is particularly
significant, since he represents one of the strongest indigenous
intellectual influences on the Decembrists, several of whom either
attended his public lectures or were taught by him in his capacity
as professor of moral and political sciences at the Tsarskoselsky
Lyceum, Kunitsyn1s work Natural Law (l8l8-20) was condemned for
its Rousseauist version of the contractual theory of political
power, which was judged, not illogically, to be incompatible with
12the official view that the Tsar's power derived from God,
In i8l7, Z.I. Kameev became curator of the Khar’kov
educational district, and two years later instructed all the
professors at the University that their teaching should conform
not only with the Bible, but with the interpretation of Christianity
given by the Swiss theosopher, J.P. DutoSt-MembriniP The rector
of the University, T.F. Osipovsky, was dismissed in 1820 for an
alleged comment to a student that it was more appropriate to say
. 1 4»God exists» rather than »God lives», Osipovsky offers a parallel 
with Lubkin, in that before his pioneering work in the advancement 
of mathematics in Russia, he delivered a sharp attack on Kant's 
'a priori' treatment of time and space. Thus opposition to Kant 
was no safeguard, despite the loathing in which he was held by the 
militant mystics of the Russian Bi-ble Society, I
I have dwelt upon the reaction as it affected the universities 
because one can see, albeit in exaggerated form, the inauguration 
of a new kind of antirationalist, and specifically anti-materialist 
ideological aggression on the part of the government, and in its 
broadest sense the Orthodox Church. It must be said however that 
Magnitsky and his imitators represent one aspect only of a broad 
cultural and political reaction which persisted up until the time
of the Crimean War, long after the zeal of Magnitsky and Runich 
had become an embarrassment to the authorities. Although the 
relatively short-lived ascendancy of these men in the universities 
gives the episode the air of an aberration, their demise, like the 
earlier resignation of Prince Golitsyn in 1824, was due not to a 
change of heart but to a change of hue, that is, the re-establishment 
of the ascendancy of the Orthodox hierarchy in place of the somewhat 
latitudinarian mysticism which had flourished in the Emperor’s 
mind and realm since l8l2. As far as public educational 
institutions were concerned, there grew within government circles 
out of this heterogeneity of conservative, reactionary and mystical 
ideas an outright suspicion of philosophy and the emergent social 
sciences alongside a new ambivalent attitude towards the natural 
sciences, which was nothing less than a volte-face in comparison 
with the curricular innovation incorporated into the educational 
reforms. This is all the more remarkable when it is remembered 
that the expansion of the teaching of mathematics and the natural 
sciences which characterised this innovation was even for a time 
mimicked by the theological academies. I
I have already made the point that the fruits of the new system 
of public education were more potential than actual. The number of 
students at gymnasia and similar secondary schools had risen from 
approximately 5,600 in 1809 to only some 7*700 in 1825. The rise 
in enrolments at the universities was proportionately greater, 
though the numbers involved even smaller: the figures for 1808-9 
at the Universities of Moscow, Dorpat, Khar'kov and Kazan combined 
were 450, while in 1823-24 they had risen to a little over 1 ,600.
It is noteworthy, though probably coincidental, that the lowest 
figures were in Magnitsky’s stamping-ground at Kazan.^ Although
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the University professors were clearly not overburdened with 
teaching and lecturing responsibilities, it was not a propitious 
period for intellectual achievements. It is fortunate that 
N.I. Lobachevsky, who was dean of the physical-mathematical faculty 
at Kazan University from 1820 to 1825, was no more than delayed 
by Magnitsky's incumbency in his epoch-malting elaboration of a 
non-Euclidean geometry.
It would be impossible to argue that the Decembrist 
rebellion was even partially a direct outcome of the educational 
reforms, though this in itself is connected with the relative 
lack of vigour of the new institutions. The Decembrists were 
almost entirely young army officers of noble stock, and many 
were bora into rich aristocratic families from Moscow and 
St. Petersburg. Consequently they participated in the nobility's 
moves to avoid public schools, and were generally educated in 
alternative private establishments, or existing institutions 
reserved for the nobility. An exception must be made for the 
Society of United Slavs, which was first called by that name in 
1823, and was grafted onto the Southern Society of the Decembrists 
as late as September 1825. Its members were in many ways the 
prototypes of the radical raznochintsy of the l860*s, and were 
generally the sons of small landowners, ruined noblemen, minor 
government officials or clerics. One was the son of a Ukrainian 
peasant, but ran away from home at the age of 17 and exchanged
his family name of Duntsov when he managed to obtain documents in
l6the name of a dvoryanin P.F. Vygodovsky. He had received some 
education at a Catholic school, whereas some of his future comrades 
had benefitted from the new system of public schools. I.I.Gorbachevsky, 
for example, attended the Vitebsk gymnasium, while V.A. Bechasnov
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was educated at its counterpart in Ryazan' before proceeding to
the Cadet Corps. N.A. Kryukov, who was a member of the Southern
Society, spent some time at the Nizhegorod gymnasium, but this
17was because his father was governor of Nizhegorod.
Kryukov was at once unusual amongst the membership of the
Northern and Southern Societies in having attended a public
secondary school, and also typical in that he received his first
instruction at the aristocratic boarding school of Moscow University,
an experience he shared with V.F. Raevsky (the first 'Decembrist'
to be arrested), F.F. Vadkovsky, M.A. Fonvizin and P.G. Kakhovsky,
l8one of the five to go to the scaffold in 1826. Although this 
particular 'school within a school* was a legacy of the previous 
century (Novikov is numbered amongst its graduates), the 
proliferation of boarding schools catering exclusively for the 
nobility was more characteristic of the first two decades of the 
nineteenth century, particularly after 1809, when the government 
issued two decrees, inspired by Speransky, the first of which 
abrogated the preferential entitlement of the sons of aristocratic 
families to exemption from the lower grades of state service, and 
the second of which made the attainment of a whole range of higher 
grades conditional upon graduation from a university, or passing an 
entrance examination administered by a university.^ This could 
be seen as legislation following logically from the educational 
reforms, from the state's pressing need for qualified personnel 
in education, medicine, government, the armed forces and industry, 
and from Peter's original conception of a nobility entirely defined 
by service. But it was also at loggerheads with the nobility's 
increasing attempts to throw off its service obligations and replace 
them with service privileges, and thereby achieve some kind of
corporate status. But the extent to which the government felt 
in a position to enact such unpopular legislation is an indication 
of the increasing dissonance between the goals of the bureaucracy 
and the nobility, and moreover of the increasing social distance 
between the two. This is particularly well illustrated by 
Speransky himself, whose non-noble origins (he was the son of a 
village priest) and non-noble training (he was educated at the 
Vladimir and St. Petersburg theological seminaries) made him a 
natural lightning conductor for aristocratic resentment. The 
differences ' should not, however, at this time as well as
in the latter years of the eighteenth century, be overemphasised, 
since underlying the decrees is a continuing need by the state for 
the service function of the nobility, and since the evasion of 
public educational institutions to which the legislation was an 
attempted countermeasure was on the part of the nobility a 
manifestation not only of class prejudice towards their open 
nature, but also of a justifiable judgment that the years spent in 
secondary and tertiary education would be worth considerably less 
to a young dvoryanin than the same years spent in state service.
Generally speaking, the aristocratic boarding schools proved
inadequately staffed to fulfil their twofold function of preserving
the social isolation of the nobility and enabling them to meet the
new qualifications for high state service. An exception must be
made for the aforementioned state-sponsored Tsarskosel»skoe Lyceum,
which was founded in l8ll, and which was attended by the future
Decembrists I.I. Pushchin and V.K. Kuchelbecker, and also the poet
Pushkin, who moved in Decembrist circles but was considered too
21unreliable for initiation. Exception cannot be made for the 
Jesuit boarding schools, which multiplied after l8l0, the year in
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which Count A.P. Razumovsky became Minister of Education. It 
is no coincidence that Razumovsky was heavily influenced by the 
Catholic reactionary philosopher and founder of Ultramontanism 
Joseph de Maistre, who had been since 1803 the King of Sardinia's 
minister plenipotentiary in St. Petersburg. In 1820, the Jesuits 
were expelled for their proselytising zeal on behalf of Catholicism, 
though they seem to have been singularly unsuccessful in this
respect in the case of the Decembrist A.P. Baryatinsky, who
22attended one of their St. Petersburg establishments.
Several leading Decembrists were educated in the traditional
aristocratic manner by private tutors, and some enjoyed the
benefits of learning abroad. Sergey Murav'ev-Apostol, for example,
before he became a student at the Institute of Communications
which was founded in Alexander's reign, was educated at a Parisian
private boarding-school with his brother Matvey. M.P. Bestuzhev-
Ryumin, who with Murav'ev-Apostol negotiated the union of the
Southern Society with the Society of United Slavs, was fortunate
enough to be educated at home by foreign tutors, and professors
from Moscow University. P.I. Pestel', like Radishchev, was a
student in Germany (in Hamburg and Dresden) and his example
undeniably gives some substance to Sturdza's and Magnitsky's
horror of the German universities. Many Decembrists (including
K.F. Ryleev, A.A. Bestuzhev-Marlinsky, N.A. Bestuzhev and D.I.
Zavalishin) received a traditional noblemen's training in the 
23Corps of Cadets.
Although few Decembrists were actually educated in the new 
public schools, and very rarely in the new universities, their 
theoretical and practical concern with education is fully 
consonant with the spirit of the reforms. This is perhaps no more
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than would be expected from a group whose theoreticians gave 
virtually unanimous tacit endorsement to a philosophy of history 
which like that of the eighteenth-century French philosophes 
accorded primary causative status to a concept like 'enlightenment•, 
and conversely to ignorance, illusion, superstitution and so on.2^ 
It was this endorsement which would earn the reproval of successive 
generations of historical materialists, expressed in the judgment 
that those Decembrists who were materialists were in this respect 
•inconsistent', or at best that their materialism was 
•metaphysical'. But given that they shared in the Enlightenment's 
rationalist optimism that proper education and the advance of 
knowledge would inevitably lead to greater happiness, the solution 
of social problems and the elaboration of the true principles of 
morality (the entire complex of inferences resting on a kind of 
Socratic moral determinism), it is scarcely surprising to find 
education included in the four "fields of activity" designated 
by the moderate Constitution of the Society of Welfare. J However 
since one of the other fields is 'philanthropy', it could be 
argued that this early concentration on education reflects more a 
masonic belief in change by individual conversion, rather than a 
belief in education as a vehicle of social reform. Indeed there 
is in later manifestoes like the Northern Society's Constitution 
or the Southern Society's Russkaya Pravda a concentration on the 
details of political, economic and social measures to the 
detriment of a fresh and constructive educational policy. One 
cannot help but relate this alteration in emphasis to an 
emergent distrust, even fear, within the two major societies 
of anything akin to popular participation in the movement, which 
can be put down to the unwitting class prejudices on the part of 
their members, or exceptionally to the estimation of a hard-headed
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strategist like Pestel' that a military uprising should 
precede social reform. This tends to lend a hollow ring of 
abstraction to declamations in Decembrist writings about "the 
goddess of enlightenment" and inspired in Gorbachevsky of the 
more plebeian Society of United Slavs suspicion of Pestel's 
highhandedness and Sergey Murav’ev Apostol's cynical
"Machiavellian" appeal to the simple faith of the troops in
26his Orthodox Catechism.
Against this, it should be pointed out that the reason for 
Major V.F. Raevsky’s arrest on 6 February 1822 was that he was 
suspected of disseminating revolutionary propoganda in his 
capacity as teacher in Major-General M.F. Orlov’s divisional 
Junkers school and Lancastrian school for soldiers of the ranks. 
After his eventual exile in 1828, Raevsky married a peasant
woman and founded a school at the village of Olonki, near
27Irkutsk. By far the most impressive pedagogic achievement
amongst the Siberian exiles was to the credit of I.D. Yakushkin,
whose two single-sex schools at Yalutorovsk produced more than
28
1600 graduates.
It may be more than coincidental that the two foremost 
Decembrist, educationalists were also two of the Soviet pantheon 
of convinced atheists and materialists claimed to have continued 
the tradition of Lomonosov and Radishchev. I do not wish to 
argue that the educational reforms were in any sense responsible 
for the emergence of such views in any individuals; it may be 
however that the reforms and subsequent reaction form part of a 
complex of social factors, and are also the vivid expression of 
shifting social patterns, which although they do not provide a 
causal explanation of a given individual’s views, at any rate
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throw light on the fact that those views attain cultural 
significance. The first point I wish to make does not relate to 
the Decembrists, though it does to their immediate successors. 
This is that the reforms, in conjunction with Speransky's decrees 
of 1809, eventually, from the l820's onwards, succeeded in 
diverting the nobility into the universities, which despite the 
attentions of Magnitsky and Runich for a few years, became 
repositories of German learning in general, and specifically 
German idealist philosophy. This cluster of conditions, provides 
the intellectual kernel for the development of the true radical 
intelligentsia, of which the Decembrists are justly considered the 
prototypes.
As far as the Alexandrine period and the Decembrists are 
concerned, it is probably the failure of the reforms and the 
reaction against them which tells us more. Apart from the lack of 
personnel and of resources, both in their own ways to a large 
extent brought about by the Napoleonic Wars, the nobility's 
preference for the dancing classes and etiquette of the private 
boarding-schools represents not only an intellectual frivolity 
inherited from the previous century but also a widening gulf of 
similar vintage between the goals of the nobility and the monarchy 
as executed by its bureaucracy. It has been argued that the ill- 
fated Decembrist uprising was the last of three significant 
attempts only of the service élite to restrain the autocrat's 
unlimited power, the first being during the so-called Time of 
Troubles spanning the turn of the 17th century, and the second 
the occasion of the Empress Anne's accession in 1730. 29 The high 
social standing of many leading Decembrists and their families 
certainly favours such an interpretation, though to accept it
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wholesale would be to lend little weight to the sincerity of the 
principles underlying their reformist projects and manifestoes.
In any case, this grand level of theorising is difficult to 
assess, particularly where one’s own depth of knowledge across a 
broad sweep of history is lacking. I can only reiterate that in 
the case of the Decembrists, unfulfilled, not to say rejected, 
expectations play a major part in their eventual opposition to 
the monarchy, either in practice or in principle, and it may be 
that materialism, if indeed it is an academic interpretation of 
the world which goes hand in hand with a political desire to change 
it, became that much more likely in association with an educational 
policy which during one decade was an enthusiastic sponsor of 
curricular innovation, and in the next branded it as corrupt and 
godless. In conclusion, suffice it to say that it was in the 
educational area that the government made its first public 
assault on the evils of atheism and materialism, and in so doing 
fully recognised for the first time the double-edged weapon that 
advanced education represented for the maintenance of unlimited 
power. In other words, if recognised quite early that in order 
to produce both highly qualified and highly obedient personnel, 
an intellectually acceptable ideology was necessary, moreover one 
which was opposed to materialism, perceived as coterminous with
revolution
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Section 2 - Western Ideas
The rather artificial and schematic choice of subheadings 
referred to in Section I is nowhere more apparent when contact 
with Western Europe is considered in implied isolation from the 
other factors selected as the possible conditions of the increasing 
significance of materialist thought in Russia. As we have already 
seen, the new universities were modelled on their German counterparts; 
the four-tier system of public schools can be derived from the 
Frenchman Condorcet's philosophy of education; and even the rhetoric 
of the reaction, directed as it was against the flood of depravation 
from the West, can be linked to the presence in Russia of de Maistre. 
It would indeed be difficult to select any major act of 
legislation, work of philosophy or science, or any element of the 
entire intellectual superstructure of Alexander's Russia as 
entirely independent of some kind of Western influence. It might 
follow from this that a separate consideration of the role of the 
West were redundant, were it not for the peculiar intensification 
of contact with it during Alexander's reign, and did it not raise 
an important question of theory as to how far such external 
influences can be accepted as an explanation of what they 
influenced.
Magnitsky's aquatic metaphor for the spread of Western ideas 
seems particularly appropriate when one considers the reign of 
the Emperor Paul, in comparison with which the first decade of 
his son's rule seems like the opening of the floodgates. Paul's 
apparently liberal gesture in releasing Radishchev and Novikov 
from prison may have been more in defiance of Catherine's memory, and 
it seems that the only thing he had in common with his mother was 
a thorough detestation of the French Revolution. His xenophobic
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prohibition of both study and travel abroad for Russian subjects,
and of the import of foreign publications and music contrasts
vividly with his eldest son’s avowed ambition as a young man simply
to live as a private citizen with his wife beside the Rhine.1
Indeed it was Alexander’s suspected scorn for Russians which
wounded many potentially loyal young Decembrist army officers.
That a new stance had been adopted towards Western Europe during
the first years of Alexander’s reign can be seen from the
membership of the short-lived Anglophile ’’Unofficial Committee".
Count Paul Stroganov was taught by the radical French mathematician
Gilbert Romrae, a member of the Jacobin Club, who used to take his
pupil to its meetings during the first years of the Revolution.
Stroganov was also a member of the select English Club, and the
other three members of the Committee, Prince Adam Czartoryski,
N.N. Novosil’tsev and Count Viktor Kochubey passed several of their
earlier years in England. It is noteworthy that two other liberals
of a rather different hue,Speransky and Admiral N.S. Mordvinov,
2married Englishwomen.
It is natural that while the proto-Westerners of the "Unofficial
Committee" had the monarch's ear, the censorship should be relaxed,
particularly as this was also the wish of older statesmen and
literary figures like Zavadovsky, Count A.R. Vorontsov, G.R.
Derzhavin and N.M. Karamzin. The new law concerning censorship
of 9 July 1804 exempted foreign books sent to private individuals,
but ordered that manuscripts intended for publication be submitted
, 3
to the Ministry of Education. The limitations of this measure
were soon apparent, when in the same year, I.P. Pnin's Essay on
Enlightenment with regard to Russia was prohibited and withdrawn
from all libraries when the author in the second revised version
4argued against serfdom. Although the new Tsar had abolished
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Catherine's "Secret Expedition", Russia's participation in the 
Third Coalition against Napoleon's France prompted the revival of 
the security police, thereby accelerating the end of a pause in 
surveillance and censorship. In 1805 a provisional committee 
of public security was set up under the Ministry of the Interior, 
and made permanent at the beginning of 1807. The committee, which 
incidentally included Novosil'tsev in its membership, was charged 
with the surveillance of individuals and societies, especially 
the masonic lodges, a function which was carried out by the Special 
Chancery of the Ministry of Police from l8ll to 1819, the time in 
which that ministry existed separately from the Ministry of the 
Interior. Thus we can see that even before Golitsyn's Academic 
Committee and the Magnitsky era in the universities, an alliance, 
albeit often notable for its lack of cooperation and communcation, 
had been formed between the educational authorities and the police 
for the control of Western influences. Nevertheless, a dramatic 
expansion took place during the first years of Alexander's reign 
in the publication of books, a large proportion of which were 
translations of foreign works. It is perhaps not surprising, not 
only in view of the Anglophile complexion of Alexander's earlier 
counsellors, but also given the fact that, unlike its French 
neighbours, England had managed to combine monarchy with liberal 
political and legal institutions, that the throne lent its weight 
to an unusual Russian vogue for English and Scottish thought by 
ordering the translation of Jeremy Bentham's Discourse on Civil 
and Penal Legislation and Jean Louis Delolme's The Constitution of 
England. Admiral Mordvinov chose Bacon, Newton, Adam Smith and 
Bentham as the four greatest contributors to human welfare; Newton's 
Principia Mathematica, Sir William Blackstone's Commentaries on the
Laws of England, and Adam Smith's The Wealth of Nations were
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all translated.
It need hardly be pointed out that much of what was 
advocated in these works was at complete loggerheads with 
economic« legal and political practice in autocratic Russia, 
and that it was equally clear from the earliest years of the 
nineteenth century that the monarchy had no intention of 
yielding up any of its absolute legislative power, either to 
the Senate or later on to the State Council proposed by 
Speransky. Could it not be, then, that the influx, sponsored 
by the government, of Western literature espousing liberal 
political systems, planted seeds of reform in the minds of the 
young Decembrists, and that in the oppressive climate of censorship 
and surveillance which followed, these seeds grew into attitudes of 
radical opposition? There seems to be a clear analogy here between 
the educational model for the development of materialist thought 
and the literary model for the growth of political opposition, 
and not only an analogy but a connection in that the literary 
model provides that degree of opposition which makes the 
government’s own opposition to materialism and atheism a 
recommendation of them. Needless to say, the applicability of a 
similar literary model to the acceptance of materialist ideas 
themselves could be investigated, whether in conjunction with 
the growth of oppositional political views, or indeed as in 
itself the simplest explanation possible for the existence of 
materialists in Russia; the fact that certain individuals had 
access, for example, to the writings of Epicurus or d’Holbach, 
might be singled out as the necessary and sufficient antecedent 
condition of their views.
5
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Whatever approach one favours, the questions begged by each 
one concern the relationship between the accessibility of certain 
views in books and periodicals, and their acceptability to certain 
individuals and groups. Alexandre Koyré, in a work spanning this 
period, makes the following observations
"En effet, on peut dire que toute l'histoire intellectuelle 
de la Russie moderne est dominée et déterminée par un seul 
et même fait: 'le fait du contact et de l'opposition entre la Russie 
et l'Occident, celui de la pénétration de la civilisation européenne 
en Russie."^
It would be hard to imagine a Magnitsky gainsaying the implied potency 
of Western thought; indeed to that extent the sentiment was apparently 
shared by the Investigating Commission set up by Nicholas I to 
interrogate the Decembrist insurgents. For instance, in the standard 
questionnaire to which the prisoners were required to submit written 
answers, the following questions were puts
"From what time and from where did you acquire liberal :
thoughts^•i;e. were they communicated by other people, or by the
reading:of books or works in manuscript, and which ones? Who helped
7to implant these thoughts in you?"
It must be said that the Decembrists were not reluctant to answer 
this question, and that their replies give plenty of valuable 
information about the kinds of books and authors by which they were 
undoubtedly influenced. But it should be noted that they were led 
by the question's assumption that liberal ideas were acquired, 
either by contact with others or by reading books and manuscripts, 
and moreover that it was palpably in the interest of the accused to 
ascribe their criminal beliefs and activities to some kind of 
contagion from abroad, rather than to their own deepest convictions.
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Unfortunately, this kind of explanation failed to mitigate their 
crimes as far as their judges were concerned, in all probability 
because the latter were unable to conceive of any other kind of 
explanation. Apart from those considerations, the replies of the 
Decembrists to this particular question are striking as much for 
the diversity, within certain limits, as the similarity of the 
books and authors which they single out as the culprits. A penitent 
Bestuzhev-Ryumin mentions the tragedies of Voltaire and the "empty- 
worded" de Pradt, while Pestel' attributes his transition from a 
constitutional to a republican way of thinking to; amongst other 
things, reading Antoine Destutt de Tracy. A.A. Bestuzhev-Marlinsky 
cites Bentham and the historian Heeren, whereas both Ryleev and
E.P. Obolensky choose Bignon and Benjamin Constant. More 
traditional fare is selected by the religious convert A.N. Murav'ev, 
who read Machiavelli, Montesquieu and Rousseau's Contrat Social, 
and by the leader of the Society of the United Slavs, P.I. Borisov,
g
who went back to the Lives of Plutarch and Cornelius. Moreover, 
this diversity does not correlate with divergencies of opinion over 
the principal disjunctions of Decembrist social and political 
philosophy (republic or constitutional monarchy, federation or 
strong central government, emancipation of the serfs with or 
without land, and so on).
The most fundamental objection that can be made against Koyre's 
observation is that to treat the history of ideas as a process of 
cross-pollination, or an exercise in genealogy, is ultimately 
unsatisfying. Apart from the fact that as a general procedure it 
would sooner or later logically short-circuit, since not every 
writer's thoughts could all be derived from the others', it also 
tells us very little to say, for example, that Pestel' was a
republican because he read Destutt de Tracy. We may never be 
able to explain why.an individual like Pestel is attracted 
towards republican views, but his admiration of Destutt de 
Tracy is part of that attraction, and not the cause of it.
The same can be said about groups and philosophical vogues.
It is true in a sense that modes of philosophical thinking in 
Russia were determined at various points in its history by the 
prevalence of the works of Voltaire, Schelling, Hegel, Feuerbach 
and Marx. But there is obviously more to the particular appeal 
of each thinker to its generation than the availability of their 
works and the passage of time. For one thing, and this is 
increasingly true from 1801 onwards, each thinker or school of 
thought is but one of a variety of West European intellectual 
inputs, and however unoriginal the Decembrist theorists may have 
been, one can still ask why certain views had more appeal than 
others. It should be borne in mind that in the masonic lodges, 
future and even actual Decembrists, and other young men of much 
the same social background were taken with the mysticism of Jung- 
Stilling and Eckartshausen. Just as the Schellingians of the 
l820*s and 30's could swallow the indigestible imperfections of 
the empirical world by an appeal to a higher reality, so some of 
the freemasons were comforted by Jakob Boehme's sedative doctrine 
that evil is God's creation necessary for the realisation of the 
good; similarly, they could by obedience of the commandments prepare 
themselves for elevation to the ranks of the angels in Emanuel 
Swedenborg's Spiritual World. In other words, from the same 
generation, one group of the educated nobility when presented with 
theoretically the same Western European intellectual menu could opt 
for a metaphysic diametrically opposed to another group's choice, 
even though Russian reality were apparently equally unacceptable
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to both. In this respect, on one hand the masonic mystics, and 
later on the Young Men of the Archives and Wisdom-lovers,and on 
the other the Decembrists, anticipate the opposing views of the 
Slavophiles and Westerners of the l830*s and 40's. It may be 
that this is a paradox of dimension only, and that finer 
focussing on family background, psychological make-up, personal 
acquaintances and chance contact with a particular sort of 
philosophy at an opportune point of personal development might 
prove more revealing, but such divergent reactions present at 
least a prima facie logical obstacle for Koyr£' thesis.
The contact, or contagion theory not only fails to explain 
why similar groups are attracted towards opposing ideas, but 
also why one group is particularly infected by one set of ideas 
rather than another. That a historically significant group in 
the first quarter of the nineteenth century should in part turn 
towards materialism is both in itself and in terms of the contact 
theory surprising, since the period marks a low ebb in the history 
of materialist thought generally. By this time the optimism and 
speculative bravado, generated by the Newtonian synthesis in 
mechanics and culminating in the materialism of La Mettrie and 
d'Holbach, had lost their vigour, and interest was being focussed 
upon what could not be explained by the world-view of Newton's 
disciples, rather that what could. Newton's demonstration that 
the gravity of falling bodies could also account for the observed 
paths of the heavenly bodies lent itself to an atomism which 
rendered obsolete the crude mechanistic analogies of Boyle's 
philosophia corpuscularis. Although Newton himself was loath to 
speculate about the mechanism by which bodies gravitate towards 
each other with a mathematically describable regularity, this did
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not deter some of his followers from an easy ascription of an 
attractive force to the very material nature of the bodies 
themselves, a hypothesis expressly rejected by the author of the 
Principia. In Britain this standpoint was adopted by, for 
instance, the mathematician Cotes, though he, like most other 
contemporaries and followers of Boyle and Newton, such as Samuel 
Clarke, Richard Bentley, William Whiston and Colin Maclaurin, were 
at pains to demonstrate the compatibility of theism with the 
mechanical philosophy. This was less the case on the continent 
of Europe; although the French were impressed by Newton's 
achievements, they were not like his compatriots overawed. 
Mathematicians like Clairaut and Laplace tidied up some 
mathematical inaccuracies in the Principia. and in conjunction 
with more accurate empirical data, were able to dispense with 
Newton's appeal to "active principles" or agencies of God to 
overhaul the system from time to time. Add to the new atom not 
only attractive but repulsive forces, and one can with a few 
mental leaps envisage a materialist metaphysic which could in 
principle digest all observed physical phenomena, including 
heat, light, gravity, magnetism and what was known of electricity. 
Add again an even greater problem-hopping attribution of 
sensation to matter, and there emerges the materialist strand in 
French Enlightenment thought dating from La Mettxie's Natural 
History of the Soul in 17^5»
But the very development of French materialism was paralleled 
by scientific developments which would undermine its theoretical 
foundations. Although the emergence of chemistry as an exact 
science, following the elucidation of the nature of combustion, 
Lavoisier's modern nomenclature and Dalton's atomic theory,
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promised to add colour and depth to the materialists» world-view, 
the nature of chemical affinity remained obscure. Humphry Davy, 
after his electrolytic decomposition of potash and soda, suggested 
that chemical affinity might be electrical in nature. Davy, though, 
was no materialist, and baulked at Dalton's atomism; his intimation 
of the relationship between chemistry and electricity may not be 
unconnected with a taste for German idealist philosophy nurtured in 
his youthful friendship with the Romantic poets Southey and Coleridge. 
But that Schelling's Naturphilosophie should have influenced the 
development of chemistry, though not in itself surprising, is less 
likely than in the case of physics, where quantitative 
experimentation upon the phenomena of heat, light, electricity and 
magnetism rendered their material and mechanical interpretation in 
terms of "imponderable fluids" less tenable, and left open the way 
for a dynamic world-view. This goes some way towards accounting for 
the considerable influence amongst scientists of Schelling's views 
on the fundamental unity of nature, despite the patent opposition 
to empiricism in his methodology. Russian science, particularly in 
the person of D.M. Vellansky, a professor at the Medical and 
Surgical Academy at St. Petersburg who had attended lectures by 
Schelling in Germany, proved an enthusiastic host for German 
idealism, though it was not thereby inspired to emulate the 
achievements of Davy or of Hans Christian Oersted, who discovered 
electromagnetism in 1819.
It might at this point be argued that the contact theory 
still holds for the Decembrists, since the reaction against 
empiricism and materialism was largely German led, and in Russia 
German influence was still largely confined to the administration 
and to education, both of which fields were not favoured by a still
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Francophile nobility. Hence they would not be expected necessarily
to enjoin the opprobrium which the Young Goethe and his companions
heaped upon Baron d 'Holbach, whose Système de la Nature, according
to Goethe, appeared to them "as the very quintessence of senility,
9as unsavoury, nay, absurd." Nevertheless, the aforementioned 
Moscow circle of Schellingian 'Wisdom-lovers' were equally anxious 
to dissociate themselves from the views of the French Enlightenment, 
and their very name 'Lyubomudry* was a conscious Slavonic 
substitution for 'filosofy', which carried at that time the 
connotation of 'philosophes*. The foremost wisdom-lovers, Prince 
V.F. Odoevsky, D.V. Venevitinov, I.V. Kireevsky, A.I. Koshelev and 
N.M. Rozhalin were contemporaries of the Decembrists, and there 
were undoubtedly connections between the groups. Koshelev, for 
instance, was at one stage induced by Ryleev to read French writers 
like Benjamin Constant; V.K. Kuchelbecker co-edited the journal 
'Mnemozina' with the conservative Odoevsky, whose cousin A.I.
Odoevsky was also a Decembrist.* 0 There is certainly no question, 
either, that the Decembrists were unaware of the German philosophers. 
Indeed, E.P. Obolensky, who was one of the most radical and politically 
active of the conspirators, and who took command of the mutiny in 
Senate Square on 14 December 1825, declared himself a Schellingian 
in an admittedly defensive letter to S.N. Kashkin. According to 
the future conservative F.N, Glinka in his testimony to Nicholas I's 
Investigating Commission, Obolensky was also interested in Indian 
mythology and the Zend-Avesta, and therefore it should be kept in 
mind that he presents a clear counter-example to any attempt to 
establish a one-to-one relationship between radical political views 
and materialist philosophy. 11 Amonst the other Decembrists,
Raevsky vas familiar with German philosophy, though he preferred 
Condillac to the systems of Kant and Schelling. Yakushkin, on
the other hand, apparently preferred the critical philosophy to 
empiricism: Locke*s epistemology, which Yakushkin confused with 
Condillac's sensationalism, makes twice two equal five, the 
correct computation being provided by Kant's a priori categories.
This is not to deny that there was in general amongst the
Decembrists a leaning towards French rather than German authors,
but it must be stressed that their preference is not blind, and
whether consciously or not, some selection must have taken place.
Furthermore, if materialist views are to be attributed to the
influence of the philosophes, it needs to be explained why the
materialists rather than the deists held sway, particularly when
insofar as one can talk of a tradition in Russian intellectual
history during the eighteenth century, the nobility's taste was
predominantly for Voltairian freethought. Although Voltaire was
an ardent proselytiser of Newtonian natural philosophy in France
(his Elements de la Philosophie de Newton appeared in 1738), what
he apparently prized in the English mathematician's work was what
Newton himself argued, namely that it pointed to the existence of
an all-powerful Creator. Voltaire favoured design over an
Epicurean chance concourse of atoms, and wondered that Lucretius'
De Rerum Natura, which he described as a course in atheism, was
sold to the public and could even be found in the libraries of
l4cardinals and archbishops. It might also be worth mentioning 
in passing that in France there were some who saw that the new 
atom invested with attractive and repulsive forces which had 
been derived from Newtonian mechanics could be stripped of the 
notion of extension which it had inherited from the past. Thus 
a dynamic point-atom representing a halfway house to Schelling's 
objective idealism was posited as early as 1758 by R.G. Boscovich,
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the Italian Jesuit astronomer who spent his last years in Paris, 
and a similar immaterialist view was adopted in the following 
century by the mathematician A.L. Cauchy and the physicist 
A.M, Ampere. Cauchy, incidentally, was a devout Catholic and 
Royalist who defended the Jesuit Order which d’Alembert had 
attacked, and Ampere's father was guillotined by the Republican 
Army after the rising at Lyon in 1793, evidence for a trinity of 
immaterialism, religiosity and conservatism converse to the one 
under discussion here.
It would be unfair to Koyre to infer from one statement 
taken from his writings on Russian intellectual history that his 
interest in the ideas of the Alexandrine epoch extends only as 
far as their perpetrators’ bookshelves. For one thing, he refers 
to the "opposition" between Russia and the West as well as contact 
between them, and I intend in a later subsection to consider whether 
it is not rather the opposition between certain groups within 
Russian society which better explains what might be called 
differential selectivity from a broad-fronted "penetration of 
European civilisation into Russia." There comes a point in all this 
discussion about Russia and the West, which has so dogged Russian 
historiography, even in speculation about the emergence of the first 
East Slavic state in the ninth century, when one wonders if it does 
not rest on a rather unconvincing West European identity which owes 
its existence simply to Russia being the focus of attention. It 
is hardly surprising in the wake of this to find with regard to the 
Decembrists a countervailing imbalance in Soviet scholarship on the 
side of their undoubted patriotism, rejection of a blind worship 
of the West and resentment of the participation of foreigners in 
the government, together with an undue emphasis on indigenous
133
sources in the present concern with the genealogy of their thought.
The via media might be as follows. The truth which underlies 
Koyr6's observation is that the raw material of Russian 
philosophical thought was almost always imported. But it is not 
the raw material alone which determines the finished product. For 
example, some of the ideas of bourgeois France and Germany would, 
during the course of the nineteenth century, take on forms adapted 
to and moulded by Russian conditions, and of course by Russian 
thinkers, as in the case of Bakunin's anarchism, Herzen's agrarian 
socialism, and Lenin's Bolshevism. The Voltairian fad may have 
been largely a form of servile imitation for the benefit of the 
autocrat; but at the same time, a firmly rooted eclectic or 
reactive philosophical culture was developing, and it is the 
processes of selection and adaptation which offer most to the 
student of Russian intellectual history. To this end even mistakes, 
inconsistencies and misunderstandings of Western authors can be 
instructive, as is well illustrated during the first decade or so 
of the penetration of Hegelian philosophy into Russia. Put 
simply, the burden of the argument is that foreign books, and for 
that matter foreign affairs in general, including the experiences 
of travel or service abroad, are neither collectively nor a fortiori 
in themselves sufficient to explain the Decembrist movement, but as 
raw material, or ingredients, are undoubtedly necessary,
I have so far concentrated largely on the foreign or translated 
written word in this discussion of the West's impact upon the 
Decembrist movement, in the main because Koyr£'s statement is applied 
to the entire span of modern Russian intellectual history. But to 
confine the discussion to literary influences would be negligent in 
view of the decisive importance in the formation of Decembrist
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attitudes accorded by some historians, and indeed by some of the 
Decembrists, to the army's European campaign following Napoleon's 
disastrous invasion of Russia in the autumn of 1812. Although 
some of the leading Decembrists, notably Mikhail Bestuzhev-Ryumin, 
Kakhovsky, Borisov, Kryukov and Baryatinsky were too young to take 
part in the Napoleonic Wars, many of their elders, such as Pestel', 
Sergey Murav'ev-Apostol, Ryleev, Fonvizin and Yakushkin, joined in 
the pursuit of the French Army across Prussia and Saxony, a pursuit 
which culminated in March l8l4 with the entry of Tsar Alexander 
and Frederick William of Prussia into Paris itself. Yakushkin 
recalled that when he first joined the select Semenovsky regiment 
in l8ll, the officers would play cards, drink and carouse, but that 
in l8l4 after the formation of an artel' of 15-20 officers, they 
were given to playing chess, reading foreign newspapers and 
following European events. He spoke of the inevitable effect on 
thinking Russian youth of a whole year in Germany and some months 
in Paris, an effect expressed in a profound dissatisfaction with 
many aspects of Russian society on their return:
"In l8l4, existence for young people in Petersburg was tedious.
In the past two years, we had seen with our own eyes great events
which had decided the fate of nations, and in some measure had
taken part in them; now it was unbearable to look upon the empty
life of Petersburg, to hear the chatter of the old men, extolling
all the old things and deriding every move forward. We were now
15100 years ahead of them."
These sentiments were echoed and amplified by Fonvizin, who was 
enrolled into the newly formed Society of Salvation by Yakushkin 
shortly after his transfer from the Semenovsky regiment to the 
regiment of chasseurs of which Fonvizin was colonel. He gave the
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following account of the effect of the Great Patriotic War and 
the European campaign of 1813-14 on the young Russian army 
officers;
"In the course of two years of fraught military life, amid 
constant danger, they were accustomed to strong emotions, which 
for the brave ones became almost a necessity.
It was in this frame of mind, with a feeling of their own 
worth and an elevated love of the fatherland that the majority 
of the guards and general staff officers returned to Petersburg 
in 1815. In the campaigns across Germany and France, our young 
people had become familiar with European civilisation, which had 
made such a strong impression upon them, that they were able to 
compare everything they had seen abroad with what faced them at 
every turn in their own country - the enslavement of the vast 
majority of Hussions, the cruelty of superiors towards their 
subordinates, the abuse of power in every form, everything 
governed arbitrarily - all of this shocked and disgusted educated 
Russians and their patriotic feelings. During the campaign many 
of them had become acquainted with German officers, members of 
the Prussian secret union (Tugendbund) which so beneficially 
organised the rebellion in Prussia and brought about its liberation, 
and with French liberals. In candid conversations with them our 
young people unconsciously adopted their liberal ways of thought 
and aspiration towards constitutional institutions, and were 
ashamed of Russia, such a deeply humiliated autocracy."
Fonvizin goes on to ask how the young liberals could be 
satisfied after all this with the petty tasks of a vulgar regimental 
life, and worse still, be repaid for their dazzling exploits by the
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rigorous discipline of the drillground favoured by Alexander 
and his brothers.
Both Yakushlcin's memoirs and Fonvizin's essay on Russian 
history were written after many years of penal servitude and exile 
in Siberia, and it may be that even in the case of participants 
in important historical events the perspective of hindsight can 
impose upon the memory an artificial causal framework. Their 
estimation of the seminal importance of the army's European 
adventures was however shared by some of the insurgents, for 
example Ryleev and A.N. Murav'ev, in their testimony to Nicholas's 
Investigating Commission, though the quality of these submissions
as evidence of motivation is subject to the same reservations made
17earlier in this section. Bestuzhev-Marlinsky took it upon 
himself in a letter addressed to Nicholas to explain to the monarch 
the historical development of freethinking in Russia, and in so 
doing anticipated his fellow conspirators' conclusions:
"In the end, Napoleon invaded Russia and it was then that the 
Russian people first felt their own strength, it was then that 
there arose in every heart a sense of independence, at first
political, and afterwards national. This was the beginning of
18freethinking in Russia."
It would be an easy matter in the light of such evidence to opt for 
a simple explanation of the Decembrist rebellion phrased in terms 
of a dissatisfaction with Russian reality engendered by first-hand 
experience of culturally and economically more advanced Vest 
European neighbours, a hasty assimilation of their political theory 
and a naive imitation of clandestine political organisations like 
the Tugendbund and Burschenschaften in Germany, or the Italian
Carbonari. The young Decembrists' newly acquired liberalism would
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in addition be bolstered after the Napoleonic Wars by further 
heroic exploits from abroad to add to the inspiration of the 
ancients from reading the works of Plutarch and Cornelius Nepos. 
Favourites amongst the Russian students of foreign affairs were 
the German student Karl Sand, who, in March 1819, assassinated
the reactionary German dramatist and long-serving Russian agent
\
Augustus von Kotzebue; the young army officers Diego Riego and
Quiroga who led an unsuccessful attempt in 1820 to overthrow the
restored absolute monarch Ferdinand VII of Spain; the liberator
of Spanish America Sim^n Bolivar; but most of all, the early hero
of Greek War of Independence, Alexander Ypsilanti, who had served
19in the Russian Army and was known to some of the Decembrists.
It is a small step to argue firstly from the undoubted quality 
of youthful idealism and romanticism in the Russian officers’ 
reaction to their experiences on the European campaign and in their 
thirst for news of the surge of rebellion during the years 1819-21 
in South America, Spain, Portugal, Piedmont, Naples and Greece; and 
secondly, from the lamentability of the failure of their own 
uprising in comparison with the sacrifices of their heroes, to a 
conclusion that the Decembrist movement was a pale imitation of 
West European models quite inapplicable to Russia. Richard Pipes, 
for example, in a recent general history of Russia, gives the 
following verdict, in the context of a description of the normally 
apolitical and profligate Russian aristocracy:
*'In 1813-15 many younger members of these rich families, 
having spent time in Western Europe with the army of occupation, 
came under the spell of liberalism and nationalism. It is these 
people who founded the Russian counterparts of the German Tugenbunde 
and in 1825, inspired by uprisings of liberal officers in Spain,
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Portugal and Naples, made a move to abolish absolutism in Russia. 
But the Decembrist revolt had no antecedents and no issue, it was 
a solitary event, an echo of distant happenings."
Later on, he gives this opinion:
"The Decembrist movement ... was for sheer drama and the 
number and eminence of persons involved not equalled until the 
socialist-revolutionary turmoil of the 1870s. Yet it is difficult 
to make a case that it was a Russian movement properly speaking 
because its inspiration, ideals and even forms of organization 
came directly from Western Europe. They were all derived from 
the experience of post-Napoleonic France and Germany where many 
Russian dvoriane spent two or three years during the campaigns 
of 1812-13 and the occupation which ensued. It was testimony 
to the cosmopolitanism of young Russian aristocrats that they 
felt so completely at home in the political ferment of the 
Restoration era they thought it possible to transplant to their 
native land the political programmes of a Benjamin Constant,
Destutt de Tracy, or the American constitution. Once the conspiracy 
failed, these ideas evaporated, and the next generation of 
intellectuals turned to an entirely different source."20
This judgment raises some points of difficulty. As to the 
first line of the first paragraph, it is doubtful whether even a 
Magnitsky or a Runich would appeal to enchantment as an 
explanation of the liberal views of the scions of the aristocracy. 
Secondly, the most interesting aspect of the Decembrist movement 
as a part of Russian history is precisely that it does have 
antecedents and issue, but that the latter are so different from 
the former. The Decembrists are transitional figures in that their 
methods are clearly within the tradition of the army's role in the
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preceding century’s crises of succession, but their political
aims equally clearly foreshadow those of the intelligentsia.
This duality is encapsulated in the chant of the soldiers in
Senate Square; ’’Constantine and a Const it ut ioni” (even though,
it has been said, some of the soldiers thought that "Konstitutsiya"
21was the name of Grand Duke Constantine’s wife). What is more, 
some members of the intelligentsia saw themselves as the inheritors 
of the Decembrist cause, notably Herzen and Ogarev, and also men 
of the l860s like N.V. Shelgunov and M.L. Mikhailov. Herzen 
attended as a fourteen year old the singing of a Te Deum in Moscow 
in celebration of the hanging of Pestel* , Ryleev , Kakhovsky, 
Murav’ev-Apostol and Bestuzhev-Ryumin, and recalled in his journal 
Polar Star:
’’Never have the gallows been celebrated so much...
There before that altar desecrated by bloodstained prayer,,! 
swoi^ to avenge the murdered, and dedicated myself to the struggle 
with that throne, with that altar, with those cannons.”
It was in the wake of the Decembrist débàcle that he and Ogarev
made their childhood oath on the Sparrow Hills near Moscow to
22sacrifice their lives to the struggle for freedom.
Thirdly, to deny that the Decembrists were a Russian movement 
'»properly speaking” sounds like the higher redefinition fallacy, or 
logically akin to saying that no true Scotsman puts sugar on his 
porage. More seriously, it places the martyrs of 1826 on a level 
with the imitative Francophiles of the drawing-rooms of Catherine’s 
St. Petersburg, a comparison which does little justice to the 
sincerity and universality of the young officers’ critique of a 
whole range of political, social and economic ills and malpractices 
in their own beloved fatherland. On a theoretical level, since only
l4o
the most hard-headed Stalinist would not turn his good eye towards 
the undeniable indebtedness of nineteenth-century oppositional 
thought to Western sources, it must represent a fine judgment where 
to draw the line beyond which a school of thought becomes truly 
Russian. Fourthly, the question of the applicability of Western 
institutions to Russian conditions marks a Berlin Wall in much of 
Russian political thought subsequent to the Decembrists which few 
individuals straddled with ease, and if an affirmative answer to 
the question was a mark of cosmopolitanism, then that was a 
characteristic of many amongst the intelligentsia as different as 
Chaadayev, Butasevich- Petrashevsky and Plekhanov. But to argue 
that the Decembrists were little more than importers of Western 
political, theory and practice devalues the significant differences 
of opinion within and amongst the secret societies, and the debates 
over serfdom, an institution which by then was almost peculiarly 
Russian. Furthermore, Decembrists were not unaware of, or 
uninterested in, Russian history, as can be seen from Raevsky's 
glorification of "free" Novgorod and Pskov in his poem "Singer in 
the Dungeon" written after his arrest in l822.2^ Finally, although 
it is quite true that most thinking Russians of the l820s and 30s 
turned away from the ideas associated with the rebellion of 1825, 
the study of French liberal thought was preserved at Moscow 
University within the student circles of Herzen, Ogarev, N.P. 
Sungurov and the Kritsky brothers. More importantly, the 
predominance in Nicholas' first years of rule of the kind of 
idealist metaphysics sponsored under Alexander by Vellansky, Galich 
and the Wisdom-lovers is arguably due more to an other-worldly 
retreat in the face of the crushing of the Decembrists' attempt to 
better the real world, or simply to the fact that such aspirations 
were manifestly perilous, rather than to the mere "evaporation" of
alien ways of thinking. It is noteworthy that by the 1840s 
German idealism, almost as if by the impetus of its own internal 
dialectic, had led many young Russians back to materialism and 
French radical thought.
Obviously, the last few points imply an interpretation of the 
significance of Decembrist political and philosophical thought 
opposed to that of Pipes, which however, despite its almost stark 
clarity, is not open to simple refutation. The basis of my own 
opposition will become clearer throughout the next two sections.
This section has been partially intended to show that what the 
Decembrists lacked in education, they made up for in their reading 
of Western literature and service abroad. Its principal aim though 
was to argue that this contact with the West was a necessary but 
not sufficient element in the formulation of their political and 
philosophical views. It would be difficult to imagine the 
rebellion of 1825 happening when and how it did without the French 
invasion and its aftermath; but it would be equally difficult to 
equate any mere transient imitation of the West with the intensity 
of opposition to throne and altar which can from time to time be 
felt through the extant writings of the army officers, and which 
Herzen colourfully calls up from his adolescence.
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Section 3 - The Church and Religion
Remembering that one of the principal objectives of this work 
is to investigate the existence and possible nature of a relationship 
between materialism and atheism on the one hand and radical 
political opposition on the other, it has already been suggested 
that the growth of political opposition, whatever its reasons, 
might add considerable weight to the earlier hypothesis that the 
government's possible over-reaction to what it took to be 
materialism and atheism might have recommended such a world-view to 
some sections of the nobility. It was also pointed out that the 
government's sponsorship of liberal ideas before and even during 
the Great Patriotic War, only to be followed by energetic censorship 
and surveillance directed against them presents as a sequence of 
events an analogy with the Ministry of Education's curricular reforms, 
followed by its rejection of the new subjects as godless, or 
materialistic. More than one theoretical line of approach remains 
open. It could, for instance be argued that the entertainment of 
materialist views by the Decembrists suggests a broad-fronted 
disaffection with official Russia that makes the contact theory of 
the origin of their social and political views seem even more 
remotely tenable. There are some difficulties with this hypothesis: 
the contact theory could be extended to cover the adoption of 
materialism, though this would raise all the objections of the 
previous section, and would not account for the connection of 
materialism and radicalism; more seriously, if as well as regarding 
materialism as part of an overall disaffection one also wanted to 
maintain the position that opting for materialism is all the more 
explicable within an intellectual climate of growing political 
opposition, then the overall argument would be open to the charge 
of circularity, in that materialism and radicalism are alternately
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shuffling between the dock and the witness box in support of each 
other. Although this sounds like contempt of the court of logic, 
one wonders if history does not muddle along like this. There may 
be between political and metaphysical philosophy a reciprocal or 
mutually reinforcing interrelationship which rules out of order 
any ascription of causal primacy to either. Leaving aside 
ahistoricist views which would exempt men's mental artefacts from 
discussions of this nature, there remains at least one alternative 
to the aforesaid metahistorical melange (or at its tidiest, 
advocacy of alternating causal primacy) which as a class of views 
subsumes Marxist historiography, and which would make both 
ontological and political theories dependent upon some underlying 
preceding or primary factor. Hypotheses framed in accordance 
with this explanatory structure will be examined in the next 
section.
This section's purpose is to continue the discussion begun 
under the heading Education. The point has already been made 
that the Magnitsky era represents one facet only of the reaction 
which set in after the Napoleonic invasion. But although it 
makes sense to speak of a broad cultural, political, philosophical 
and religious alignment against whatever the French armies were 
held to stand for, finer focussing reveals as is so often the case 
that useful historical generalisations may gloss over the real 
complexity of intellectual cross-currents. In this case, the 
reaction conflates at least two perceived antitheses, the opposition 
of materialism and religion on the one hand, and the opposition of 
the masonic lodges and the Orthodox Church on the other. That these 
antitheses could be reformulated in other ways is yet more 
testimony to the richness of the period, a fact which may give
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pause to any easy characterisation of materialism as the natural 
metaphysical response of political radicals to a State-administered 
Church.
As far as the Orthodox Church is concerned, its fortunes 
under Alexander may be encapsulated in two apparently incompatible 
ways. Firstly, almost for the very reason that educational 
standards, if not very high, had never been higher, equally, 
dissatisfaction had never been more acute with the weak theological 
tradition and antirationalist posture of the Church. Secondly, by 
the end of Alexander's reign, the Orthodox Church was arguably the 
most powerful ideological force within the Empire, a position to 
be consolidated under Nicholas, and crystallized in Count Uvarov's 
formula of autocracy, Orthodoxy and nationality. Such a historical 
reversal cannot be put down simply to the spirit of reaction, 
since that would be to overlook an event which on the face of it 
marked the lowest point in the Church's standing since the erosion 
of the formal independence had been initiated by Peter the Great.
In 1817, a Ministry of Spiritual Affairs and Public Education was 
formed out of the existing Ministry of Education, and the Holy 
Synod. This could be viewed as no more than an act of bureaucratic 
streamlining, since Prince Golitsyn had been ober-prokuror of the 
Holy Synod since 1803 and Minister of Education since 1816. What 
however rankled with Orthodox conservatives and clerics was that 
the new department of spiritual affairs was divided into four 
sections, one concerned with the Orthodox Church, and the others 
with Roman Catholics, Protestants, Jews, Moslems and so on.
Apparently the religious tolerance practised under earlier Russian 
monarchs like Peter and Catherine was now a doctrine of inter­
confessional equality formalised in government structure.
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That there was no clear dividing line between Alexander's
liberal honeymoon and the onset of reaction can be ajudged
from Alexander's speech to the first session of the Polish Diet
in 1818, and Novosil'tsev's constitutional project of 1820. There
is evidence though more convincing than with the Tsar's flirtations
with political reform that an attitude in official circles of
religious toleration and even ecumenism had withstood the shock
of the Napoleonic invasion. The simplest explanation for this
is that religious heterodoxy cut across the spectrum of political
views. In other words, even the obscurantist educationalists
Magnitsky, Runich and Karneev had to look beyond the doctrinal
inertia of the State Church in their search for an adequate
spiritual defence against the intellectual threat from the West.
The most obvious official underwriting of a supraconfessional
Christianity was the Tsar's authorisation in 1812 of the formation
of a Russian Bible Society. Its model was the British and Foreign
Bible Society, founded in London in l8o4 for the distribution of
Biblical translations 'without note or comment*. The Roman
Catholic Church found such doctrinal neutrality hard to swallow,
and Catholics were eventually forbidden to join the Russian
Society. The growing opposition of the Orthodox Church was
characteristically less theological; indeed, the Society’s first
committee included two metropolitans, and the St. Petersburg
Ecclesiastical Academy's modern Russian version of the New
Testament completed in 1818, was sponsored by the Holy Synod.
Shortly after Nicholas's accession, however, the Bible Society
was suppressed, and it was decided that it was dangerous to allow
oa spoken Russian version of the Bible to circulate. This 
reversion to traditional Orthodoxy had begun in the last years of 
Alexander's rule, when the Tsar had yielded to the arguments of
the young archimandrite of the monastery of St. George near 
Novgorod, Photius Spassky. The unfortunate Golitsyn, who in 
addition to his ministerial rank, was also President of the 
Bible Society, soon toppled under the weight of the Church's 
opposition and the jealousy of Alexander's long-standing servant, 
Arakcheev.
The reasons for the decline and fall of the Bible Society are 
by no means clear. Soviet scholars tend to regard the difference 
between the bibleitsy and the ortodoksy as the difference between 
two forms of obscurantism in Russian idealism, and perhaps the 
exchange of Golitsyn and Magnitsky for Arakcheev and Photius seems 
a minor tremor in comparison with subsequent upheavals. It is at 
least interesting though that the Bible Society, at any rate in its 
avowed objectives, represented a supersacramental religiosity which 
in its overlap, both physical and ideological with the masonic 
lodges, contrived to collect under one ideological roof such 
unlikely collaborators as P.I. Pestel' and the Grand Duke Constantine. 
The relationship is of course tenuous in the extreme, though it 
illustrates the furthest thrust of optimistic eighteenth century 
autocracy, which had burst the Muscovite theocracy asunder. The 
Orthodox Church was clearly the worse politically and materially 
for this process; but its subordination to the State at the same 
time bound it closer to it. Thus it was quite natural that when 
the autocracy recoiled in the face of external and internal 
opposition, it fell back upon the Church. As an explanation for 
what happened, this would be glib and too abstract, but as a way of 
dealing with complex historical interactions, it gives an 
explanatory structure. A fuller understanding of the relationship 
of the Russian throne and altar would demand close consideration of
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the interrelationships of autocracy, nobility, bureaucracy and 
clergy, matters more appropriate to the next section, concerned 
with the growth of political opposition. Further attention will, 
however, be given in this section to the revival of the Orthodox 
Church when the internal implications of the Holy Alliance are 
examined. An interim qualification is that the autocracy is at 
any one time one person, whose strengths and weaknesses weigh 
more than most in the historical balance.
In the case of Alexander, this raises a question of a familiar 
rhetorical type: was the changing nature of the autocrat a 
determinant of, or merely a faithful reflection of, the changing 
nature of the autocracy? The question is dubious in more than 
one way, not least because it cannot be considered in isolation 
from the political interrelationships just mentioned; moreover, it 
suggests a kind of thought experiment in which, say, a Peter the 
Great or Nicholas I is imagined as a substitute incumbent. Such a 
historical transplant begs more questions than it sets out to 
answer, the most obvious being how one could divorce either of 
those monarchs from his own environment. Nevertheless, it should 
be possible to ask to what extent Alexander's own inconsistency 
and impressionability are responsible for the kaleidoscopic religious 
patterns of his reign, even though one's theoretical bets are 
hedged by the recognition that such characteristics are to some 
extent to be expected when the territory of a »'liberal” autocrat 
is violated in the name of "liberalism”. A similar hardening of 
policy is to be seen amongst the Romanovs in the cases of 
Catherine II and Alexander II, where the threat to the dynasty, if 
not in the latter case to the monarch himself, is less critical 
than the overwhelming reality of the French invasion. Thus despite
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all the evidence of conflicting forces in Alexander I's 
personality, caution should be exercised in deciding the 
relationship between undoubted reversals in government policy, 
and an apparent volte face in the Tsar's personal attitudes, 
especially if the latter turns out to be a historian's 
perception based on an exaggeration of the extent of his 
liberalism when a young man, and a failure to recognise a 
persistence, albeit attenuated, of his earlier sympathies 
throughout the reign.
This is by no means to deny that a considerable change in 
Alexander's outlook came about in the years 1812-15, or that 
his own example played an important part in the intellectual 
life of his times, as he acknowledged himself on receipt of a 
report on the activity of secret societies in 1821. This is 
nowhere clearer than in the realm of religious belief and 
practice, which in turn affected to some degree the gamut of 
metaphysical views in early nineteenth-century Russia. We have 
seen that the Grand Duke Alexander and his circle of friends 
imbibed a wide variety of Western ideas in a half-baked fashion, 
including the works of currently popular heterodox and mystical 
writers such as Bohme, Swedenborg, Madame Guyon and her defender, 
Archbishop Fenelon. But their thinking was still fully in the 
mainstream of Russian eighteenth-century secularism, and it was 
not until 1812 that the kindling took place of the religious 
fervour which characterised the architect of the Holy Alliance. 
Alexander was recommended by Prince A.N. Golitsyn to seek solace 
in reading the Bible, during a period in which the Tsar, having 
been persuaded to relinquish command of the army in the field, 
and confronted with the entry of Napoleon's troops into Moscow,
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had reached a nadir of personal popularity throughout the nation. 
The steps by which the near-recluse in search of consolation was 
transformed into the bearer of a grand religio-historical mission 
are inextricably bound up with the resurgence in the fortunes of 
the Russian army and of Alexander himself, though typically, 
personal contacts appear to have played no small part in the 
development of the Tsar's religious views. He was clearly 
attracted by the emphasis onthe inner, spiritual life emphasised 
in varying degrees by English nonconformity, German pietism, and 
contemporary mysticism, and in l8l4 had long discussions with the 
Quakers William Allen and Stephen Grellet in London, and with 
Jung-Stilling in Bruchsal. The following year marked his first 
meeting, at Heilbron, with the Protestant mystic Baroness Julie 
von Krudener, with whom he corresponded, and met again in 
Heidelberg and Paris. Another native of the Baltic German states, 
Madame Tatarinova, occupied apartments in the imperial palace and 
played host to a distinguished selection from St. Petersburg 
society who shared the conviction that a state of mystic ecstasy 
could be arrived at by dancing in circles. Such giddy heights of 
religious fervour by no means marked the limits of Alexander's 
and Golitsyn's religious toleration: Golitsyn's own 
nephew was converted by the Jesuits, and a number of sects 
offered paths to religious fulfilment, and liberation from sin 
and carnal desires by more than one means - the Khlysty. for 
example, by orgiastic revelry, and the Skoptsy by castration.^
The sensational extremes of minority cults should not be 
allowed to obscure the fundamental point that Alexander’s personal 
example encouraged the exploration of forms of religious activity 
by groups often outside the Orthodox Church, and often at odds
with it, most notably the branches of the Bible Society, and 
the masonic lodges* Admittedly, amongst the freemasons and the 
members of the Bible Society were many who saw no contradiction 
with the Orthodox faith, and the same can also be said of Madame 
Tatarinova’s sect. Nevertheless, the raison d'etre of the Bible 
Society was to create a supradenominational Christianity, and 
this could not but run counter to the interests of the Orthodox 
Church as the church of state. As for the freemasons, the very 
diversity of their beliefs and practices makes it impossible to 
perceive any basic incompatibility with Orthodox doctrine; yet 
although some of the lodges were little more than social clubs 
for the nobility, freemasonry was at this time also associated with 
rather more radical quests for a universal religion than that of 
the Bible Society. There is some overlap in this respect between 
the Society and the lodges, notably in the person of A.F. Labzin, 
best known for the spasmodic appearances of his journal "The 
Messenger of Zion", while the censorship permitted. However,
Labzin's quarrelsome and arrogant nature, together with his 
uncompromising mystical views, became an embarrassment to Golitsyn 
and the Bible Society, and he was eventually exiled. Golitsyn’s 
ideal;a kind of eclectic theology derived from the existing 
doctrines of the Orthodox, Roman Catholic and Protestant Churches, 
was not on the face of it anticlerical, even though it threatened 
the Orthodox Church’s political status; Labzin’s mystical aversion 
towards the material world, and advocacy of an inner, spiritual 
Christianity as a means to avoid contact with it, made him 
unequivocally hostile to the Church as a tangible institution:
"The outer church is a crowd of public, inferior Christians, like 
Job on the dung heap." There is some affinity between these 
acerbic words and the private views of Alexander’s adviser Speransky.
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The son of a village priest» he probably came into contact with 
the transcendentalism of Fichte and Schelling in his years as 
both student and teacher at theological seminaries, a fact which 
at a later time might have thrown some light on the charge of 
atheism levelled at him by enemies. By that time, however he had 
become a freemason, and his views had been modified, particularly, 
it seems, in the light of his correspondence during the years 
1804-6 with I.V. Lopukhin, who introduced him to the ideas of 
BiJhme, St. Martin, Fenelon and Madame Guyon. Speransky had little 
in common with Labzin, apart from a reluctance or inability to 
ingratiate himself with the imperial court, and an adverse 
estimate, admittedly in his own case less vocally articulated, 
of the Church as an institution, which for him, as he wrote in a 
letter to his daughter, represented '»a weak, deviating, compromising 
Christianity which differs only verbally from pagan moral doctrine.»6
Such anticlerical sentiments are typical of freemasons in Italy, 
Spain and France, where an ambivalent attitude towards the lodges 
on the part of the Roman Catholic Church throughout the greater 
part of the eighteenth century gave way to unmitigated hostility 
after the French Revolution, and where, especially in the case of 
the French philosophes and the Italian Carbonaria, strong links 
existed between the lodges, liberalism and nationalism. Despite 
Speransky's unremitting labour on a number of stillborn constitutional 
projects, the choice of Labzin and him as representative of a 
current of masonic mysticism antagonistic to the Church in no way 
suggests the union of anticlericalism and political, radicalism 
under the roofs of the Russian lodges. More characteristic of 
Russian Freemasonry in any case than anticlericalism was a concern 
with personal morality, charitable works and an undoctrinal 
Christianity, a concern which had more in common with the Germanic
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than the Latin lodges. Speransky himself articulated the 
implications of such a religious attitude across the whole span 
of an individual's activity: "I do not know a single question 
of state which cannot be referred to the New Testament."^ Although 
this avowal is theoretically in harmony with the reactionary 
programme of the Holy Alliance, its rejection of any divorce 
between public and private morality, between matters of the 
temporal and spiritual realms, is completely at odds with the 
theory and practice of the Orthodox Church, whose weak theological 
tradition left it without the distinctive stance towards the 
state of its Western Christian counterparts. This inherent 
predisposition towards subservience to secular political power 
may even have been strengthened by the orientation of such vigorous 
spiritual elements as there were within the Church towards 
extremes of irrationalism, or of renunciation of the material world, 
with the result that conflicts within the Church tended to be 
resolved by the departure from the Church by the dissidents, rather 
than by compromises within, or changes of, Church policy. The 
revival of hesychast asceticism in the eighteenth century continued 
throughout the Alexandrine era and beyond, but its very nature 
(despite or because of the experience of Nil Sorsky and his 
followers in the debate over church property in the sixteenth 
century), and its confinement to the monasteries, precluded its
direct relevance in the development of the Church's relations with
x . 8the state.
The simplest interpretation of the appeal of freemasonry to 
the nobility is that it filled the spiritual vacuum left by the State 
Church, whose dogged adherence to Eastern Christianity offered 
little to the dvoryanin and his successfully grafted Western
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European sensibilities. Freemasonry, it could be argued, 
offered in its time a similar kind of substitute for the official 
faith to that provided by German idealism for the conservative 
young Schellingians of the l820s and 1830s. The parallel, though, 
is suggestive, because if apolitical transcendentalism would be 
transformed, sometimes in one and the same individual, into Neo- 
Hegelian radicalism, might not a comparable line of descent 
exist between the masons and the Decembrists? There are two kinds 
of evidence for this contention. In the first place, the 
authorities' growing suspicions about the activities of secret 
societies culminated in their prohibition, in 1822, a measure 
which also covered the lodges. This act does not in itself 
guarantee any affinity on the freemasons' part with the 
conspirators of the Carbonari.the French Charbonnerie, or indeed 
with Valerian Lukasinski's National Freemasonry society within 
the Polish army; the legislation need be seen as no more than a 
further example of the spectacular reversal of earlier policy 
which highlights the period of reaction. The high tide of the 
lodges' activities in the preceding century had taken place in the 
1770s and 80s, whereupon they were suppressed by an increasingly 
jittery Catherine II. After the assassination of Paul, the revival 
of the lodges was tolerated, to the point where a kind of deal was 
made in l8l0 between the elders of the Grand Lodges and the ministry 
of police, which in return for the official recognition of the 
lodges' existence demanded reports of their activities and scrutiny 
of their documents and rules. Several officials of the ministry, 
including the minister himself, Balashov, were admitted to the 
freemasons' ranks, a fact which is testimony as much to freemasonry's 
natural part in the liberal religious activity of the period, as to 
the ministry's evident policy of careful surveillance.^ There is
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nothing to suggest that the leading masons baulked at the
partnership required by the authorities. This is not to say
that they always saw eye to eye amongst themselves. From the
first years of Alexander’s reign, virtually all the lodges had
united under the Grand Directorial Lodge of Vladimir, but in
l8l4 a split took place between those who practised the French
system of masonic organization and ritual, and those, influenced
by contemporary German practice, who objected mainly to the
superimposition in the French system of a galaxy of ’higher
degrees’, such as the knights of the Orient, or the princes of
Jerusalem, in addition to the three traditional degrees of
freemasons. It would be tempting in the context of the present
discussion of the relationship between religious beliefs and
political persuasion to look for the emergence of a significant
reforming group, particularly as the controversy centred around
an issue reminiscent, albeit quite remotely, of the rejection of
the episcopacy by many of the West European Reformed Churches.
The inaptness of this comparison is best demonstrated by the fact
that the differences between the two Grand Lodges (the Grand
Provincial Lodge and the Grand Lodge Astree) which formed as a
result of the split, were patched up in little more than a 
10year. .
The most plausible explanation of the fate of the lodges is 
that they fell foul of a blanket retaliation to the known political 
activities, in the mildest sense, of secret societies which had no 
direct affiliation to freemasonry. It can, though, still be argued, 
(and this is the second kind of evidence promised earlier), that an 
umbilical cord exists between the lodges and the blameworthy secret 
societies, in that some members of the latter were formerly masons.
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Amongst the Decembrists, Pestel•, in the company of the 
aforementioned Balashov, was a member of the Loge des Amis Reunis.
As it happened, Pestel1, and an inhabitant of the fringes of the 
Decembrist circles, P. Ya Chaadayev, were members at about the 
time when their particular lodge left the Grand Provincial Lodge 
to join the Grand Lodge Astrée. If the split which resulted in 
the formation of these two lodges were given the significance 
which the previous paragraph was reluctant to grant it, this move 
might have suited Pestel's supposed Lutheran inclination. Instead, 
it appears that he left the Loge des Amis Reunis to join the loge 
des Trois Vertus, which continued to be part of the union of the Grand 
Provincial Lodge. It is unlikely that Pestel»s movements at this 
time (1817) were governed by masonic principle, particularly as 
his membership of the second lodge was of short duration; of far 
more significance is that amongst his fellow masons of the Loge des 
Trois Vertus were several politically like-minded young guards 
officers, including S.I. and M.I. Murav'ev-Apostol, N.M. Murav'ev,
A.N. Murav'ev and Prince Sergey Trubetskoy, the future head of the 
Decembrists' Northern Society, who was to be dictator after the 
uprising and before the installation of a provisional government.
Of these, only Prince Trubetskoy and Alexander Murav'ev continued 
their masonic activities for any appreciable length of time after 
the foundation of the first Decembrist secret society; in Murav'ev's 
case, his religiosity soon overcame his radicalism, a transition 
which Yakushkin attributed to his wife, who as Murav'ev's fiancée 
would sing the Marseillaise with him, but after a few months of 
marriage had turned him from a "desperate liberal" into a "desperate 
mystic". He left the Society of Welfare in 1819.11
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It would be wrong to infer from Murav'ev’s example that a 
taste for the spirituality of freemasonry precluded commitment to 
the secret societies. Decembrist-masons who combined a religious 
or idealist world-view with a radical political stance were M.S. 
Lunin, and the Baltic German V.K. Kuchelbecker, who, as we have 
seen, was a close associate of Prince Odoyevsky’s ' Wisdom-lovers', 
notably in his capacity as co-editor of the journal Mnemoaina.
Both Kuchelbecker and the martyr Ryleev were masons in the early 
l820s, in the former’s case until the year of the lodges' suppression} 
Ryleev appears as a member of the Loge de l’Etoile Flamboyante in 
its records for the years 1820-1. Amongst the other Decembrist 
freemasons were N.I. Turgenev, well-known as one of the Alexandrine 
advocates of free trade, and whose timely departure for Western 
Europe in 1824 delivered him from the fate of his fellow 
conspirators; and G.S. Baten'kov, who in 1863 (also the year of his 
death) wrote at the request of the historian S.V. Eshevsky a short 
memoir on the freemasonry of Alexander’s reign. Baten’kov was by 
no means typical of the Decembrists; he joined a lodge whilst on 
state service in Siberia, where he also befriended Speransky during 
the latter's governorship of the province. Speransky's patronage 
and partial return to favour opened Baten’kov’s way to a promising 
service career in St. Petersburg, and he was even at one time 
prominent in the central administration of the hated military 
settlements, under the equally hated Arakcheev. It was not until 
the death of Alexander that he joined the Northern Society, and 
even then he shortly renounced his constitutionalist views and 
took no part in the Senate Square revolt of December 14. This is 
not to say that his Decembrist affiliation was a complete aberration 
in the face of the crisis of succession. According to his own
15?
testimony to the Investigating Commission, he acquired his liberal
ideas through friendship with V.F. Raevsky during their service
in the Corps of Communications Engineers, and according to the
historian of ideas A.N. Pypin, the reason for his distant dispatch
to Siberia shortly thereafter was his reputation as a ‘restless
13person• (bespokoinyy chelovek).
Pypin warns us that Baten’kov exaggerates the significance of 
freemasonry in his memoir, which moreover was written hurriedly and 
informally by an old man distanced from his subject by decades, and 
within a few months of his death. To this it may be added that 
Baten’kov had to endure a punishment arguably even more severe than 
the hard labour of many of his more heavily implicated fellow 
conspirators: he was held in solitary confinement in the fortress 
of St. Peter and St. Paul for a period of twenty years.^ Pypin’s 
judgment that the memoir is imprecise and nebulous need therefore 
come as no surprise, though he admits that the obscurity of 
Baten'kov’s exposition is partially intentional. It is in any case 
hard to disentangle any alleged vagueness on Baten’kov’s part 
from the inherent obscurity to the rationalist mind, of the 
religious foundations of freemasonry to which he alludes.
Furthermore the obscurity is compounded by the secrecy by which he 
evidently still felt bound, to the extent that his account of 
masonic beliefs and internal organization is presented as having 
been related to him by an adept befriended in his youth. Although 
this might seem a rather casual way to observe secrecy, it should 
be noted that in the midst of his descriptions of the masonic degrees, 
Baten’kov is at pains to justify the obligation which he has just 
circumvented. Secrecy is necessary for the lodge to preserve ’’the 
great light of knowing the cosmic cause of everything - the existence
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of a self-sufficient and all-powerful God. This is a secret 
from the world, unable to organise itself in accordance with 
knowledge of the truth. It is desecrated by the speech used 
in society, with its halftruths and ambiguities. Therefore no 
account of freemasonry can give a clear and precise concept: 
for this one must be a mason, and use those defined terms, 
that language, which, like mathematical language, has been 
developed and refined by the work of many generations of 
thought. The obligation of secrecy is to preserve throughout 
the passing of generations the concepts which have been achieved,
leto maintain them in their entirety and purity.”
Such epistemological esotericism, not to say atavism, is a 
far cry from the French Enlightenment thought (especially the 
empiricist or sensationalist strand of it represented by Condillac, 
Helvetius and others) which informed some of the more ambitious 
philosophical excursions of Decembrists, for example those of V.F. 
Raevsky and N.A. Kryukov. The disdain expressed for everyday 
speech, the choice of mathematical language as an analogy, albeit 
a historical one, with the desired idiom, and the references to 
clear and precise concepts, both in the quoted passage and elsewhere 
in the memoir, are reminiscent of the seventeenth-century rationalist 
theories of knowledge which partly stimulated Locke’s rejection of 
innate ideas and doctrine of the mind as a tabula rasa. The implicit 
antagonism towards empiricism of Baten’kov’s defence of secrecy 
cannot so readily be extended to rationalism’s other antonym, fideism, 
principally because Baten’kov does not elaborate on the source, rather 
than the transmission of the all-important concepts. This leaves 
open the possibility either that they are attained through some sort 
of direct mystical apprehension of the deity, or that they are
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similar to those contained in the propositions of natural
theology, and are derived as well as conveyed by means of reason.
This is not an unrealistic disjunction, since the works of Boehme
and Saint-Martin exist side by side with William Derham's
Physico-Theology in the eclectic reading-list of the Russian
16masonic tradition. But whether or not any incompatibility 
can be found between certain masonic views and revealed theology 
in general, the relationship between freemasonry and Christianity, 
as we have already seen, is by no means clear-cut, and Baten'kov's 
guarded statement is interesting in this respect: "[.The masonsj 
regard the Revelation, the word of the prophets and.the Gospel 
with veneration, without constraining the mind,and ascribing law 
and doctrine, like a trusteeship, to the reqirements of an external 
discipline of thought; they avoid disputes, and do not consider 
themselves confined to any particular circle; they see no use in 
fanatical propaganda, which does not produce inner concentration 
and stability. " 17
Baten'kov's qualified endorsement of the Christian Revelation 
and reservations about ^external" religion hint at the aforementioned 
views of his patron Speransky; at the very least what follows is 
consistent with the supraconfessional spirit of Prince Golitsyn's 
religious administration, and this, if it were typical of masonic 
views, would be sufficient to incur the enmity of the Orthodox 
prelates and conservatives of the hue of Admiral A.S. Shishkov, 
whose attitudes began to dominate in the early 1820s. The Church's 
opposition to freemasonry would serve as a qualification at least 
to the contention that the lodges were the innocent victims of 
legislative grapeshot primarily intended for secret political 
societies. And as we have seen, several prominent Decembrists
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had connections with the lodges, and some found the masonic 
world-view congenial. It would be hard to refute the assertion 
that the original stimulus and organisational model for the 
first Decembrist secret societies were at least partly provided 
by freemasonry: apart from the trappings of secrecy, including 
the taking of an oath, the projected activities of the first 
societies were redolent with the spirit of masonic philanthropy, 
as was observed earlier. The founder-members of the Union of 
Salvation, with the notable exception of Yalcushkin, were all 
masons. But we are still far from establishing anything 
resembling a parental relationship between freemasonry and 
Decembrism, for a number of reasons. Firstly, those Decembrists 
who were active conspirators and remained practising masons were 
a very small minority, and both activities appear independent of 
each other. Secondly, the lodges until quite shortly before their 
prohibition enjoyed the government's tacit approval, and indeed 
the participation of many of its officials; there seems no reason 
to doubt that the lodge masters co-operated willingly with the 
government, and that the majority of masons supported it. Thirdly, 
although masonic religious notions appealed to some of the 
Decembrists, they were at odds with the epistemological and 
metaphysical views of a significant proportion of the rest. This 
is self-evident in the case of atheism, and I have argued that the 
implications of Baten'kov's characterisation of masonic beliefs are 
incompatible with empiricism. Baten'kov is explicit about the kind 
of world-view which is the principal subject of this study:
"Isolated materialism, however ingenious and utilitarian are 
the fruits of its labour, is considered {joy the masons'] insufficient 
to explain the wonders of nature, by means of their dynamic process; 
and for the analysis of phenomena, they consider to be genuine
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those concepts in which there can be perceived the presence of 
the light of the cosmic cause and exact unity with the word."1^
It should be remembered that these words were written in 
1863, and may betray too much of the influence of Hegelianism to 
be accepted as an accurate representation of masonic antipathy to 
materialist thought in the first quarter of the nineteenth century. 
Furthermore, in 1863, materialism was far more publicly upheld, as 
well as imputed, and it may therefore have been its current 
popularity which prompted Baten'kov's comment, or led him to 
exaggerate in his own mind its importance during the period of the 
lodges' activity. On the other hand, he could have had in mind 
some hostility between materialists and masons amongst the 
Decembrists, similar to the division which is known to have existed 
between believers and non-believers amongst the exiles in Siberia 
after 1825. Yakushkin, for example, made no attempt to conceal 
his scorn for masonic ritual in a passage from his memoirs 
describing a meeting of the philanthropic Union of Welfare at 
St. Petersburg in 1818. The meeting, likened by Yakushkin to a 
"bad comedy" in comparison with previous meetings in Moscow, was 
attended by many "ardent freemasons", and an argument took place 
as to whether the oath for entrants to the society should be taken 
on the Gospel or on the sword. Yakushkin regarded the whole thing 
as quite ridiculous, and commented that the masons wished to 
introduce their own practices into the society because "in the 
lodges they were accustomed to play the fool."1^
In fairness to Baten'kov, reservations similar to those 
applied to his own reminiscences may be expressed with regard to 
Yakushkin's historical perspective. His raillery at the masons'
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expense comes from the first of the first two parts of his
memoirs dictated to his two eldest sons in 1853-5. The available
evidence does not in any case permit the direct inference that
Yakushkin's opinion was representative of the views of the hard
core of political insurgents which survived the early Decembrist 
20regroupings. The most that can be said is that freemasons
diverting the energy of reforming zeal into disputes about the
paraphernalia of entrance ritual must have been amongst the
likeliest candidates during the purge of unsuitable or "untrustworthy'»
members« which, if we accept Yakushkin's account, was the real
purpose underlying the decision to dissolve the Union of Welfare
_ 21taken at the Moscow conferences of 1821. To make a related but 
more general point, the constitution of the new secret society 
(the embryonic Northern Society, but as yet lacking a southern 
counterpart to justify the epithet), although it retained masonic 
overtones, in that the first part, intended for new recruits, 
restricted itself to philanthropic objectives, nevertheless 
contained a second part intended for the consumption of members 
of a "higher category" (shades of the lodges again) in which there 
was for the first time spelt out a clear political objective, to 
limit autocracy in Russia. This is where the Decembrists clearly 
depart from the traditional theory and practice of the Russian 
freemasons, in that their programme implicitly enjoins the belief 
that social change can, or perhaps should, be brought about by first 
modifying or replacing (a disjunction at the centre of Decembrist 
differences) political institutions, whereas the masons took the 
view that the betterment of man could only be effected by changes 
of individual hearts.
163.
We may now return to the suggested umbilical nature of the 
connection between the masonic lodges and the Decembrist secret 
societies. To begin with, if we accept that the secret societies 
sprang directly out of the lodges, this suggests a model of the 
development of Decembrism which might relegate materialism to the 
status of an extremist minority viewpoint. The argument could, at 
a stretch, be made monocausal, the fundamental factor being the 
spiritual vacuity of the Orthodox Church. The breach, the argument 
might run, was most adequately filled by the vigorous eclecticism 
of the masonic lodges, whose clandestine method of organization 
provided a natural basis for the proliferation of secret societies 
bent upon the subversion of a regime which relied increasingly for 
its ideological nourishment upon a symbiotic union with the Orthodox 
Church. Amongst the objections which could be levelled at this 
particular formulation is the fact that establishment of the first 
Decembrist secret societies preceded the renunciation by the 
government of its policy of interconfessional equality in favour 
of Orthodox supremacy. If the rejoinder were made that the decline 
of this policy, although it does not explain the origins of the 
secret societies, nevertheless intersects at that point in its 
history where political attitudes began to harden, then the final 
objection must be that the evidence does not support the view that 
the source of political opposition is antagonism towards the Church. 
What the sources of such opposition are is the subject of the next 
section; but it can still be argued that whatever the reasons for 
opposition to the government, its cohesion and articulation were 
dependent upon the prior formation of a network of lodges morally 
and theologically at odds with the State, as the State itself 
recognised in the act of prohibiting them in 1822. The most 
plausible conclusion then to be made in relation to this investigation
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of the affinities between metaphysical beliefs and political 
attitudes is that dissatisfaction with the status quo in early 
nineteenth-century Russia is a natural extension of the masonic 
ethical precepts of the fraternity and equality of man. The 
expression of materialist and atheistic views by certain Decembrists 
would, it is true, have been deplored by masons. But the hostility 
of a Yakushkin presents no more of an embarrassment to an otherwise 
plausible general thesis than does the idealism of a Baten’kov to 
the alternative thesis that it is materialism which, at least in 
the Russian context, is the natural metaphysical correlative of 
political radicalism.
It may be impossible to practice to unravel, or even to 
identify, all the strands, be they social, political, economic, 
psychological, intellectual, perhaps even ethnic, geographical, 
climatic, physiological or historical, which may influence, or 
determine (the semantic bridge depending probably as much on the 
confidence or prior theoretical commitment of the analyst as the 
strength of the evidence) the possibly inconsistent collection of 
ideas and attitudes attached to the history of one individual.
How much more unlikely it is, then,that the shades of political 
opinion and nuances of metaphysical speculation embraced by the 
Decembrists as a group may be explained in toto by one or other 
of the crudely polarised models given above. In any case, even 
one who argued that a political rejection of the ideological 
presuppositions of Tsarism was most likely to be matched by a 
repudiation of the basic tenets of Orthodoxy, need find nothing 
logically objectionable in the corollary that a desire only to 
limit autocratic power in some way was most readily associated 
with affiliation to a religious grouping, unlike the Orthodox Church,
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which offered some ethical criteria for the conduct and 
organization of political life. As we have seen, such an 
association exists in the case of the reforming bureaucrat 
Speransky. If then, we accept that the two apparently polarised 
models are not mutually exclusive, then the role of freemasonry 
as midwife to a moderate, reforming kind of Decembrism is, given 
its subsequently declining relevance as attitudes hardened within 
the secret societies, almost an indirect affirmation of the 
affinity between republicanism and materialism, in that even the 
most supradenominational kind of Christianity, or even super- 
Christian kind of religion, falls by the wayside as reformism gives
f
way to revolution. This is not to say that after 1821 there were 
no more constitutional monarchists or religious believers, but 
merely to observe that as republican views crystallised, the 
Decembrist secret societies became further removed from the masonic 
lodges. This phenomenon, incidentally, favours the view that the 
prohibition of the lodges was less an expression of government 
disapproval of their philosophy, than, as was suggested before, a 
general attack on secrecy as a means to suppress suspected political 
opposition.
The reason for this fairly full discussion of freemasonry and 
its implications is that because of its connections with revolution, 
indirectly in the case of the Decembrists, and more immediately, 
for example, in the case of the philosophes in the France of the 
ancien regime, it has to be taken seriously in any discussion of the 
political relevance of a metaphysic with which it, in a sense, 
competes. It should be admitted that m  this discussion, no strong 
links have been established between masonic and materialist ontologies 
on the one hand, and political views on the other. It could be argued
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that many Decembrist-masons left their respective lodges, not 
because masonic ethics became incompatible with their developing 
political stance, but because their increasing opposition to the 
government rendered unacceptable the deal which had been made between 
the lodge masters and the ministry of police; or, on a more practical 
level, because the presence in the membership of many government 
officials made the lodges an unsuitable forum for the exchange of 
radical views. It would not follow directly, if this were the 
case, that there would be a shift, where metaphysics were considered, 
towards materialism and atheism. Nevertheless, if government 
sponsorship is taken as the yardstick by which the acceptability 
of ideas and ideologies is judged, consciously or otherwise, by 
political dissidents taken as a group, then it is worth noting that 
hardly any version of Christianity failed at one time or another 
to win approval in ruling circles in Alexander I's Russia.
A final point to be made in relation to freemasonry is that 
much of the preceding discussion has granted for the purposes of 
argument that the lodges played a significant role in the inception 
of the Decembrist movement. That they played some part is 
undeniable, though it has already been argued that the masons' 
world-view, and their implicit approach to social and political 
questions, were at odds with the most characteristic elements of 
Decembrism. The least that can be said, that the lodges provided 
an organisational model for the secret societies, is by no means 
the exclusive honour of freemasonry, since, as we have seen in M.A. 
Fonvizin's account of the army's campaign in Germany and France in 
1813-14, the influence of the lodges has to be balanced against the 
impact of West European political societies like the Prussian
Tuaendbund.
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The starting-point of this section was the assertion that
the period of reaction which set in after the invasion by the
French army, and which is so readily associated with Magnitsky’s
irrationalist onslaught on the curriculum of the new university
at Kazan, turns out upon closer inspection to contain its own
tensions and oppositions. Although the Orthodox Church on the
face of it plumbed the depths of its fortunes under the Romanovs
upon the establishment of the Ministry of Spiritual Affairs and
Public Education in l8l7, by 1825 Orthodoxy had become a cornerstone
of Tsarist ideology. Although it was not until 1833 that Count
S.S. Uvarov, in his first memorandum as Minister of Public Education
to the curators of the educational districts, made his now famous
proclamation that education was to be conducted in the joint spirit
of Orthodoxy, autocracy and nationality, the new ideology was
anticipated in the paeans of Admiral A.S. Shishkov to Orthodoxy,
absolutism and patriotism, which can be found, for example in his
article of l8l2 "Discussion of love of the fatherland" published in
22renversâtions of lovers of the Russian language. Indeed it was 
Shishkov, known earlier in Alexander’s reign for his opposition to 
Karamzin’s attempts to mould a modern Russian literary idiom, who 
followed Golitsyn as Minister of Education, a change accompanied by 
the restoration of the Holy Synod’s responsibility for the administration 
of the Orthodox Church. The Church’s political recovery reflects 
the growing stature at court of the archimandrite Photius: in
Masaryk's phrase, "Arakcheev and Photius represent theocratic
23caesaropapism at the close of Alexander’s reign." However, it 
was autocracy not theocracy which the Church advocated, and any 
ascendancy which it enjoyed over the throne was likely to result 
the weakness of one of its temporary incumbents.from
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The fact that the political rehabilitation of the Church 
prelates was at the expense of Golitsyn, Magnitsky and Runich 
indicates a marked shift in the conduct of religious affairs in 
Russia from the Tsar’s own favoured policy of interconfessional 
liberty, though it should be noted that he was not prepared to 
renounce the policy to the extent of actually abolishing the 
Russian Bible Society (a measure which his severely Orthodox 
younger brother Nicholas would lose little time in enacting).
This is not to say that the fall of Golitsyn marked an ideological 
upheaval in the reign of Alexander; it was more that the chickens 
hatched in Alexander’s conception of the Holy Alliance had come 
home to roost. The logic of the Tsar’s self-appointed role as the 
champion of legitimism led away from his personal predilection for 
moonlight mysticism and English nonconformity. More fitting to 
Alexander's international mission would have been the tirades against 
freemasons and the disciples of Saint-Martin indulged in by Count
F.V. Rostopchin, the governor-general of Moscow, who with Shishkov was 
responsible for much anti-French propaganda during Napoleon's Russian 
campaign. It might be objected that this hardly fits in with the 
inspiration allegedly provided by Mne. von Krudener in the formation 
of the Tsar's views at that time; indeed the eventual partnership of 
monarch and patriarch cannot be read from the wording of the document 
signed by Alexander, Francis II of Austria and Frederick William III 
of Prussia. Its spirit is characteristically all-embracing and 
ecumenical; the act makes public the intention of the monarchs to 
conduct their domestic and foreign affairs in accordance with "the 
precepts of justice, Christian charity and peace, which, far from 
being applicable only to private life, must have an immediate influence 
0n the will of monarchs and guide all their steps ..." a pronouncement
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far more in keeping with Speransky's masonic ethics, than with
Orthodoxy's resignation in the face of the temporal world, and
consequent lack of censure in it. The contrast though is instructive,
for although the participating nations were exhorted to regard
themselves as part of the same Christian nation, and subject to one
divine sovereign, the problem remained for each monarch as to the
source of the validation of his dynasty and its policies. In Alexander's
case, the kind of religious free-for-all over which he had willingly
presided was ultimately inconsistent with the need of the autocracy after
l8l5 to entrench and defend itself against antagonistic ideologies.
Christianity in a general sense could not be expected automatically to
favour the actions of the Tsar rather than those of his subjects or of
other nations. This potential contradiction is glossed over in Article
I of the Holy Alliance, which declares that the monarchs will be united
to each other by a bond of fraternity consistent with the words of the
Holy Scriptures, which command all men to consider each other as brethren,
but that "regarding themselves as Fathers of families [my underlining]
in respect to their subjects and armies, will lead them, in the same
spirit of fraternity with which they themselves are animated, in
25preserving religion, peace and justice."
Alexander would probably have been surprised if anyone had dared 
to suggest that a cunning switch to a related metaphor had been used 
to absolve monarchs from the implications of their relationship with 
their fellow men, though at the time this might not have been lost on 
a Metternich. Eventually, however, Alexander overcame his own lukewarm 
attitude towards the Orthodox Church, and the fact that he yielded to 
the influence of Photius and Arakcheyev is at least consistent with the 
recognition that the Christian justification of an autocracy based on 
serfdom is less likely to come from a rootless, international, urban-
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based variety of heterodox sects than from a national Church of State 
bound to every level of the social and political structure. The 
notion of an alliance between the Church and the legitimate temporal 
powers is hardly peculiar to Russia in the Restoration epoch; indeed 
the presence at the Russian court from 1803-17 of de Maistre could 
hardly have lessened the likelihood of some kind of welding of 
spiritual and temporal interests, though his connections with the 
Jesuits make his contribution to the final outcome somewhat ambivalent. 
His rejection of Protestant science, philosophy and theology as 
••materialistic" is fully consonant with the educational policies of the 
Magnitsky era, though it is not at all clear that Magnitsky, Runich or 
Karneev would have echoed the following sentiments from de Maistre’s 
works, which however foreshadow the official ideology of Nicolaian 
Russia:
'•There should be a state religion just as there is a state political
system; or rather, religion and political dogmas, mingled and merged
together, should together form a general or national mind sufficiently
strong to repress the aberrations of the individual reason which is,
of its nature, the mortal enemy of any association whatever because it
26gives birth only to divergent opinions."
De Maistre could, as a Roman Catholic, call upon the tradition of 
Augustine and Aquinas for his spiritual defence. As we have said before, 
no comparable tradition existed within the liturgically-orientated 
Orthodox Church, and the state’s increasingly perceived need for religious 
support could not immediately be met. Thus the first volleys to be 
fired against liberalism in the reactionary period of Alexander's reign 
were fired in the name of Christian theism in general rather than of any 
particular denomination's theological tradition. It might therefore be 
expected that amongst the Decembrists atheism and
materialism would weigh
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more heavily in the balance against mere anticlericalism than would 
otherwise be the case within a political grouping not totally opposed to 
the existing sociopolitical order, the reason being that the government 
itself associated political reform with atheism. Whether or not this is 
so will depend in part on the ideas of individual Decembrists, to bo 
discussed later. At this juncture, it might be interesting to consider 
the secret societies* corporate attitudes towards religion and the Church
It has already been pointed out that freemasons were active in the 
Decembrist secret societies at least until the dissolution of the 
Union of Welfare in 1821, and it would therefore be out of the question 
that any constitutions or manifestoes drafted before that date should 
betray any antireligious sentiments that might have existed amongst the 
other members. The constitution of the first society, The Union of 
Salvation, or the Society of True and Faithful Sons of the Fatherland, 
founded in l8l6, has not survived, but the Regulations of its 
successor, the Union of Welfare, state as a condition of entry that 
members should confess the Christian faith. This is apparently no 
mere gesture to convention, since later on amongst the duties falling 
under the educational 'field of activity* we read that "the confirmation 
of a young man in the principles of religion and his devotion to it are 
the most powerful means for the formation of his morality.»27
Although the dissolution of the Union of Welfare coincided with a 
toughening of political objectives and with the cessation of most of 
the leading Decembrists* masonic affiliations, the definitive political 
prescriptions of both the Northern and Southern Socieites* policy 
documents were derived not only from natural law theory, but also from 
Christian principles. The first version of N.M. MuroVeVs constitution 
for the Northern Society was drafted in 1821-22 end „.Ices the following
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statement:
-The experience of all nations and all ages has demonstrated that 
autocratic power is equally ruinous for rulers and for societies: that
it is inconsistent both with the tenets of our holy faith, and with the
28principles of right reason."
The second, more radical version of the constitution, drafted in 
1824, makes a related point about the existing class structure:
»The distinction between the well-born and the simple people is not 
accepted as it is contrary to faith, according to which men are
brothers, all are b o m  well by the will of God, all were b o m  for good, 
and all ore sim£le_people, for all are weak and imperfect . "29 There
is little support in these statements for the general proposition that 
materialism is the world-view of progressive social groups, but they do 
lend weight to the foregoing argument that the logic of the Holy 
Alliance led the autocrat away from potentially subversive Christian idealism 
to ecclesiastical pragmatism, that is, to the national Church.
If the appeal of the egalitarian implications of Christian ethics 
was powerful enough to survive the hardening of opposition to the 
status quo which spanned the two drafts of the Northern Society's 
constitution, what then of the Southern Society, whose plans for the 
destruction of the imperial family and the abolition of class 
privileges made its members uneasy allies of the constitutional 
monarchists in the north? The Bible of the Southern Society was 
Busskaya Pravda, a work begun by P.I. Pestel' shortly after the defeat 
of Napoleon in l8l4, and completed and titled in about 1824. It would 
be wrong to regard it primarily as a representation of Pestel*s own
views, not only because, to paraphrase its grandiose title, it was 
intended as a legacy of the Great Russian peoDle fr.»- •people lor the improvement of
the state structure, and as an instruction for the anticipated
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Provisional Government, but also because a number of other conspirators
collaborated in its compilation, notably Obolensky, the brothers
Murav’ev-Apostol, Kryukov, Turgenev and N.S. Bobrishchev-Pushkin. Like
Murav'ev's drafts, Russkaya Pravda appeals to Christianity in order to
undermine the proprietary rights of absolutism:
”... the government exists for the good of the people, and has no
other basis for its form and existence than the people*s welfare, whereas
the people exists for its own good, and for the fulfillment of the will
of the All-highest, who has commanded men on this earth to glorify his
name, and to be virtuous and happy. This divine law was decreed for all
men in equal measure, and, consequently, everyone has a right to its
fulfillment. And therefore the Russian people is not the possession or
30property of any one person or family."
The teaching of Jesus, having disposed of slavery, is less 
convincingly, though arguably with some good historical grounds, called 
to the defence of the individualistic ethics underpinning laissez-faire
capitalism:
"The primary duty of man, which serves as the source and origin of 
every other duty, consists in the preservation of his own existence*
Apart from natural reason, this is demonstrated by the word3 of the 
Gospel, which contain the whole of Christian law: love God, and love 
thy neighbour, as thyself, - words implying that self-love is a necessary 
condition of human nature, a natural law, and consequently, our duty ... 
The obligations which God has imposed on man through faith are the 
most fundamental and indispensable. They connect life on this earth 
with eternal life, and therefore all state decrees must be related to 
and made consistent with man’s duties towards his faith and the all- 
highest creator of worlds. This first kind of duty concerns the 
spiritual world. They are known to us from the Iloly Writ. The second
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kind of duty concerns the natural world. They are known to us from 
the laws of nature and natural needs. God, the creator of the 
universe, is also the creator of the laws of nature and of natural 
needs."'*1
The words of the Scriptures are invoked again in a powerful 
indictment of serfdom;
"To own other people, like one’s own property, to sell, mortgage,
give away and bequeath people, just like objects, to use them according
to one’s own whim, and with no prior agreement with them, and merely
for one’s own profit, and sometimes amusement, is a shameful business,
contrary to humanity, contrary to natural laws, contrary to the holy
Christian faith, contrary, finally, to the will of the All-highest,
proclaimed in the Holy Writ, that all men are equal before him, and
that only their deeds and virtues constitute the difference between
32them."
At one level of interpretation, certain of the sentiments 
expressed above, especially the doctrine of the two Books suggested by 
the distinction between duties known from the Scriptures and those 
known from the natural world, could be placed in the tradition of 
Reformed theology, and therefore ascribed to Pestel’s supposed 
Lutheran leanings. But Russkaya Pravda represented a significant 
section of Decembrist thinking, and the appeal to Christianity is 
presented as the moral foundation of the manifestoes of both the 
Northern and Southern societies. Thus far, the inescapable impression 
is one of continuity with masonic ethics, provided one is prepared to 
accept that under the prevailing conditions in Russia, there was bound 
in the minds of some freemasons to be a transformation of the 
traditionally apolitical nature of Russian masonic philanthropy into 
direct political action, not through any rejection of the fundamental
precepts of the masons* religious world-view, but rather through a more 
sharpened and impatient desire to see Kussian reality conform to them. 
If it seems odd that arguments for the paternity of the lodges in 
relation to Decembrism should reappear so soon after the generally 
negative judgment reached after the discussion of freemasonry earlier 
in this section, it should be remembered that the influence of the 
masonic world-view was by no means excluded; indeed its parturition of 
the moderate reformists amongst the Decembrists could be taken as an 
indirect affirmation of the affinity between materialism and radicalism. 
That interpretation now seems highly tendentious in the light of the 
documents so far considered, which support the view that Christian 
egalitarianism provided the moral impetus across the entire range of 
Decembrist political thought. A further extract from I W k a y a  Pravda
suggests that this egalitarianism was derived from the supraconfessional 
spirit of freemasonry:
»We are obliged to prohibit all those.actions of the laws of other 
faiths which are contrary to the spirit of Christian laws; but we may at 
our discretion permit everything which is not contrary to their spirit, 
even though different from them. - The Christian law has one and the 
same spirit in all its different confessions, and political laws are only 
required to defend it, and to be consistent with its spirit.»34
There is a danger here that by alluding to quotations taken out of 
context, false impressions will be created, and we shall lose sight of 
the fact that the documents so far considered are in the mainstream of 
Vest European political liberalism, with little or nothing to do with 
theology. For example, the last extract's affirmation of the unity of 
the Christian law follows closely upon a similar assertion of the unity 
of political and civil laws; one of the reasons given for this assertion 
is that "being a moral or theoretical truth, political truth is 
everywhere the same", an axiom which owes much to the rationalism of the
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political thought of the Enlightenment era. The paradox of the twofold 
Newtonian legacy of sceptical empiricist epistemology on one hand, and on 
the other a belief on the part of Newton's French admirers that universal 
laws could be discovered by reason in the fields of morality and politics, 
was as apparent amongst the Decembrists as in the French liberal thinkers 
whose ideas they found so attractive. It is noticeable in the extracts 
given above that the ideas of natural reason and natural law (concepts of 
some antiquity in political philosophy whose origin it would of course be 
quite wrong to attribute exclusively to a belief in the existence beyond 
natural science of laws of the simplicity and universality of Newton's 
laws of mechanics) go hand in hand with direct appeals to Biblical texts. 
These appeals notwithstanding, the general rhetoric of Russkaya Pravda is 
stocked with conceptions, such as the inalienable right of property, the 
existence of government for the people's welfare, the derivation of rights 
and duties from the nature of man, which testify to an a priori confidence 
that practical and moral truths may be deduced by reason. This cast of 
thought has been seen by later philosophers, especially those elaborating 
Hume's observation that all systems of morality encountered by him 
passed from "is" to "ought" statements without explanation, as a failure 
to distinguish between logically distinct kinds of proposition; 
interestingly the very title of the work in question shows how what is 
now called the naturalistic fallacy was embedded in language itself, since 
¿ravda meant both "justice" and "truth". This is not to say that 
language is a determinant rather than a reflection of philosophical 
presuppositions, since deductive morality in the shape of natural law 
theory formed the basis of the political philosophy of a variety of 
European thinkers attractive to the Decembrists, such as Montesquieu, 
Spinoza, Locke and Rousseau, as well as Antoine Destutt de Tracy, the 
commentator on Montesquieu, singled out by Pestel* for the benefit f 
Nicholas* Investigating Commission as a strong influence in the
176.
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formation of his opposition to despotism. 35 Mention should also be made 
in this connection of the Russian prosvetitely of the Alexandrine era, 
notaly V.V. Popugaev, l.P. Pnin, A.S. Kaysarov and A.P. Kunitsyn, whose 
publications have strong affinities with the theoretical presuppositions 
of the Decembrist documents; as was pointed out in Section 1 , Professor 
Kunitsyn was persecuted by Runich for the views expressed in his lengthy 
work Natural Law, and exercised personal influence over certain of the 
Decembrists educated at the Tsarskosel’sky Lyceum.
Beliefs in natural law and natural rights, and the contractual origin 
of states, are described by Soviet historians as ’’idealistic" (in 
contradistinction to historical materialism), but leaving aside any 
consideration of basic inconsistencies, affirmations of natural rights 
have historically coexisted with metaphysical views usually regarded as 
materialistic, notably in the case of certain of the eighteenth-century 
French philosophes, and of the Englishman Hobbes in the seventeenth 
century. Although Hobbes* laws of nature seem to have more in common 
with the analysis of rights as useful conventions given by Hume, the 
opponent of natural law theories, than with the a priori rights invoked 
by the Decembrists, it should be remembered that utilitarianism, derived 
from the nhilosophes and from Bentham, exists alongside rationalism in 
the gamut of their political views. This is not an attempt to demonstrate 
a similarity between the political philosophy of the Leviathan and 
Russkaya Pravda, but the example of Hobbes brings to mind the usual 
estimation that his characterisation of natural laws as the commands of 
God is to be taken with a pinch of salt: it might similarly be possible, 
without much groundless and endless speculation about the sincerity of 
Pestel's and Murav’ev's invocations of Scripture, to show that at least 
some of the Decembrists were prepared to present their views in religious 
clothing in order to divert religious approbation to their own cause 
rather than to the justification of the Romanov dynasty. The most obvious
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proponents of this strategy were Sergey Murav'ev-Apostol and Mikhail 
Bestuzhev-Ryumin, whose negotiations on behalf of the Southern Society 
with the Society of United Slavs led to the alliance of September 1825. 
According to the memoirs of I.I. Gorbachevsky, a dispute took place 
during the course of the negotiations, in which he and Major Spiridov 
of the Slavic Union opposed Murav»ev*s opinion that the best means of 
influencing Russian soldiers was to arouse religious fanaticism in 
them, and that reading the Bible could inspire hatred of the government.
It is important to distinguish the question of the sincerity of the 
allegiance to Christianity of Murav'ev and Bestuzhev from their 
evaluation of the Bible as propaganda material, based on an estimation 
of the susceptibilities of the ordinary Russian soldier, to which 
Gorbachevsky was totally opposed. Murav»ev*s argument, in Gorbachevsky's 
account, was that notions like republican government and the equality of 
estates were "the riddle of the Sphinx" to the soldiers, but that if they 
were made aware of the divine injunctions in certain chapters of the 
Bible against the election of kings and obedience to them, they would 
not hesitate "to take up arms against their lord."^ Gorbachevsky replied 
that "tolerance" was the distinctive mark of the Russian people, who were 
not influenced by priests and monks, and doubted the utility of the 
language of ecclesiastics on whom the people looked askance:
"I think that you can find more freethinkers than fanatics amongst 
our soldiers, and it could easily turn out that common sense would moke 
some of them say that the proscription of the election of kings was not 
a divine command to the Israelites, but a cunning ruse on the part of the 
Levite priests who wished to support theocracy."
Murav'ev felt that this was to overestimate the soldiers: "... the 
simple people are good, they never use their reason, and therefore they 
must be the instrument for the achievement of our aim."^
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There seems no reason to doubt that Murav. ev-Apostol »a. capable 
of making auoh a statement, despite all the normal reservations about 
the reliability of memoirs, and in this case about the evident class 
friction obtaining between the relatively low-born and low-ranked member, 
of the Slavic Union and the aristocratic delegates of the Southern Society.
"The members of the Southern Society for the most part functioned 
within a circle of people from the highest estate; wealth, connections, 
rank and outstanding service were considered an essential condition for 
entry into the society ...,,3S Gorbachevsky felt that their desire to 
avoid the participation of the people and to conceal their real 
intentions from the lower ranks stemmed from their social position and 
habit of commanding, which made it difficult for them to accept equality 
in society, or to trust people lower in the state hierarchy. It may be 
that the greater social gulf between MuraVev and the common soldiers 
explains why his respect for their intellectual powers is less developed 
than Gorbachevksy's; be that as it may, the fact that MuraVev recommends 
Scripture rather than political education for people who do not use their 
reason seems as poor a reflection on the text as its readers, since he is 
clearly not in this context making a theological distinction between 
reason and faith. This implication was taken up by Spiridov, who claimed 
that anyone imbued with religious feeling would not use such a holy 
object as the Bible as an instrument for the attainment of some outside 
aim. 39 Spiridov was obviously aiming below the belt, but whether or not 
MuraVeVs attitude was merely, in Gorbachevsky., phrase "the cunning of 
Machiavellianism,” , or was based on Christian conviction cannot be 
resolved. His advocacy of religion, in response to Gorbachevsky's 
characterisation of the Russian army's attitude towards it, does not
help us, since it was utilitarian rather than spiritual »m , .»FAniuai. "Believe me,
religion will always be a powerful stirrer of the human heart; it will 
show the way to virtue, it will lead to great exploits by the Russian
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who according to you is indifferent to religion, and will bestow on him
4lthe martyr's crown."
During the course of this debate, Murav»ev-Apostol showed his 
opponents a paper which Gorbachevsky described as including a translation 
from the Old Testament of the Israelites' election of Saul as king. This 
was in all probability Murav'ev's "Orthodox Catechism", written in 
collaboration with Bestuzhev-Ryumin, a major portion of which was 
devoted to a summary of I Samuel 8. In this chapter, the prophet, 
having heard the Israelites* request to make them a king, warns them of 
the expropriations of their children and property which would ensue:
"And ye shall cry out in that day because of your king which ye shall have 
chosen you, and the Lord will not hear you in that day."*12 One of the 
quotations from which the profanity of kingship is inferred is taken 
from the same passages "And the Lord said unto Samuel, Hearken unto 
the voice of the people in all that they say unto thee, for they have 
not rejected thee, but they have rejected me, that I should not reign 
..43over them."
Murav'ev concludes, in a manner which seems anachronistic to the historian,
if not the theologian, that "the election of kings is contrary to the
. 44divine will, because our one king must be Jesus Christ." The catechism, 
presented in traditional question and answer form, invokes Biblical 
quotations in support of the thesis that monarchy contravenes God's law.
A typical passage is the following:
"Question How can one take up arms with a completely pure heart?
Answer By taking up arms and courageously following those who speak in 
the name of the Lord, remembering the words of our Saviour: Blessed are 
they which do hunger and thirst after righteousness, for they shall be 
filled; and having crushed the injustice and dishonesty of tyranny, by 
setting up a government in keeping with divine law.
l8i.
Question What kind of government is keeping with divine law?
Answer One without kings. God created us all equal, and having come
down to earth, chose the apostles from the common people, not from kings 
45and worthies."
The catechumens, or "the Christ-loving Russian army" are finally 
instructed that it is their duty to oppose tyranny and to restore faith 
and freedom in Russia, and that anyone who lags in his duty, will bring 
anathema upon himself, like Judas the Betrayer.^
The paper cut little ice with the sceptical Gorbachevsky, who
pointed out that it could equally be deduced from the New Testament
47that to oppose the monarch meant to oppose religion; this point had 
clearly not worried the catechists, who had not only quoted from the 
Sermon on the Mount, as above, but also had used the words of the Apostle 
Paul. In any case, Spiridov and Gorbachevsky omitted to draw the 
attention of the other members of the Slavic Union to the catechism, on 
the grounds that they knew beforehand that they would be opposed to it. 
This might seem like the rationalisation of personal prejudice, though 
when we come to consider the views of individuals within the society of 
United Slavs, such an interpretation will become less plausible. The 
Society's collective pronouncements shed little light on the metaphysical 
views of its membership, though, unlike those of its new allies, they 
are compatible with freethought. The regulations of the society are 
couched in religious terminology, though the religion is somewhat eclectic, 
and the tone not without a hint of mockery; for example:
"6. Let the goddess of enlightenment be your penates. and happiness 
shall settle with love in your household ...
8. Ignorance and its children - pride, superstition and fanaticism - 
they will be your evil spirit Beelzebub.
9 . Be tolerant of all the confessions and customs of other peoples, be
48obliged to make use of only the truly good."
182.
The society's blood-curdling oath makes one reference to traditional 
Christian demonology:
"Hell itself with all its horrors will not be able to compel me to reveal
to the tyrants my friends and their aims."
Otherwise the oath invokes only a secular religion of enlightenment, and 
punishment for violation of the oath is conceived in terms of earthly 
existence;
"Upon joining the United Slavs for the liberation of myself from tyranny
and for the restoration of freedom, which is so precious to the human race,
I solemnly pledge myself on this weapon to mutual love, which for me is
a divinity, and from which I expect the fulfillment of all my desires ...
Should I violate this oath, then let remorse be the first vengeance for
my oath-breaking, let the point of this sword turn against my heart and
fill it with hellish torment; let the moment of my life that is injurious
to my friends be the last one; let my existence be transformed into a
chain of unprecedented misfortunes from the fatal moment that I forget 
49my pledge."
According to Gorbachevsky's account of the society's objectives,
the Slavic Union saw no role for Christianity in fostering the acceptance
of its grand federative design amongst the people. This is significant,
since its members distrusted military revolutions, which "may become,
not the cradle, but the grave of freedom, in whose name they were
carried out", and advocated that no revolution take place until the
people had been adequately prepared for the new type of civic life:
"To fulfill these intentions [the United Slavs] decided to allot a
certain portion of their funds to buy serfs their freedom; to attempt to
organize or aid in the organization of small village and rural schools;
to instil in peasants and soldiers a feeling for tho necessity of knowing
justice and a love for the fulfillment of a citizen's duties, thereby
arousing in them the desire to alter the degrading condition of slaveavery,
and so forth."
183.
There is evidently no intention here of drawing the serfs* attention to 
the unacceptability of their social condition by referring them to the 
Bible, and the contrast afforded by the passage with Murav*ev-Apostol's 
propaganda makes the latter appear patronising rather than evangelical. 
But the examples of Yakushkin and Raevsky should deter any simplistic 
cleaving between the secular populism of the Slavic Union's proto-
and the mock-pious aloofness of their aristocratic fellow- 
conspirators. That having been said, the wish to win over the rank-and- 
file soldier by playing upon his supposed religious prejudices extended 
beyond the "Orthodox Catechism" within the aristocratic societies. 51 
Bestuzhev-Ryumin’s "Proclamation" echoes the catechism's denunciation 
of slavery as a contravention of Christ's teaching, and welcomes the 
death of the Tsar as a merciful release by God from tyranny. The Russian 
army, as "true sons of the Church" will fulfill its sacred task and 
without committing any sin will establish a popular government based on 
divine law. "And the servants of the altars, till now left in poverty 
and held in contempt by our wicked tyrant, will pray to God about us, who 
have restored the temples of the Lord to all their former glory. " 52
How for the Southern Society end the Slavic Union were eble to put
their opposing theories into practice is a matter of conjecture. Once
the United Slavs had committed themselves to the proposed insurrection,
despite their suspicion of military revolutiony revolution, their propaganda appears
to have been hasty and inadequate, if we accept the testimony of
Grigoriy Kraynikov, in return for their sunnort ho usupport, he and his comrades were
promised by Andreevich and Bechasny of the Society „f United Slavs the 
alleviation of their service duties, the present severity „f which wo, 
blamed on an administration composed mostly of Germans. 53 Accordin t
the testimony of a former soldier of the life-guards of the Semenovsky 
regiment, Fedor Anoychenko, Murav'ev-Apostol was particularly interested 
in former soldiers of the disbanded Semonovsky regiment like himself; on
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several occasions he gave Anoychenko•s comrades and himself money for 
vodka, and blamed the Tsar for the severity of their military service. 
Anoychenko, however, denied taking any oath, and disclaimed any 
knowledge of the "Orthodox Catechism."^ There is no doubt that the 
Catechism was circulated, and several copies have been preserved, 
though one wonders how far Murav'ev and Bestuzhev were prepared to put 
their religious propaganda to the test in their personal contacts with 
their subordinates, particularly in the light of the youthful Bestuzhev's 
"Proclamation", which would see the rebellion almost as a liberation of 
the clergy. We have already seen that Gorbachevsky and Spiridov regarded 
this approach as a failure to recognise the traditional anticlericalism 
of the Russian soldier and peasant. Gorbachevsky»s generalisation must 
be viewed in the light of his own religious indifference, but it has 
some plausibility from what we know of the spiritual and material 
impoverishment of the clergy under a Romanov dynasty manifestly 
unsympathetic to the national church from the reign of Peter the Great 
until the last years of Alexander I's incumbency. Not only did the 
church suffer by comparison with the zeal of the schismatics and 
sectarians amongst the people, but its supposed moral leadership was 
impaired by the increasingly exclusive and hereditary nature of the 
priestly class, ahd also the growing reliance of the rural clergy on 
local charity. The need to improve the parish clergy's conditions was 
set down in Russkaya Pravda; a similar point was made by A.A. Bestuzhev 
in his letter to Tsar Nicholas, where in an exhaustive inventory of the 
ills afflicting the fatherland, he pointed to the wretched condition of 
the rural clergy, held in disrespect and forced to begs 
"Having no stipend, they are totally reliant upon the kindness of the 
peasants and are compelled to ingratiate themselves with them; they have 
fallen into the very sins for the removal of which they were intended. " 55
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Although on tho face of it, the lot of tho clergy as portrayed by 
Bestuzhev might have commended them to the peasants, it is easy to see 
how they risked being regarded as superfluous parasites. It is probably 
no coincidence that the propaganda which Bestuzhev helped to compose 
differed markedly from the Southern Society-s appeal, to Christianity 
and the Orthodox Church. The prime instigator was the poet K.F. Byleov, 
who was enrolled by 1 .1. Pushchin into the Northern Society as late os 
1823, but whose leadership had an invigorating effect on the society's 
activities and recruitment. The propaganda referred to takes the form 
of simple couplets which could easily he sung by the soldiers, and is 
aimed usually at the Tsar himself, ,s well as other figures representing 
the government, such as Arakcheev, Volkonsky, Magnitsky, Grech and 
Bulgarin, a good example being the verses beginning "Our Tsar, the 
Russian German". Each couplet is followed by a refrain in which tho Tsar 
is ironically referred to as tho "Orthodox Lord", a hint at tho 
anticlericalism which is a significont emotional element of more than one 
of these songs. Ryleev, as was mentioned earlier in this section, was a 
member of a masonic lodge, and one of the couplets of "Our Tsar, the 
Russian German", written in 1823, a year after the prohibition of the 
lodges, accuses Alexander of being afraid of lows and of freemasons 
("Trusit on Zakonov, truslt on masonov")?6. The most graphic 
identification of the people's oppressors is given in tho worksong
beginning "This is how the blacksmith works" ("Uzh k„k she. ______
in which the blacksmith hammers in three nails, one for the boyar, the 
second for the priests and hypocrites, ",nd having said a prayer, the 
third nail for the Tsar."”  Iha verMs commencing "Oh, where are those 
islands" are an invocation of a utopia, where, incidentally, Faddey 
Bulgarin fears not the claws of hi, wife's aunt, and where Magnitsky is 
silent and Mordvinov (proposed by the Northern Society as one member of 
the Provisional Government) cries out freely. Of . 1 1 the songs, these
»86.
verses contain the strongest anticlerical feeling. Xhe islands are 
envisaged as pieces where people read Voltaire's poem "The Maid of Orleans" 
and "the church calendar lies under the bed", and "where the hussar, scold 
the priests, like bed-bugs, with wax." Xhe final lines consist of the 
following exhortation:
»'To the islands, to the islands, brothers,
Ve'll throw the church calendar in the priests' ugly facesl"58
Enough evidence may already have been presented to undermine any 
proposition that Christianity is a fundamental or necessary element of 
the social and political philosophy of the Decembrists! it can be 
inferred that a significant number of the policy-making conspirator, saw 
the need at least publicly to guarantee the truth of their moral and 
political prescriptions hy invoking a supernatural creator and legislator, 
though given that an appeal is also made to an analogy between moral 
laws and law, of nature, the former invocation is, at any rat, logically, 
unnecessary. Admittedly, God is held, for example in Kusskava Prows. 
to be the source of obligations and natural laws, but to soy that God 
guarantees moral standards may be an attempt to legitimise group values 
and objectives, whereas to advocate God's authorship of natural laws is 
more likely to be an attempt to explain a regularity or legitimacy 
already sufficiently attested by reason and experience. In other words, 
the appeal to a Creator in this case need be no more than a device to 
encourage the acceptance of an analogy between natural and moral laws 
with enough logical power to secure ene's own political objectives. Be 
that as it may, there can be no denying that religion played a significant, 
if diverse, role in the development of Decembrist thought, or that the 
secret societies numbered amongst their members sincere believers. The 
purpose of the final part of this section, which has in presenting only 
the relatively public manifestoes and propaganda material of the
187.
Decembrists and leaving aside consideration of the private views 
individuals, given a one-sided impression, has been to show that there 
are good grounds for not accepting even this one-sided impression at 
face value. There is a serious danger here of tendentiousness, a danger 
which may not have been removed merely by recognising it. The 
tendentiousness would be based upon a prior commitment to . correlation 
between attitudes towards the prevailing religious world-view and 
attitudes towards the existing mode of government. He have seen that 
scepticism, deism and anticlericalism were often associated with a 
reformist political stance towards the end of the eighteenth century.
A similar association exists in what we have so far seen of the 
anticlerical ism within the Northern Society, the most moderate 
politically of the Decembrist secret societies, whereas religious 
indifference characterises the more egalitarian and populiat society 
of United Slavs. The major .tumbling-block to the acceptance of the 
correlation of degrees of opposition to the religious and political 
st.tus_guo is presented by the Southern Society, whose programme of 
republican government to be attained by revelutionary mean, seems to 
be the toughest political line of all, and yet whose attitude towards 
religion and the Church could in some instances be described as conservative.
The coexistence of political, social and economic radicalism with 
religious conservatism in, f„r example, the pages of Russkav, fraud, could 
simply b, accepted and regarded a, an important counterexample refuting 
the universality of the correlation of degrees of opposition to the 
political and religious status quo. Certain qualification, ought however 
to be made. There is no doubt that Russkay, Pravd, was more radical than 
Nikita Murav*ev's constitution in that it called for the abolition of the 
monarchy, a political objective incidentally to be achieved by a garde 
jerdue of assassins dedicated to the destruction of the imperial family.
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Pestel* and his collaborators were also on the face of it economically 
more radical than their northern comrades, who while agreeing that 
serfdom should be abolished, defended the nobility’s existing ownership 
of the land. A well-known passage from Russfcaya Pravda suggests that 
this would have met with the total opposition of the Southern Society;
"A characteristic feature of the present century is marked by the
open struggle between the people and the feudal aristocracy, in course of
which there begins to arise an aristocracy of wealth, far more harmful
than the feudal aristocracy, for the latter can always be shaken by public
opinion, and consequently is to some extent dependent upon public opinion,
whereas the aristocracy of wealth, through possessing wealth, finds in it
an instrument for its views, against which public opinion is completely
powerless, and is able by means of it to keep the whole people ... in a
59state of total dependence."
It seems clear, though, from Pestel's testimony to the Investigating 
Commission, where he reiterates his dislike of hereditary aristocracy and 
aristocracy of wealth, that he is concerned with political rather than 
economic rights, and that Herzen’s description of him as "a socialist
6o •before socialism" is not on this count justified. What Pestel' objected 
to in Murav’ev's constitution, according to his testimony, was that the 
right to hold public office was made dependent upon property, and it was 
precisely that which he dubbed "this dreadful aristocracy of wealth.»61 
As far as the ownership of land was concerned the difference between north 
and south was not great, since both allowed for some communal ownership, 
and where the Northern Society defended existing rights, the Southern 
Society planned to give over half the land to private ownership and 
development. In general, both societies were committed to the sacred and 
inalienable right of property, and both wanted the abolition of estate 
and guild institutions inimical to the growth of free enterprise. Apart 
from disagreement about the form of government, the greatest gulf between
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the Southern Society and the Northern, and tor that natter the Slavic 
Union, concerned the extent of political control, rather than the extent 
of eocial and economic reconetruction. For example, v. read in lh,„l„va 
Pravd, that "members of society are divided into those who give orders 
and those mho obey. This division is inevitable, because it proceeds from 
human nature, and consequently exists everywhere, and must exist. " 62 The 
appeal to human nature a. a fixed quantity, though not incompatible with 
the psychological determinism of French Enlightenment moral and political 
philosophy, has at any rate to modern ears the ring of conservatism, and 
these statements taken out of context could sit comfortably in a 
justification of autocracy.
In the same tract, the option of federative government is rejected in 
favour of a united and indivisible state, on the grounds that the right 
to nationhood of the subject peoples is secondary to the general welfare 
of the dominant people. The balance between the two principles is 
determined by a third, which rules that the general welfare be concerned 
with the security of the state and not with any "vainglorious expansion 
of the boundaries of the state.» 63 Thus, it might be said, the Southern 
Society was, at least on paper, dissociating itself from any further 
imperialist expansion, but would rest content with the fruits so far 
gathered. The Northerners favoured federalism, though some were not 
only opposed to Pestel's proposed Russification policies but also to 
the exception he was prepared to make in the case of Poland, which was
held to be capable of independence. Objections of a similar kind were
made to the alliance concluded in ifloi.n b®tween the Southern Society and
the Polish Patriotic Society. It was n« w  + .y. it was only to be expected that centralised
government should be a sticking-point in the negotiations with the 
Society of United Slavs in the following year, since the first axi™ „f 
the Slavic Union was the esteblishment of a federation of all the Slav
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paoples, or at any rate those peoples considered by the society,
members to be Slavonic. It conld be argued that in reaching agreement.
the United Slavs were forced to sacrifice their own political identity,
Gorbachevsky, with the benefit of hindsight, was in agreement with th.il
judgment:
“The fate of the Slavs had been decided. From that moment, the 
Slavic Union existed in the hearts .„1 „¡„da of a few, who could not 
forget the grand and elevated, though perhaps in the opinion of some, 
unrealistic, ideal of a federative union of the Slavic nations."64
* further point of disagreement in the course of these negotiation, 
was again a question of the estent of political control, and again the 
antipathy of the Slavic Union was reciprocated by the Northern Society. 
Both groups were highly suspicious of the role of the Provisional 
Verkhovnaya Bum, for which Bo-skay. Pravda was intended as an instruction, 
and which was to enjoy unlimited legislative power for a limited period, 
in order that the proposed change, be brought about gradually and in 
consequence with the minimum „f social upheaval. This non-representative 
interregnum met with the opposition of Nikita MuraVav in St. Petersburg 
and Petr. Borisov of the United Slavs in Leshchin. Borisov, whose 
scepticism and self-control upset the impetuous and naive Bestuzhev- 
Byumin, asked by what right and whose consent the Supremo Duma would 
govern Russia for the proposed ten-year period:
“Khat constitutes its power, and what safeguards will you introduce
in order to prevent one of the members ofmoers of your government, chosen by the
army and supported by bayonets, wresting autocratic power?"
Bestuzhev was outraged by the question, but as Borisov, who was given to 
classical allusions, pointed out:
"Julius Caesar was murdered in the middle of name, struck down by 
his own greatness and glory, but over the murderers, over the ardent 
patriots, triumphed the faint-hearted Octavian, an eight.e„-ye.r-.,d
youth."
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It would be easy enough to accept the Southern Society's 
rationalisations of the ten-year interregnum in terms of the avoidance 
of bloodshed, were it not for the authoritarianism which is evident 
elsewhere in Russkaya Pravda. This attitude undoubtedly owes a great 
deal to the personality of Pestel', who shares something of Lenin's 
unswerving and unyielding subordination of means to ends. Yakushkin's 
portrait is particularly instructive:
»Pestel» always spoke intelligently, and obstinately defended his 
point of view, in the truth of which he always believed, as one normally 
believes in mathematical truth; he was never carried away by anyone, 
and perhaps in this fact lies the reason why of all of us he alone during 
the course of almost ten years, without weakening for a single moment, 
worked zealously on the business of the Secret Society. Having once 
demonstrated to himself that the Secret Society was the true moans for 
the achievement of the desired end, he merged his existence with it.» 66 
The appeals to Christianity in Russkaya Pravda and in the propaganda of 
Bestuzhev-Ryumin and Murav'ev-Apostol must be seen in the context of a 
clear desire within the Southern Society to impose radical reform and 
to preserve the natural division between those who give orders and those 
who obey, be they individuals or nations. Thus Pestel' and his comrades 
at Tul'chin, although more hostile to autocracy than N.M. Murav'ev and 
the other constitutional monarchists of the Northern Society, 67 were at 
least initially prepared to contemplate methods of political control 
previously associated with the exercise of the Tsar's unlimited 
sovereignty. It has already been argued that the policies of the Holy 
Alliance impelled an otherwise ecumenical Alexander to recognise the value 
of the national church for the stability of his regime. It might 
similarly be argued that the desire to enact reforms without the 
unpredictable participation of the ordinary soldier and peasant led a 
possibly indifferent Southern Society to a similar conclusion, that the
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traditional faith was the best means to maintain the masses in a state 
of pious acceptance of authority, in this case that of the rebels.
The validity of the argument is open to doubt, though, the truth of its 
main component propositions is well attested. We have already seen how 
Gorbachevsky ascribed the Southern Society propagandists» desire to 
avoid the participation of the people in the revolt, and their 
concealment of their real intentions from the lower ranks, to their 
social status. Apart from the religious propaganda, and the previously 
quoted extracts from Russkaya Pravda (one of which advocated qualified
toleration of religious faiths), we read in the first version of the 
latter work:
"Christian Orthodoxy, the Graeco-Russian faith must be recognised 
as the ruling faith of the Great Russian State,"6®
In the second version, the assimilation of the Church into the state 
organs begun by Peter the Great is fully endorsed. Although the 
conditions of the rural clergy are to be improved, the clergy as a whole 
are to be considered as "a part of the government...a branch of the state 
administration, a division of the bureaucracy. " 69 The capital of the 
Russian state is to be transferred to Nizhniy Novgorod, which is to be 
renamed Vladimir, m  memory of the great man who introduced the Christian
faith into Russia:
" ... and let Russia's centra +centre by rts very „ame forever bear witne„
to the Russians' eternal gratitude for this art nf +t of virtue and beneficence".^
One measure of the limitation of the evt«»* + . . .the extent to which the Southern Society
”  PrePar°d tClerate •“ - C M s t i . n  faiths is afforded by their
attitude towards the yews, who. they regarded as an elusive '.state within
a state", hostile to Christianity, it was suggested that tho P„li,h
Russian Jews shouid get together and set up a state in Asi. Minor.’'1
This policy of Russification and the extension of Orthodo 
in isolation from the Southern Society’s programme of political
taken
social
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and economic revolution, is hard to distinguish from official theory 
and practice during the reign of Nicholas I. I am not in saying this 
attempting to salvage the thesis that radical opposition to a government 
justifying itself in the name of religion is likely to be accompanied by 
antireligious metaphysics, by arguing that an apparently radical Southern 
Society is in reality more conservative than its apparently more moderate 
northern counterpart. Nevertheless, it becomes clear that the extent 
of opposition to a feudal or semifeudal autocracy cannot be measured in 
a simple linear fashion. If the Southerners can be accused of wishing 
to retain Tsarist methods of coercion, the Northerners can be seen as 
defenders of the existing privileges of the landowning nobility. These 
are generalisations derived from Russkaya Pravda and Murav'ev's 
Constitution, and it should immediately be noted that, for example, some 
prominent Northerners like Ryleev and E.P. Obolensky were attracted by 
Pestel's advocacy of the destruction of the imperial family, and took 
exception to Murav’ev's insistence upon a propertied electorate. 72 But 
to pursue generalisation further, the moderate Northerners were 
primarily concerned with economic and political liberty, whereas the 
Southerners added to these goals the imposition of a measure of social 
equality, for the attainment of which they looked to the same means by 
which the Tsars sought to maintain inequality. The paradox that the 
inversion of an oppressive regime engenders an equal amount of 
oppression has been noted by countless Western liberals emphasising, 
for example, the continuity between the ancien regime and the 
revolutionary Terror m  eighteenth—century France or between Imperial 
Russia and the Soviet Union, The implied parallel between the Southern 
Society and the Bolsheviks in terms of political control does not on 
the face of it throw any light on the Southern Society’s appeal to 
Orthodoxy, since the ideology of the Bolsheviks was antireligious au 
dernier point. Leaving aside debating points about the function of
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Marxist-Leninist materialism as a secular religion, one of the many 
differences between the Bolsheviks and the Southern Society was that 
for the former popular participation was not only desired and encouraged, 
but regarded as an ideological essential of revolution, whereas for the 
latter, exactly the opposite was the case. The Bolsheviks saw as part of 
their role the fostering of class consciousness amongst the industrial 
workers and peasants, a process which included the identification of 
religion as an expression of the ideology of the exploiting classes; 
clearly the Decembrists were theoretically poles apart from such a 
characterisation of revolutionary purpose, and the difference between the 
two sets of social, political and economic goals could be offered as a 
simple analogue of the conflicting approaches to religion adopted by the 
Bolsheviks and the Southern Society. In other words, the similarity 
between the groups* perceived need for strong centralised political 
control is neither here nor there. This conclusion however, seems 
unsatisfactory, since the location and strength of advocated political 
authority has been put forward as the measure by which to gauge the 
differing attitudes towards religion and the church which we have found 
amongst the three principal Decembrist groupings. It should nevertheless 
be noted that although it is difficult to find a criterion derived from 
their political philosophy, other than the degree of control to be 
exercised, which would illuminate the different approaches evinced by the 
Southern and Northern Societies towards the use of religion in the 
service of the revolution, it appears that the degree of popular 
participation in the revolution is a matter of policy which not only 
separates the Southerners from the Bolsheviks, but also from the Slavic 
Union, a group which it is a little less far-fetched to compare with 
Lenin’s party than in the case of their aristocratic allies.
In summary, the Bolsheviks favoured popular participation and strong 
political control, and attempted to replace Orthodoxy with a state-
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sponsored secular metaphysicsthe Slavic Union favoured popular 
participation but opposed strong political control, and were, so far 
as we have seen, indifferent to religion, and the Southern Society 
wished to keep popular participation to a minimum and favoured strong 
political control, and wished to retain the religion formerly sponsored 
by their political antagonists. It could be inferred on the basis of 
the foregoing caricatures of three differing sets of political attitudes, 
that at any rate in the context of Russian history, the affinities between 
ontological and political beliefs may be determined by a balance of the 
respective desires to win the people's heart and to claim the people's 
mind. Whether or not this is the case is independent of whether the 
Southern Society's corporate appeal to Christianity was founded upon 
religious conviction or whether it was more "the cunning of 
Machiavellianism", though were it the case, it would render the truth 
of either of the latter less critical for the salvation of the thesis 
that materialist metaphysics went hand in hand with political opposition*, 
it would merely entail that the nature of that political opposition would 
have to be specified more closely. Suffice it to say, then, that as far 
as this discussion of the Decembrists' corporate attitudes towards 
religion and the Church has been concerned, no atheistic sentiments can 
be found, but that there are some grounds for not accepting at face value 
even the most enthusiastic avowals of support for the Orthodox Church.
No final judgments about the relationship between Decembrism and religion 
can be given until the insurgents' individual views have been considered.
In conclusion to this section, and in connection with its initial 
recognition that the Magnitsky era was but one facet of a rather complex 
period of reaction, it should be borne in mind when it comes to a fuller 
assessment of the Decembrists' metaphysical views that insofar as they
can be shown to have been shaped by governmental attitudes and activities,
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they must have been shaped as much, if not more, by the variety of 
supraconfessional religious configurations either sponsored or tolerated
by the state, than by the latter-day Orthodox hegemony, personified in 
the archimandrite Photius Spassky. Thus although it might still be the
case that atheism and materialism would constitute an expected response on 
the part of at least some political dissidents within a society where 
religion was monopolised by a state-controlled Church, the fact that 
religion was not controlled by the state through the national church for 
the majority of Alexander's reign, and the associated fact that his 
administration was likely to be associated more with Christian theism in 
the abstract, than with a concrete estate of ecclesiastics, makes it 
logically attractive that atheism should be associated with rejection of 
the State, for otherwise there is no reason to expect that the response 
on the part of the state’s opponents to a state-administered church 
should be anything more extreme than the anticlericalism which we have 
already encountered in the propaganda songs of Ryleev and Bestuzhev- 
Marlinsky. This is not to say that as a general rule atheism and 
materialism are only to be expected, or at any rate are more likely, 
when the government is more easily associated with theism than with any 
particular denomination. Such a simple conclusion could easily be 
undermined by pointing to the generation of radicals and atheists, 
including Belinsky, Bakunin and Herzen, whose repudiation of temporal 
and spiritual authority developed in an official atmosphere of 
Orthodoxy, autocracy and nationality. It is, however, at least likely 
from what we have seen of the corporate attitudes towards religion and 
the Church manifested by the three Decembrist factions, that the 
metaphysical views of political radicals, to the extent which they 
depend on either, and for that matter to the extent which either can be 
separated, depend as much upon the extent and nature of their own 
political opposition, as they do upon the policies of the government
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towards religious confessions other than those of the State Church. Thus 
in the case of Bakunin, his rejection of authority was so extreme, profound 
and upon so many levels, that his anarchism was bound, psychologically 
if not logically, to have been accompanied by atheism, regardless of the 
religious policies of the Russian government, or indeed of any other 
government whose scrutiny he happened to attract. But Decembrism, as we 
have seen, was not the absolute negation of existing political reality 
which was the dynamo of Bakuninism; instead, varying degrees of opposition 
coexisted on the political, economic and social levels. It is therefore 
only to be expected that government policy towards religion and the church 
would play a more critical part in the formation of the metaphysical views 
of an oppositional group whose rejection of the existing order was far 
from total, or even consistent. To be more specific, I am suggesting 
that the peculiar nature of Alexander's conduct of spiritual affairs 
contributed to a balance amongst the Decembrists between anticlericalism 
and agnosticism or deism on the one hand, and atheism and materialism 
on the other, which was less towards the former than would be expected 
from a consideration of their political views alone. This expectation 
assumes an appeal to the simple correlation between degree of political 
opposition and degree of departure from Orthodoxy which seems to be 
confirmed as a workable generalisation for the liberal nobility of the 
late eighteenth century, and the intelligentsia which inherited the 
Decembrist cause.
This is to speculate in advance of the evidence to be provided, for 
example, by an analysis of the surviving views of Decembrists such as 
Yakushkin, Baryatinsky, Borisov and Gorbachevsky. It might therefore be 
worthwhile, at a point where it has been observed that of all the liberal 
policies associated with Alexander’s reign, the sponsorship of a 
comparatively high degree of interconfessional equality proved slightly
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hardier than the educational and political reforms, to recollect that
such were the connections between the masonic lodges and the
embryonic Decembrist secret societies that it seemed not unreasonable
to entertain an alternative correlation between metaphysics and political
opposition to that assumed above. The alternative, that the masonic
world-view at least initially provided the intellectual stimulus in the
process whereby growing disillusionment with the Tsarist regime began
to be articulated, could not be totally discards „7 aiscarded, and served as a reminder
that any attempt to argue for an exclusive union of Decembrism with any
particular class of metaphysical views would number amongst its
presuppositions a unanimity of Decembrist social, political and economic 
objectives which did not exist.
199
Section 4 - Political Opposition
The previous section’s rejection of the claims of any one kind of 
ontology to a monopoly of trade with Decembrist political philosophy 
brings to mind the demise of more than one possible monocausal 
explanation of such atheistic and materialistic sentiments as found 
expression amongst the insurgents. It has already been pointed out that 
in the sphere of education, the Tsar and his advisers promoted against 
the odds philosophical and natural scientific instruction as part of 
their curricular reforms, only for many of the doctrines thereby 
introduced to be branded as atheistic and materialistic by subsequent 
officials in the Ministry of Education. It was suggested that this might 
serve to recommend atheism to students of the new philosophical and 
scientific disciplines. One of the difficulties of this line of 
reasoning is that so many Western ideas were covered by, for example, 
Magnitsky's application of ''materialist" and "atheist", that it becomes 
implausible to suppose that a disciple of Kant or Schelling would 
renounce views which we should now consider opposed to materialism or 
atheism, simply because they were described as such by an administrator 
not renowned for philosophical acumen. This is not to say that the 
official attitudes put into practice by Magnitsky for the benefit of the 
students at Kazan’ could have had no real impact on the development of 
Decembrist thought; Magnitsky, it will be remembered, was nothing if not 
sensitive to the possible materialist implications of contemporary 
physics, cosmology and anatomy, and we shall see that metaphysical views 
which Borisov and Yakushkin founded upon data from these sciences could 
be interpreted as at least compatible with the acceptance of materialism. 
Nevertheless, even though the fact that the official assault on 
materialism and atheism was first publicly mounted during the reign of 
Alexander I in the sphere of education is vital to my contention that 
the latter stages of that period mark a turning-point in the history of
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Russian materialism, the fact is not in itself sufficient to explain 
why that world-view was more prevalent in certain social groups rather 
than others. The same charge of insufficiency was levelled against the 
argument that political and metaphysical freethought in Russians was the 
direct result of contact with politically and metaphysically freethinking 
West Europeans or their publications. If freethought were a contagion, it 
needed to be known why some sections of society were more immune than
others.
Leaving aside the not inconsiderable arguments of the previous section 
that the true intellectual progenitor of Decembrist political philosophy 
was masonic ethics, the implication being that the materialism and atheism 
of certain of the insurgents, if it were to be explained at all, should 
be explained in purely individual terms, the preferred hypothesis was 
that the government's association with most forms of Christian theism 
was likely to recommend atheism to its staunchest opponents. In other 
words the arguments become more plausible upon the insertion of a clause 
impiying that the proponents of materialism and atheism, or at any rate 
those whose attitudes may have been stimulated by those factors mentioned 
above, were also opponents of the Tsarist regime. This takes us back to 
the opening paragraph of the previous section, where it was suggested 
that related metaphysical and political views might be dependent upon 
some underlying, preceding or primary factor or set of factors. It 
need not follow, of course, that the factor or factors should be 
responsible in the same way for both the metaphysical and political 
views; provided that they accounted for the growth of political 
opposition, the arguments for the appeal of materialism would thereby be 
made sufficient.
I mentioned in the aforesaid paragraph that to seek to explain the 
relationships between ideas by reference to some underlying factor or
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factors would as a class of historico-philosophical views subsume 
Marxist interpretations of history. It would therefore be impossible to 
investigate in any depth this general methodological approach without at 
least recognising that it raises the question as to how far Decembrist 
ideas can be traced back ultimately to changes in economic relations of 
production, or mediately to conflict between social classes. I propose 
to decline the invitation either to validate or to falsify Marxism, 
primarily on the grounds of incompetence in economics and economic 
history, but secondarily because there are enough factors in the Russian 
Alexandrine context to account for the development of political opposition 
within the army and consequently enough indigenous factors to render 
untenable the view that Decembrism was mere imitation of the West, without 
having recourse to a commitment to economic determinism. Nevertheless, 
some observations should be made. Firstly, I could not rule out in 
principle explanations of the ultimate or mediate kind given above. The 
fact that the Decembrists were scarcely less homogeneous in terms of 
class origin and occupation than they were in terms of sex and age make 
it unlikely that any explanation which excluded considerations of class 
could be given of the fact th&t of all the sections of Russian society 
they were the most attracted to certain kinds of political and 
metaphysical thought. (However, an explanation in terms of class alone 
could not be sufficient, since by no means all of the nobility shared 
these views). Again, the unanimity with which the Decembrists condemned 
serfdom and protectionist trade policies, and all institutions inimical 
^o laissez-faire renders it implausible to treat their ideas independently 
of economic developments within Russia, unless it is argued that such 
condemnations stem from an ingenuous and unrealistic imbibing of Western 
political economy; such an argument would, I believe, fly in the face of 
the harsh criticism of specifically Russian economic practices and 
institutions expressed in several corporate and individual Decembrist 
writings.
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The second kind of observation I wish to make concerns not so much 
the truth of economic determinism as the validity of the claims of Soviet 
historians that the Decembrist rebellion represented an abortive bourgeois 
revolution, an interpretation completely at odds with Professor Pipes* 
two viewpoints referred in Section 2, and apparently inconsistent with 
each other, either that the Decembrist revolt represented the last of 
three attempts by the service elite to restrain autocratic power, or that 
it was an event without antecedents or issue in Russian terms but merely 
an imitation of distant happenings. In the words of I. Ya. Shchipanov: 
»'Objectively, the Decembrists» struggle was a struggle for a bourgeois 
basis and a bourgeois superstructure corresponding to it. " 1 This 
statement at first sight poses a logical oddity, in that according to the 
Marxist-Leninist conception of history, the superstructure (for example, 
social relations, institutions, political, legal, philosophical and 
religious ideas) is determined by the relations of production, or the 
material basis of society; it would therefore be difficult to see how 
the ideas of the Decembrists could be a struggle for a basis and a 
corresponding superstructure when they should form part of the latter and 
be in the final analysis determined by the former. Clearly what is 
meant is that the existing feudal basis had already entered a transitional 
stage on its way to being replaced by a capitalist socioeconomic 
formation, and Shchipanov indeed argues that the second half of the 
eighteenth century had seen in Russia the development from a natural 
economy of a market, commodity and money economy. lie quotes figures given 
by M. Zlotnikov comparing the number of manufacturing enterprises with 
more than l6 workers in l8o4 with the corresponding number in 1825, 
together with the total number of workers and proportion of hired as 
opposed to serf labour in each case. Although the percentage increase in 
the number of enterprises is fairly high (about 50^ ), the number is small 
to begin with, and moreover the proportion of hired labour rises very
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little (about 6%). It consequently becomes a matter of fine judgment 
as to whether the remarkable excrescence of ideas opposing the official 
»superstructure* in the years after the Napoleonic Wars can be put down 
to what seems to be a rather slow shift in the economic basis of 
Alexandrine society. This is not to say that Shchipanov wishes in any 
way to deny the peculiar significance of the campaigns of l8i2-l4 in 
the Decembrist movement; rather they are accorded a vital role in 
increasing the national self-consciousness of the people. Indeed many 
of the factors which might have been emphasised in contradistinction to 
economics by historians antipathetic to Marxist-Leninist philosophy of 
history are readily included in Shchipanov»s analysis: for instance, 
the disillusionment of the army after their successful campaigns, the 
harsh discipline imposed upon soldiers, the unpopularity of the military 
settlements, patriotic motives, the effect of revolutionary events in 
France, Spain, Portugal, Naples, Piedmont and Greece, and the influence 
of liberal and materialistic ideas (though with the emphasis on indigenous 
rather than Western European thinkers). The difference is that in the 
case of the Marxist-Leninist interpretation, what is described as the 
superstructure is in the final analysis determined by the material 
basis of society. It would be a vulgarisation of the theory of basis and 
superstructure to claim, for example, that a particular philosophical 
doctrine was determined directly by economic relations of production.
But although the Marxian belief in the dependence of intellectual 
production on material production was considerably refined after the 
early» somewhat bald statements by Marx and Engels in The German Ideology 
and the Communist Manifesto, it could be argued that the resultant 
increased flexibility was bought at a price, in that some ideas were 
allowed a measure of independence, the possibility of the reaction of 
the intellectual superstructure back upon the material basis was admitted 
(thereby blurring what was formerly an unequivocally monocausal theory),
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and the material basis so distanced from the superstructure that the 
ultimate dependence of any set of ideas upon economic relations of 
production became effectively immune from refutation; in other words, 
it was in danger of becoming more a matter of definition than a historical
insight.
But the difficult question as to whether Marxist-Leninist analyses 
of the conditions determining the production of thought need differ 
pragmatically from certain non-Marxist attempts to place particular sets 
of ideas in their social and historical context, does not, fortunately, 
need to be resolved in order to account for the growth of political 
opposition in certain sections of Russian society during Alexander’s reign. 
Indeed, to dwell on the economic basis alone is unlikely to shed any light 
on why it was that those groups of individuals who were, to use Marxist- 
Leninist terminology, struggling for a bourgeois basis and superstructure, 
were almost exclusively young army officers, and to a considerable 
extent drawn from some of the most favoured aristocratic families. This 
is not however to say that the opposition towards autocracy expressed 
by those groups was not in part stimulated by the economic structure and 
by the government’s financial policies. We have already met with 
objections to serfdom founded upon Christian ethics and natural law theory, 
for example in Russkaya Pravda, but Pestel’ also argued the economic 
benefits of the substitution of serfs by free labourers in Russian 
agriculture in his unfinished work Prakticheskie nachala politicheskoy 
ekonomii» and Yakushkin, in his Mnenie smolenskovo pomeshchika ob 
^■.mbozhdenii krest’yan ot krepostnoy zavisimosti, written about 1820, 
put forward the view that it would be to the advantage of both if serfs 
vere able to rent their lord’s land. Yakushkin was one of the few 
landowners to attempt to take advantage of the decree of 20 February l803 
which provided for the conversion of serfs into a new class of 'free
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farmers’, subject to the landlord’s agreement, though he concluded that
this measure was not the means to end serfdom, and that to free serfs
without a sufficient quantity of land was no guarantee of their 
' 4independence.
There is little point in continuing to illustrate a general point 
which is not in dispute: the fact that throughout Decembrist literature 
we find a more or less articulated desire to abolish or to modify 
institutions which were seen as obstacles to the liberalisation of trade, 
agriculture and industry in Russia, a desire which, however, could be put 
down to the impressionability of young army officers armed with a 
superficial knowledge of the ideas of political economists, such as Adam 
Smith, J.-B. Say and Sismondi, and dazzled by a brief encounter with 
industrially more advanced nations in Western Europe. It would be wrong 
though to suppose that such ideas and experiences did not provide a 
suitable basis for the critique of Russian reality. The widest audience 
was reached by N.I. Turgenev, who, as was mentioned before, escaped his 
comrades’ fate by emigration, and whose devastating book La Russie et les 
j^gses was published in Paris in 1847. A useful compression of Decembrist 
dissatisfaction with the government's conduct of the economy can be found 
in A.A. Bestuzhev-Marlinsky's letter to Nicholas I on the development of 
freethought, cited in the section on Western ideas. Me claimed that after 
the Napoleonic invasion, a third of Russia's labour was occupied in the 
construction of unstable roads, while crops were left to rot in the ground. 
Tlie introduction of a state monopoly of alcohol in 1817 was held 
responsible for the disappearance of markets for the sale of grain in many 
provinces, while the multiplication of drinking houses was corrupting 
morals and destroying the peasant way of life.** The economic ill-effects 
f the military settlements were alluded to, though moral indignation 
was the most powerful reaction amongst the rebels to a measure which 
captured best of all the characteristic mixture of idealism and militarism
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in the Tsar’s personality. Yakushkin, who described the post-war 
obsession of Alexander with the military settlements and with the 
construction of bigger roads throughout Russia ("on account of which he 
spared neither the money, the sweat nor the blood of his subjects"), 
told of the disgust inspired in the army officers in Moscow by reports 
of the regimentation and harsh discipline imposed upon the peasants 
dragooned into the settlements, and in particular of the cruel manner 
in which Arakcheev supervised the suppression of a revolt amongst 
peasants allocated to settlements in the province of Novgorod. 6 It would 
be misleading, though, to concentrate upon this aspect of the decade of 
arakcheevshchina in order to understand why radical opposition found its 
expression amongst the young army officers, since, if we accept M.a . 
Fonvizin’s memoirs, the forced establishment of the settlements was 
hated "not only by liberals, but by the whole of Russia", the measure 
even, we are told, ran counter to the convictions of the officials 
charged by the Tsar with its implementation, including Arakcheev 
himself, who although he did not approve of the policy, saw to its 
execution as the sacred will of his lord and benefactor. 7 it is scarcely 
to be marvelled at that all the estates directly affected, from the 
peasants either subjected to military drill and discipline or punished for 
their resistance to it, to the merchants and landowners dispossessed of 
their property and meagrely compensated for it, should have been opposed 
to the settlements, but the nobility, as the most powerful estate of the 
realm, was evidently the most likely in its entirety to be hostile to 
what it could interpret as an attempt by a Russophobe autocrat to create 
an independent military caste. Bestuzhev-Marlinsky, for his part, 
pointed out that apart from their socially destructive effects, the 
military settlements, which were apparently intended by Alexander to 
reduce the burden of the armed forces on the exchequer, in fact 
paralysed the econo»ieS of the regions into whlch thoy
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and led the peasants into tax arrears.u
Bestuzhev then considered those estates which might have been 
expected to produce strong advocates of the development of private 
enterprise in Russia, the artisans and merchants. I have already mentioned 
in the previous chapter on the eighteenth century some of the factors 
which go to explain the chronic political weakness of the prerevolutionary 
Russian middle classes, and these in general obtained during Alexander's 
reign. The decrees of Peter III and Catherine II in 1762 effectively 
abolished the merchants’ monopoly of trade and manufacture granted by 
Tsar Alexei's Code of Laws promulgated in 1649, but more importantly 
rescinded the decree of January 18, 1721 whereby merchants were given the 
right to purchase serf labour for their factories and mills.9 This meant 
that the dvoryanstvo»s monopoly of serf ownership, also formalised in the 
1649 Code, had been restored, and henceforth merchants could only hire 
forced labour from the Crown or from the nobility. Naturally, the nobility 
with its privileged access to the cheapest (sometimes free) labour, soon 
outstripped the merchants as factory owners in the second half of the 
eighteenth century. It was also in the interests of the dvoryane to 
encourage the development of industry within another social estate to which 
the freedom to engage in trade and commerce had in effect been extended by 
the decrees of 1762, namely the peasantry. The growth of peasant industry 
in the latter half of the eighteenth century had been slow, but in 
Alexander's reign, when the cotton industry had become established in 
Russia, significant fortunes began to be amassed by peasant entrepreneurs. 
Since many of the factories were situated in villages owned by the nobility, 
and since their products did not compete with those of the nobility's own 
factories, the owners of the new capitalists were content, as ever, to 
exact their tribute. Likewise, the government was not slow to utilise 
peasant wealth as a source of revenue.
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The merchant class in the reign of Alexander I was caught between 
two classes, and between two alternative systems of industrial production, 
of which latter it found itself in a relatively weak position to take 
advantage. Once its monopoly of trade and manufacture had been abolished, 
it was at a disadvantage in relation to the new dvoryanin factory owner 
when it came to the characteristically eighteenth-century mode of 
industrial production, which was primarily directed towards meeting the 
needs and demands of the state (in particular its militaristic appetite 
for iron and woollen cloth) on a basis of servile labour. Not only were 
the merchants in a poor position with regard to labour, but unlike his 
noble counterpart, the relations between the merchant factory owners, and 
the workers he was able to gain access to were tightly controlled by the 
government. Peter I’s original concession of 1721 of the right to 
purchase villages and their population was made only on the condition 
that they remained permanently attached to the factory or mill and not to 
the merchant factory owner himself (hence the designation "possessional" 
factory worker) . This meant that the factory owner was unable to sell the 
peasants separately from the factory, and he was in addition prevented from 
either ceasing production or changing the nature of production. The effect 
was that the owner was bound to produce the same number of goods each year, 
regardless of demand, and to employ the same number of workers at the same 
wages regardless of profit. Now if the availability of free or very cheap 
labour was a disincentive for the nobility to introduce machines into 
agriculture or industry, it was the unavoidability of servile labour that 
rendered mechanisation unprofitable for the posscssional factory owner.
The serf entrepreneur, on the other hand, for all his total want of civil 
rights, was at least in a position to benefit from the unregulated nature 
of his relations with his noble owner, to the extent that he was able to 
used freely hired labour and introduce machines, such as cotton printing 
machines, and much later, spinning machines* But even when cotton
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manufacturing, the largest area of peasant capitalism, was restricted 
in the main to small manufacturers using weaving looms and printing 
stands, such was its success in comparison with enterprises operating 
along traditional eighteenth-century lines, that the proportion of 
factory workers producing cotton goods rose from T/o in 1804 to 2l% in 
1825, and must have been the most significant contributor to the rise in 
overall number of factory workers, and the proportion thereof of hired 
workers, which either characterises this period or does not, according to 
ideological preference.^
The courtiers and intellectuals of the first decade of Alexander's 
rule, imbued as they were with the teaching of Adam Smith, and engaged as 
the Russian army was in costly European adventures, could hardly be 
expected to have been less sensitive than eighteenth-century ruling 
circles to the need to stimulate trade and industry But in the same way 
that Peter the Great's successors allowed noble privilege to take priority 
over the encouragement of the traditional trading and manufacturing 
classes, the Alexandrine policy-makers, despite their lip-service to the 
axioms of Western political economy, remained decidedly loyal to the 
interests of their own estate. The Emperor Paul, in his short but 
remarkable reign, had, it must be said, restored to the merchants the right 
to purchase peasants for factories and mines in the limited numbers decreed 
by Elizabeth in 1752. This amounted to one of the several curtailments of 
recently awarded noble privilege enacted by Paul, and far from being 
motivated by a desire to liberalise trade and industry, it was to a 
considerable extent part of an attempt to efface his mother's memory. The 
liberal ideas current in the early years of Alexander's rule might seem to 
have taken legislative form in the decree promulgated on the Tsar's 
birthday m  1801 granting merchants, townspeople (meshchane). state peasants 
and freed peasants the right to purchase land without serfs. This was 
however, a hollow concession, since the middle classes required access to
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labour above all; the government was not so generous in this respect,
for as soon as July 3, 1802, a decree was issued which had the right
restored by Paul to purchase peasants limited to transactions which
did not involve the peasants' resettlement. The production of woollen
cloth for the army, which as I have said was carried out largely in mills
employing servile labour, was so sluggish, that in 1808 an exception to
that limitation was made in the case of such mills. The conditions of
the exception proved unattractive and on November 6, 1816 the purchase
. 12of peasants for factories was prohibited altogether. We may detect 
here, as well as the preservation of the interests of the rural classes 
which acts as such a powerful determinant of legislation in the wake of 
the Petrine reforms, the first glimmerings of the realisation that 
industrial productivity was being restrained by the use of servile labour. 
It was not until the l830s that the conservative merchants, accustomed 
by tradition to dependence upon the state for markets, licenses, trading 
and industrial concessions and protective tariffs, began to press for 
the dismantling of the possessional factory system, but the requests of 
several factory owners to free their workers led to the law of December 
20, 1824, whereby factory peasants, at the owner's request and subject to 
the permission of the Committee of Minister, could be transferred to 
another status. Only by such steps were possessional factory owners 
enabled to make the transition to the use of hired labour.
Bearing in mind the inevitable shift of manufacturing from town to 
rural estate which accompanied the rise of the nobleman and peasant 
factory owner, let us see what Bestuzhev had to say about the estate of 
townspeople (meshchane)t
•»The townspeople, a respected and important class in all other 
states, in our country are insignificant, impoverished, burdened with 
duties, deprived of the means to earn a living. In other nations they 
populate the towns, in our own, since towns exist only on the map
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and freedom of trade is hampered in their corporations (tsokhi). they
peregrinate like gipsies, occupying themselves with petty trade. The
decline in trade had the most powerful effect on them, on account of
their poverty, for they depend upon the merchants like petty tradesmen,
14or like workers on the factories."
The political impotence and economic weakness of the meshchane is, as 
Bestuzhev intimated, closely bound up with the conditions which 
prevented the development in Russia of the autonomous, incorporated typo 
of town and city wherein the politically triumphant Vest European 
bourgeoisie was nurtured. Bestuzhev himself, in a footnote to the above 
quotation, explained the emptying of the towns by the tendency of the 
ambitious nobility to evade unrewarding provincial duties and seek 
service in the capital, moreover retaining their home-grown craftsmen. 
With the advantage of a historical perspective, we can add the rise of 
rural manufacturing mentioned at the beginning of this paragraph, and 
remark upon the failure of Catherine's City Charter of 1785 to overcome 
the traditional disunity engendered by the rigid estate allegiances of 
the urban population, a factor which at least accounts for the towns' 
failure to flourish.
When his attention ; turned to the merchants (kupechestvo),
Bestuzhev pointed to the stifling effect of the surviving guilds (the 
manifestoes of both Northern and Southern societies were united in calling 
for the abolition of craft and merchant guilds), but directed most of his 
criticism at the government's conduct of the economy, in consequence of 
which "many colossal fortunes were destroyed." Particularly damaging was 
the series of tariffs imposed upon imported goods, which as well as being
protectionist, thereby "enriching smugglers", were also changeable, thereby 
leading to instability:
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»The unsteadiness of the tariff reduced many factory owners to 
poverty, and alarmed others, and undermined the confidence of both 
our own and foreign businessmen in our government. On account of this, 
there began an even greater decline in our rate of exchange (i.e. 
external credit), the result of government debts, and the complaint was 
universal, that there was no cash. " 1'5
There is little point here in seeking to chart the labyrinthine turns of 
Alexandrine financial policy in order to substantiate Bestuzhev's 
observation. Suffice it to say that underlying the inherited public debt 
worsened by recurrent budget deficits, the growth in tax arrears, and 
the depreciation of the increasing volume of inconvertible paper currency 
against the silver rouble, was an unbridgeable gulf between the wealth 
produced by an economy still overwhelmingly dependent upon low-yield 
agriculture, and the exorbitant demands of the administrative and military 
machine. Within this overall framework, temporary political alliances 
could have the most remarkable effects: for example, Russia's 
participation in the Continental Blockade after 1807 meant that imports 
of English manufactured goods ceased, a vital factor in the initial 
expansion of the domestic cotton industry; but at the same time, the loss 
of the foremost consumer of exported grain was a considerable blow to 
Russian agriculture, a blow which, moreover, was sustained, as Britain 
was forced to intensify the capitalisation of its m m  farming. As for 
the various tariff acts of the Alexandrine period, it was perhaps only 
to be expected the Decembrists, political and economic liberals as they 
were, should have opposed the more or less protectionist regulation of 
external trade after l807. 16 There are, however, two points of 
qualification that need to be made. Firstly, although the Decembrists 
shared the opposition to protectionism expressed by liberal economists, 
such as the one-time tutor to the Grand Dukes Constantine and Nicholas, 
Heinrich Storch, and the aforementioned Professor Kunitsyn, a proponent
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of the policy could be found who was not only one of the most prominent 
advocates of the teachings of Adam Smith during Alexander's "liberal 
honeymoon", but in addition was sufficiently respected by the Northern 
Society to be earmarked (along with Speransky and General A.P. Ermolov) 
as one of the presiding triumvirate of the provisional government to 
be established after the revolution. This was none other than Admiral 
N.S. Mordvinov, sometime minister of the navy, who argued the need for a 
prohibitive system in his work first published in 1815 Nelcotorye 
soobrazheniya po predmetu manufaktur v Rossii. It was not that Mordvinov 
had renounced his espousal of free trade altogether, but argued that it 
was only desirable if universally practised by all nations taking part in 
foreign trade. That not being the case, and accepting what many of the 
advocates of free trade did not, that the only way to improve the economy 
in general and agriculture in particular was to encourage the growth of 
industry, he came down in favour of protectionism.*^ And it seems 
unlikely, in defence of Mordvinov's conclusions, that even the most 
conspicuous Russian industrial success of the period, the cotton industry, 
notwithstanding its more liberal mode of production, could have competed 
with the machine-made products of its English counterpart, without the 
protection of tariffs. The second qualification is not unrelated to the 
reasons which lay behind the opposition to Mordvinov's stance: it is 
that the Decembrists, far from being exceptional in favouring the 
liberalisation of trade, were to that extent in harmony with most of the 
rest of the landowning class. The harmony does not, however, stand up 
to analysis, for the landowners' esponsal of free trade was not based on 
liberal arguments. They did not, for example, put forward the view of the 
Minister of Finance, D.A. Gur'ev, that tariff barriers harmed domestic 
industry by removing the incentive to compete and thereby improve its 
products*^? rather, they took the view that Russia was primarily and 
naturally an agricultural nation, and that the growth of factories was to
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be condemned and discouraged. (This was hardly a progressive 
viewpoint, and yet is remarkably similar to the latter conclusions of 
Herzen, and to the views of N.G. Chernyshevsky and the Populists), if 
the nobility as the beneficiaries of servile labour naturally preferred 
agriculture to industry (excepting, of course, the factories on their own 
estates), the nobility as the consumers of imported Western luxuries 
equally naturally were opposed to the imposition of tariffs which raised 
the price of such goods (notably cotton and woollen cloth, sugar, dyes, 
liquor, tea and salt).
Thus it can be seen that for peculiarly Russian reasons, the majority 
of the .Ivor^stvo could uphold a viev of international trade more often 
associated with the West European bourgeoisie, whilst clinging 
tenaciously to a servile form of agriculture which had already begun to 
disappear from the social map. It was precisely in this respect that 
the Decembrists, the opponents of serfdom, and for that matter liberals 
(in some respects) like Storch and Kunitsyn, were most at odds with the 
members of the nobility who also happened to promote the virtues of 
free trade. Storch, as a matter of fact, shared some of the nobility's 
antipathy towards industry, but recognised the superiority of the free 
labourer over the slave in both industry and agriculture. 20 Kunitsyn was 
nearer to the Decembrists in intellectual affinity, and could indeed be 
called one of the movement's mentors, though his age and occupation 
destined him to suffer at the hands of the Ministry of National 
Enlightenment, rather than be dealt with by Nicholas I's Investigating 
Commission. But apart from the qualifications made, it is fair to say 
that on matters of finance, the Decembrists were out of step with the 
majority of their class, and that in consequence their economic views 
and responses to their government's economic practices can hardly be 
left out of account in any consideration of the sources of their 
political opposition. T0 underline the alienation of the insurgent army
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officers from the interests of the landowning class, Bestuzhev's letter 
is again illuminating. He divides the nobility into three categories, 
themselves redolent of the perceptions of the legacy of eighteenth- 
century thought: the "enlightened", amongst whom Bestuzhev would no 
doubt include himself and his comrades; "the literate, who either torment 
the others as judges, or themselves indulge in lengthy lawsuits, and 
finally, the ignorant, who live in the countryside and serve as church 
elders or are now in retirement, occupying themselves, God knows how, 
in agriculture. Of these, the smallholders constitute the ulcer of 
Russia: always guilty and always complaining and, wishing to live 
according to their pretensions rather than within their own means, they 
torment the poor peasants mercilessly. The rest waste their time in 
hunting ... in the social life of the capitals or in lawsuits. " 21
It could be argued that Bestuzhev is simply manifesting an hauteur 
characteristic of the small, wealthy metropolitan "elite towards the 
indigent, provincial dvoryane which made up the great majority of his 
estate; in other words, the prejudice which coloured Gorbachevsky's 
perception of the Southern Society's negotiators in the autumn of 1825.
This brings again to mind one of Professor Pipes’ characterisations of 
the Decembrist rebellion, that it was one of only three significant 
attempts by the service elite to restrain the monarchy’s unlimited power, 
all of which failed because they were led by the topmost elite, and in 
consequence did not enjoy the support of the masses of provincial 
dvoryane who valued the crown not only as a source of jobs and estates, 
but also as protection against the interests of the great landed families.22 
My own view would be that the failure of the uprising was in the event due 
more to the Decembrists’ own unwillingness to enlist a firm basis of 
support, and also to the precipitate turn of events which followed 
Alexander’s unexpected death, though I have little doubt that had the 
rural nobility been called upon to support the insurgents, they would
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almost certainly have displayed all the conservative suspicion 
mentioned. But it is a different matter to infer from that hypothesis 
that the Decembrists actually did represent the interests of the grand 
seigneurs. I would not wish to exclude entirely that kind of motivation 
from any survey of Decembrist attitudes and ideas across the spectrum, but 
feel that the foregoing discussion of their political, social and economic 
views rules it out as the movement's defining characteristic. Another 
way to assess the significance of the Decembrists in Russian history, and 
a way which moreover can be incorporated into Pipes* own model of the 
growth of opposition to the patrimonial state, thereby rendering the issue 
independent of whether or not they were struggling for a bourgeois basis 
and superstructure, is to regard the rebels as the military precursors 
of the civilian intelligentsia. Now according to Pipes the reason why 
the intelligentsia assumed political importance in imperial Russia was 
because none of the social or economic groups was able or willing to 
challenge the crown's monopoly of political power, largely because the 
surest way to short-term material benefits was by collaboration with the 
state, or because they sought the protection of the state from one of the 
other groups:
"Throughout Russian history, 'interest groups* have fought other 
»interest groups', never the state. The drive for change had to be 
inspired by motives other than self-interest, as the word is conventionally 
used - m o t i v e s m o r e  enlightened, far-sighted and generous, 
such as sense of patriotism, social justice and personal self-respect. 
Indeed, just because the pursuit of material rewards was so closely 
identified with the constitution of the old regime and subservience to 
the state, any aspiring opposition was bound to renounce self-serving; 
it had to be, or at any rate appear to be, utterly disinterested. Thus 
it happened that in Russia the struggle for political liberty was waged 
from the beginning in exactly the manner that Burke felt it ought never
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to be waged: in the name of abstract ideals. " 25
The author rather mars his case in a subsequent discussion of the 
applicability of certain definitions of 'intelligentsia'; finding too 
narrow one confined to political radicals, and too broad one more or less 
equivalent to the Western term, "white-collar" workers; he chooses instead 
the defining characteristic that an intelligent have a "commitment to 
public welfare" which takes precedence over his own interests. 24 But this 
sounds remarkably like limiting the membership of a group to those alone 
who by their example confirm one's earlier analysis of the contingent 
nature of political opposition in Russia. Leaving aside the question of 
circularity, and accepting the definition for the purposes of argument, 
there seems no reason to exclude the Decembrists from the intelligentsia. 
Their writings abound with altruism; according to V.F. Raevsky, "the aim 
of politics is the welfare (blagodenstvie) of the people", and one of the 
aims the fulfillment of which would be necessary for the well-being of the 
Russian people was "to expose the sophism of insensitive egoists and the 
tyrants of the people". Also typically, Raevsky extols in his poem 
"Satira na nravy", "the pure love of the fatherland" . 25 indeed all these 
sentiments are the common currency of the Decembrists' individual and 
corporate pronouncements, and this is scarcely to be marvelled at in a 
group nurtured in French Enlightenment thought, masonic philanthropy and 
the patriotic fervour of the war of l8l2. Professor Pipes himself 
distinguishes the morality of the young army officers f«,m the traditional 
profligacy and self-indulgence of the very rich families which produced 
many of them. The Decembrist revolt "shattered the spirit of the great 
families who had no inkling of its approach and could not understand what 
madness had siezed their youth. In general, the rich liked to enjoy life,
without much thought for their own tomorrow, let alone for the general
26good." This interesting gulf is offered as illustration of a 
conclusion that the movement "had no antecedents and issue", though
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earlier in his discussion of the political impotence of the 
*S*yantsvo, Pipes points out that although the nobility were never able 
to translate their social and economic advantages into political power, 
the bulk of the opposition to the imperial rSgime in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries derived from members of that estate:
"But the liberals and radicals were not struggling for the interests 
of their class ... They were struggling for national and social ideas of 
society as a whole - a struggle which sometimes compelled them to move 
against the interests of their own class. Surely, Bakunin, Herzen, 
Kropotkin, Lenin, Struve, Shipov, though of dvoriane background, cannot be 
said to have been in any sense exponents of dvoriantsvo causes. " 27 There 
seems little enough reason, within the authors own terminological
bounds, to exclude from this list Pestel* and his comrades.
Why was it that the cW y a n e  were prone to produce such selfless
opponents of Tsarism? Some of the reasons have been discussed in the
preceding discussion of the eighteenth century: the very rootlessness
and lack of corporate spirit of the service class, which lay at the heart
of the nobility’s political dependence upon the throne, themselves had
the result that instead of allegiances to family or locality, or in an
economic sense the pursuit of landowners’ interests, the young nobleman’s
sense of group solidarity was with his schoolmates and fellow servitors,
and this sense was most likely to be inflamed n by his perception, for
example, of the admission of large numbers of lit«»*...*..ot literate non-noblemen, and
particularly foreigners, into the state machine, rather than any measures
taken by the government to favour the interests of the merchant class.
In fact, cosmopolitan though many of the Decembrists undoubtedly were,
they were also ardently patriotic, and were incensed by „hat was held to
be Alexanders neglect of Russia, contempt for Russians, and undisguised
preference for foreigners. Yakushkin recorded, moreover, that when the
idea of a secret society was first put forward by Alexander and Nikita
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Murav'ev at the house of Matvey and Sergey Murav* ev-Apostol in l8l6f
its aim was proposed by Alexander Muravfev to be "the counteraction of
28Germans to be found in the Russian service." This turned out to be a
pretext for the formation of a society with the broader aim of securing
the welfare of Russia, but is instructive as a choice of an opening
gambit likely to inspire the approval of all. The Constitution of the
Union of Welfare lent to foreigners the distinction also enjoyed by women
29and serfs of exclusion from that body. This particular form of 
resentment was, however, not restricted to the young army officers, though 
it could be argued that because of the historical propensity of the 
nobility to produce young, rootless groups without estate allegiances, 
and with the morality of service, even the sharing of grievances with 
the remainder of an estate compromised by age and position, would be 
sufficient to explain the growth of political opposition in those 
groups rather than elsewhere in the estate.
Many of the shared grievances have already been mentioned!
dissatisfaction with the government's management of the economy,
repugnance inspired by the military settlements, resentment excited by
the numbers of foreigners admitted to the service ranks, hatred of
serfdom. To these could be added the corruption of the law courts and
the universal venality of state officials,30 and the hatred of the
personalities and policies of those of Alexander's advisers most
associated with the period of reaction, such -- ... , ., SUch as Arakcheyev and Magnitsky.
instances of the latter's cruelty are referred to as early as 20 June l 8 l 8 
in N.I. Turgenev's diaries. 31 Recourse must also be made to the element 
of dashed expectations, not only because of Alexander's failure to 
implement his promise to extend free institutions to Russia, a promise 
taken very much to heart by the Decembrists, 32 but also because the
Decembrist generation had been brought 
liberal interludes in Russian history,
up in one of those occasional 
and matured in the ambiance of
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patriotic self-sacrifice of the Napoleonic Wars. It would be 
difficult to underestimate the critical significance of such a train of 
events; not only were expectations raised, but the fulfillment of those 
expectations was seen by many as morally binding on the Tsar, autocrat or 
not . ^  Naturally this sentiment was felt most acutely amongst the 
educated army officers, who had experienced the sacrifice at first hand, 
who were the most receptive to the influence of ideas and institutions 
encountered during the European campaign, and were in the best position 
to form an adverse estimate of the liberties enjoyed by the Russian 
citizen in comparison with his Vest European counterpart. It is in this 
broad Russian social, economic, political and historical context that it 
becomes more apparent why the young noble army officer was of all the 
national types the most likely to translate the abstractions of post- 
Restoration political thought into concrete action.
That the defence of the fatherland should have been rewarded by the 
policies of the period of arnkcheyevshchina might have been sufficiently 
crushing to the guards officers’ faith in autocracy, but it should also 
not be left out account that a common cause of complaint amongst the 
Decembrists bore particular relation to conditions within the army. I 
have already referred in the section on Western ideas to the contrast 
drawn by M.A. Fonvizin between the momentous events of the Napoleonic 
Wars and subsequent army life. This is the way in which he expresses 
this sentiment:
*'0n their return to St. Petersburg, how could our liberals be 
satisfied with the vulgarity of regimental life and with the boredom and 
pettiness of the tasks and details of army drill which were strictly 
required of them by their commanders to gratify the penchant innate in 
Alexander and his brothers for drill, men at attention, individual 
training, and so forth, despite the fact that the experience of two 
years of bitter warfare with a most accomplished enemy might, it seems,
33
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have convinced Alexander that it is not on these trifles that victory 
23depends."*^
It was exactly this kind of discipline which occasioned the mutiny in 
October 1820 of Alexanders favourite Semenovsky Guards Regiment. The 
report of the mutiny reached the Tsar at an international conference at 
Troppau, and although investigations revealed the provocative nature of 
the harsh regime imposed by the commander, Colonel Schwarz, Alexander, 
abetted by Mettemich, was by now so embattled by what he perceived as 
the interrelated threats of irreligion and revolution sweeping in from 
abroad, that he attributed the revolt, in a letter to Arakcheyev, to the 
activities of secret societies, and to foreign, non-military inspiration. 
Whether or not the Tsar was at this stage justified in his diagnosis, his 
reaction to the event may have gone some way to fulfilling his own fears, 
since some of the officers of the disbanded regiment who were transferred 
to the Second Army in the Ukraine went on to form the nucleus of the 
Southern Society. ^
This, I believe, is as far as I can get, without seeking out details 
of particular individuals as a basis for indulgence in psychological 
speculation, to an estimation of the historical conditions necessary for 
any claims about the origins of the Russian 'materialist tradition' to be 
convincing. Many questions remain unposed, let alone ananswered. I have 
been severe on interpretations which seem to imply that the Decembrist 
movement owed its existence to the fact that its participants were 
influenced by the West, for a number of reasons, but mainly because that 
influence, though undeniably important, is not a sufficient condition. 
Nevertheless, no argument constructed from the historical conditions and 
events selected as having a bearing on the acceptance of materialism and 
atheism in Russia, can explain why certain individuals rather than others 
were attracted to that kind of world-view. Neither do they explain why 
only a small number of officers belonged to the secret societies when,
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if we accept what P.G. Kakhovsky wrote:
"... among my many acquaintances who do not adhere to any secret 
societies, very few are opposed to my opinions. Frankly 1 can state that 
amongst thousands of young men there are hardly a hundred who do not 
passionately long for freedom.
It would be inconceivable that the resolution of such problems, if it 
were possible, should not revolve in large measure upon the contingencies 
of individual circumstances. But to continue with generalities, the 
grounding of the origins of the »materialist tradition», by which I mean 
the advocacy of materialist and atheist metaphysical views alongside 
radical political commitments, within the Decembrist movement, raises 
difficulties stemming from that movement's very diversity, a 
phenomenon which for these purposes is best illustrated by the quite 
bitter opposition between the materialists and the theistic "Congregation" 
amongst the Siberian exiles. Leaving aside the implications of class 
differences (the poor noble or even non-noble members of the Slavic 
Union alongside the Southern and Northern Societies* scions of the rich) 
and political convictions (constitutional monarchists as opposed to 
republicans, centralists as against federalists), one avenue which might 
repay the exploration of a sociologist of religion is the complication 
of the Decembrists* liberalism with nationalism,- although one is 
undoubtedly treading upon Soviet corns here, there is in the Decembrist 
programme alongside the aspiration to modernise and liberalise the 
political and economic status-quo, something of the desire to evict an 
alien ruler and his retinue, by which, of course, is meant not Napoleon 
and the French army but Alexander and his foreign advisers and officials. 
It might be going too far to supplement this point by reference to the 
Decembrists» powerful interest in and sympathy with the national 
movements in, for example, South America, Italy and Greece, since this 
could be put down simply to their own avowed universal hatred of
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oppression, or to their recent experience of occupation by a foreign
power. If, however, it were admitted that some sections of the
Decembrists were motivated more by the desire to expel foreign elements
from their country than to replace the existing socioeconomic order and
its ideology, then it could be inferred that as far as those sections
were concerned, anticlericalism or atheism would be more unlikely than
not, provided that the national Church were perceived as uncontaminated
by foreign elements. To illustrate this point, even as ideologically
challenging and politically ambitious as the Roman Catholic Church has
been in European history, it can within a nationalist context provide some
kind of focus or symbol for opposition to alien rule,notably in the cases
of Ireland and Poland. With some qualifications, an ecclesiastically closer
parallel may be drawn with the Greek Orthodox Church during the 
33tourokratia.
A further footnote should be added to what has emerged as a general 
historical framework within which to place the emergence of a significant 
group of atheists and materialists amongst the Decembrists. The general 
framework rests upon the prior conclusion that in the eighteenth century 
there was no cohesive group bound by an ideology rejecting autocracy, and 
the related fact that the Romanov dynasty did not at that time have 
recourse to a defensive ideology of its own, and that therefore the 
political and intellectual climate simply was not conducive to the 
outgrowth of a materialist tradition, in the Marxist-Leninist sense 
(though individuals may have arrived at materialist or atheist positions 
in their o m  ways). The turning-point in the history of I W i a n  
materialism occurred round about the formation of the Holy Alliance, 
from which time the Tsars were more or less permanently on the defensive, 
and sought to justify absolutism in the name of Christianity and to 
castigate liberalism by identifying it with godlessness. Since this 
official attitude ca»e in the aftemath of the French invasion, and in
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the course of the Russian government’s increasing interest and 
interference in the internal affaire of other European states (Alexander
wa, already urging Metternich to accept the principle of interventiin in the 
affairs of other states to quell revolt, when news of the Semenovsky 
mutiny reached him at Troppau39) , and since the oppression in the sphere 
of education, which was provided with its clarion call by Magnitsky's 
invocation of a "spiritual defence" against the flood of European atheism, 
was well under way before the government began to be alarmed by the 
clandestine activities of members of its own army, there is a good case 
for the view that the concrescence of political and metaphysical 
heterodoxy was at least partly stimulated by the government’s anticipation 
and forced by its over-reaction. To put it another way, the emergence of 
hostility to autocratic rule in Russia, whatever its causes, was likely to 
be accompanied by atheism, materialism, or at any rate anticlericalism, 
since it began at a time when the government was impelled to look to the 
national church for its public sanctification. As long as the autocracy 
continued to defend itself in the name of Orthodoxy, and as long as the 
Orthodox hierarchy was seen to be an enthusiastic advocate, then the 
marriage of atheism and materialism with the kind of implacable rejection 
of Tsarism associated with the inheritors of the Decembrist cause, the 
radical intelligentsia, was rendered more probable, and is in my opinion 
the single most potent condition of the continuation of the Russian 
materialist tradition.
The promised footnote to this general scheme pertains to the origin 
of this tradition in the materialist wing of the Decembrists. The point 
has already been put forward that the Decembrists' orientation towards 
atheism and materialism may bo more than would be expected, if the kind 
of correlation of political and metaphysical distances from implicit or 
explicit officiai ideology, suggested by the periods considered before 
and after the reign of Alexander, is accepted as a useful
generalisation.
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In the first place, the truth of the generalisation cannot be determined 
independently of the views of the Decembrists, and the difficulty with 
which the views of the Southern Society were squared with the hypothesis, 
might in any case be grounds to dispose of it. Dut accepting that the 
difficulty was overcome, the problem remains as to why the absolute 
rejection of supernatural authority should have accompanied what was 
often an ambivalent attitude towards monarchy. The simplest solution 
would be that the less opposed an individual was to the existing political 
regime, the less likely he was to hold atheist or materialist views. This, 
and its converse, may be highly probable, if the numbers of the Northern 
Society and the Slavic Union are sufficient to palliate the apparent 
counter-example of the Southern Society? but there are certainly enough 
individual exceptions to witliold universal application from the rule.
We have already seen that E.P. Obolensky, a republican in the Northern 
Society, was a student of German idealism; and we shall see that P.I.
Pestel's unswerving certainty in political matters stood beside some 
indecision in the realm of religion. If, though, it is still admitted 
that it makes a broad kind of sense to say that within the sweep of the 
history of imperial Russia, the materialist wing of the Decembrists is 
more evident than would be expected, then the offered explanation, 
briefly that the Alexandrine government was, during the nurturing of 
political opposition, more associated with Christian theism in general 
than the national Church, can now be re-examined. Despite the oddity 
of the explanation, in that it gives as a reason for the origin of the 
materialist tradition an aspect of government policy which in many ways 
is the antithesis, within the bounds of religion, of the policy put 
forward as a primary agent in the continuation of that tradition, the 
apparent paradox should be balanced against a recognition of the 
difference rather than the similarity between the Decembrists and the 
intelligenty who succeeded them. It is the similarity which has been
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stressed hitherto in opposition to the view that Decembrisra was an 
imitative phenomenon alien to Russian conditions, but it can scarcely be 
denied that a chasm separates the formative years of the rebellious army 
officers from those in which the first representatives of the civilian 
intelligentsia learned to take up their pens. Many of the Decembrists 
were at the threshold of a career promising the highest honours that 
Tsar could bestow upon his servants; they were raised in a climate of 
religious toleration and relatively untrammelled political debate; their 
expectations were sharpened in the violence and emotion of the defence of 
the fatherland, and subsequent pursuit of the invader across the frontiers 
of Europe. How different were the 1830s in Russia, by which time the 
convulsion of reaction in the tail of Alexander’s reign had become the 
dreary rigidity of "the joint spirit of Orthodoxy, autocracy and 
nationality", an intellectual climate in which the new generation of 
dvoryanstvo university students struggled earnestly with an always 
unacceptable Russian reality. The Decembrists, and the intellectuals 
of the student kruzhki, arrived at materialism by diverse routes and from 
different starting-points (though in both cases, the hardening of 
political attitudes leaves a form of metaphysical idealism behind it, 
respectively masonic mysticism and Hegelianism); indeed the Decembrists 
themselves, by their fate and impact constitute an important historical 
ingredient in the distance between them and the Nicolaian generation 
which was immediately subjected to the persistent if not always 
effective, hostility of the representatives of the newly forged alliance 
of monarch and the Orthodox hierarchy. Since their experiences are so 
different, it can at least be accepted in principle that antithetical 
governmental attitudes towards religion may have played vital roles in 
the origin and the continuation of the Russian materialist tradition.
It must, though, be admitted that if the government’s sponsorship of
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liberal political and economic ideas in the reforming decade of
Alexander's reign is to be accounted a recommendation of them to the
Decembrist generation which survived the eventual repudiation of such
ideas within official circles, then the same might be said of the
government's policy of religious toleration and a supraconfessional
kind of Christianity. There is an important distinction to be made, in
that the policy of interconfessional equality was one of the most durable
elements of Alexander's reign and cannot be distinguished from the period
of reaction; indeed the non-partisan Christianity of the Bible Society was
associated %<rith some of the most illiberal government figures, such as
40Prince Golitsyn and Magnitsky. Thus in saying that it is more probable
that the Decembrists' materialist wing was stimulated by the official
approval of Christian theism, rather than by the rather late appearance
in Alexander's reign of the symbiotic political relationship of the
embattled autocrat and the subservient national church, it does not
thereby follow that they should have been hostile themselves to religious
toleration, as opposed to an attempt to overcome religious differences
which came to be seen by certain denominations as a threat to them. In
fact, religious tolerance for all faiths was a common feature of corporate
Decembrist declarations, for example the manifesto of 13 December 1825
4idrawn up by Prince Sergey Trubetskoy. It is perhaps only to bo expected 
that as important a factor in the historical significance of metaphysical 
thought as an eventually unpopular government's conduct of religious 
affairs, should have bequeathed a multi-faceted legacy, particularly in 
the light of the spread of Decembrist opinion about the truth of 
religious beliefs. That spread of opinion must now be considered.
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Section 5 - Indigenous Ideas
Before any discussion of the metaphysical views of the Decembrists, 
and in particular their materialism and atheism, some consideration must 
be given to those writers earlier in Alexander’s reign who, as the 
followers of Radishchev, are incorporated by Soviet intellectual historians 
into the materialist tradition founded by M.V. Lomonosov. These are the 
thinkers of the last years of the eighteenth century, and first of the 
nineteenth, such as Kunitsyn, Pnin, A.S. Kaysarov, V.V. Popugaev, F.V. 
Krechetov and A.S. Lubkin, now labelled ’Enlighteners’ (prosvetitely). 
and indeed whose work is characterised by the kind of Enlightenment 
rhetoric of natural rights, popular welfare and popular sovereignty, 
freedom, reason and justice which studs Decembrist moral and political 
prescriptions, and which took its most influential indigenous form in 
Kunitsyn’s Natural Law. But although Kunitsyn and his fellow liberals 
were theoretically in tune with much of Decembrist political thought, they 
were in no sense revolutionaries, and if the correlation between degrees 
of rejection of the temporal and spiritual domain holds, would not be 
expected to have been associated with materialism and atheism. Neverthe­
less, the most diligent Soviet excavators of the materialist tradition 
have found some materialist treasure in this unpromising area, for 
example, I. Ya. Shchipanov in his treatment of Pnin, Lubkin and T.F. 
Osipovsky, the rector of Khar’kov University, who, like Lubkin, rejected 
some of the basic premises of Kant's critical philosophy. It is 
interesting to note that while the reactionary elements of Alexandrine 
official circles saw atheism in Kant, his critics would later be 
elevated to the materialist pantheon by the opponents of TSarisra>
Although he attributes materialism to the three mentioned, Shchipanov 
qualified his case;
"The materialist views of Osipovsky, Pnin, Lubkin and other 
enlighteners are not free from deistic inconsistencies. This is
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particularly noticeable in Lubkin's case in his Enquiry as to whether it 
is possible to give a firm foundation to ethics independently of 
religion (1815) and Outlines of metaphysics (l8l8-19), and in pnin's 
case in his philosophical elegies."
Shchipanov's interpretation of Lubkin was singled out for criticism in a 
review in the journal Voprosy Filosofiiof the first two volumes of 
Istoriya Filosofii v SSSR. Although the authors of the work were 
congratulated by the reviewers (V.S. Gorsky, V.I. Gubenko and V.M.
Nichik of the University of Kiev) for avoiding the extremes to which 
certain intellectual historians had gone in an attempt to reveal the 
antagonistic ideology of progressive classes covertly expressed in areas 
of "non-philosophical" knowledge (scientific, sociological, ethical and 
aesthetic views), they warned against the dangers of "vulgarisation" in 
analysing the connection between philosophical and non-philosophical 
knowledge, and a too "literal" approach, whereby "mention in the work 
of some physicist or another of the term 'matter' is seen as a statement 
in connection with the basic question of philosophy. " 2 In the same way, 
the characterisation of certain biologists of the first half of the 
eighteenth century as representatives of "mechanical materialism", 
because of their application of mathematical and mechanical models ■ 
to biological phenomena, is subjected to unimpeachable logic:
"However the fact itself of the application of mathematical methods 
in certain sciences, especially in bA»logy, is not denied by the 
philosophy of dialectical materialism. Even evidence of biological 
methods at a certain level of mathematics still does not of itself say 
anything about the philosophical positions of the scientist, for 
biological phenomena by no means exhaust the qualitative variety of the 
world, and a denial of the qualitative pecularity of one component is 
still not a denial of- the qualitative differences; inthe„<whole,!1^  1
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The reviewers declared themselves unconvinced by the
interpretations given of the position of various thinkers with regard
to the resolution of'the basic problem of philosophy*, and give as an
example the representation of Lubkin as a materialist. In this
particular chapter, Shchipanov claims that although Lubkin's ideas were
"not free of deism", this was a "convenient form" for the propaganda of
4
materialistic ideas." The evidence for this contention is derived largely 
from the epistemological views set out in his Outlines of logic 
(Nachertanii logiki), in vrhich Lubkin presents the familiar mixture of 
realism and empiricism which the philosophes inherited from Locke. Ve 
have already encountered in the previous chapter the difficulties thrown 
up by classifying Lockean theory of knowledge as "materialistic 
sensualism", and need only note here that the reviewers make specific 
reference to the statement used to support the conclusion that Lubkin 
resolved the problem of truth in a materialistic manner:
"Truth is nothing other than the similarity of our thoughts with 
the very objects about which we are thinking."-^
The statement implies the existence of objects existing independently of 
our thoughts, but does not, according to the reviexyrers, entail materialism: 
"But it is clear that belief in the presence of things existing 
objectively outside of our consciousness, in just the same way as 
conviction as to their knowability, can equally consistently accompany 
both materialistic positions, and, we submit, the standpoint of objective 
idealism."^
One who did not subscribe to the doctrine that all philosophical views 
are reducible to the metaphysical monisms of idealism and materialism, 
might also add dualism, and indeed Lubkin's statement about truth, if 
applied to propositions rather than things, would be quite consistent with 
the Correspondence Theory of Truth of contemporary Western logicians, 
many of whom, I suspect, would regard metaphysical system-building as an
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obsolete mode of philosophical activity. But while the Kievan
reviewers* objection seems to me to be irrefutable, it is difficult to
see how it could be sustained if they adhered to Lenin’s broad definition
of matter, which was that it had the sole property of being an objective
reality, or existing outside our mind. But whether or not the objection
undermines the philosophical basis of dialectical materialism, the
implications of a further comment by the reviewers are severe foi the
concept of the materialist tradition as elaborated in the last years of
the Stalin era. They speak of the difficulties of systematising
philosophical tendencies on the basis of the sociopolitical life of
society, on the grounds that "philosophy, whilst being subject, without
a doubt, to great influence from political ideology, jxjssesses relative
independence. This is manifested by the fact that the resolution of
not all philosophical problems is unequivocally connected with specific
political views. And this leads to the generally known facts, that
commonly held political positions are accompanied by differences in
7philosophical views, and vice versa." As it happens, the Decembrists 
are chosen as one example to substantiate this generalisation, from which 
the following conclusion is drawn:
"But this being the case, it is natural to cast doubt upon the 
suitability in the history of philosophy of such a systematisation, which 
takes into account the unanimity of thinkers in the resolution of non- 
philosophical problems, while excluding it when dealing with those 
problems which actually constitute the subject of the research."^
Just how far-reaching are these criticisms depends upon the degree of 
independence accorded to philosophical views. Orthodox Marxist-Leninist 
theory holds that they are in the final analysis dependent upon the 
material basis of society, and that within the superstructure, philosophy 
is divided into two hostile camps, materialism and idealism, the one a 
scientific, optimistic, progressive world-view, the other pessimistic and
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reactionary, designed to keep the people in a state of ignorance and 
obedience. This makes it hard to imagine a materialist tradition in 
Marxist-Leninist terms which did not couple philosophical views of one 
broad kind with social and political views of some degree of opposition 
to the existing order. But whatever its ultimate destination, the Kievan 
review illuminates the difficulty of the twin defence of the doctrines of 
the opposing philosophical camps, and of materialism as a progressive world 
view, the attempted resolution of which results in logical solecisms to 
the effect that Pnin’s philosophical ideas "are notable for limitations 
and inconsistencies. However it must be said that on the whole he
Qinclined towards materialism in its deistic form."
This kind of circumlocution is avoided in a more recent book by 
Z.A. Kamensky, which falls within the tradition of works seeking to 
establish the long pedigree of Russian materialism, but which qualifies 
its case in a way which distinguishes it from some of the more brazen 
efforts of the Stalin era. Although a sharp distinction is drawn between 
the deistic-materialistic and the idealist schools of thought of the 
first half of the nineteenth century, the former is further subdivided into 
the "actually materialistic" and the "close to materialism - deistic. " 10 
If this seems a negligible syntactic shift from "materialism in its 
deistic form", it is at least conceded that deism takes on more than one 
form itself, from a sincere belief in a Creator of the world and Author 
of natural laws, to a convenient vehicle for the rejection of conventional 
theism. It is also recognised, and the authority of Engels invoked to 
guarantee the recognition, that the revolution in the transition from 
feudalism to capitalism may have a religious character, and cites, amongst 
others, the influence of Rousseau, and Robespierre’s cult of Reason in 
the French Revolution, and the opposition of aristocratic materialism and 
middle class religion in the English revolution of the seventeenth 
century. 11 In his discussion of the philosophical views of the Russian
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Enlightenment, Kamensky identifies Pnin and Lubkin as deists, and 
under the heading of the "materialistic variant" of the deistic- 
materialistic school, groups a number of Russian scientists, such as 
Osipovsky, S.E. Guryev, M.G. Pavlov (in his early days, before he used 
his physics lectures to impart Schelling's Katurnhilosonhle to the students 
of Moscow University ), N.P. Shcheglov, I.E. Dyad'kovsky and the 
mathematician N.I. Lobachevsky. This classification is open to much the 
same kind of objection that the Kievan reviewers levelled against the 
categorisation of the eighteenth-century biologists as materialists, but 
even if the failure of Osipovsky to observe Orthodox religious practice, 
or Dyad'kovsky's physiological approach to sensation and thought, suggest 
atheistic and materialist views, they do not in themselves entail them, 
and inference is made more difficult (and speculation easier) by the fact 
that as academics they were in a worse position than most to air their 
personal heterodox metaphysical views. It can scarcely be doubted that 
throughout the period covered by this work, we receive no more than a 
glimpse of the real extent of atheism and materialism, but lest this 
highly probable statement give license to build an edifice of conjecture, 
it should be noted that even in relatively well documented cases like 
Radishchev, Yakushkin and Belinsky, there is still room for varying 
amounts of debate as to whether they really were materialists.
Although the Marxist-Leninist belief in the incompatibility of
materialism and idealism^ tfiile it does not equate materialism with
atheism, implies that a materialist must be an atheist, Kamensky does not
present his materialist jgpsvetitely in this way, and indeed selects
atheism (which "only to a very weak degree" characterised the philosophy
of the Russian Enlightenment), as well as revolutionary political
positions, as the two intellectual marics which differentiate them from 
12the Decembrists. It would be as well as this Juncture to consider the 
evidence for the existence of atheism amongst tho Decembrists as a group.
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As we have already seen in the case of Lomonosov, Radishchev and the 
Russian Enlighteners, the est.blishn.ent of the origins of the materialist 
tradition by Soviet writers depend, to a large extent on inference, from 
philosophical writings which at the most reject some, but not all, claim, 
for the existence of independent spiritual reality, and at the most argue 
that some, but not all, phenomena are themselves material or dependent 
upon a material reality. Indeed, some of the inference, are from the 
realist metaphysical implications of empiricist theories of knowledge, 
which, although they affirm the existence of perceived objects independently 
of the perceiving mind (unwarrantably, according to Hume, and illogically, 
according to Berkeley), do not necessarily make any statement about the 
ontological status of the perceiving mind, nor for that matter about the 
constitution of the objects perceived. These techniques are also applied 
to discern the metaphysics! standpoints of Decembrists such a, V.P. „„evsky 
and N.A. Kryukov, and if those were the only methods of establishing the 
currency of materialism and atheism amongst the insurgents, then the 
scepticism which I have applied to the historical record up to the 
turning-point of Alexander's reign would delay the origins of the 
materialist tradition even more. There is, however, harder and more 
direct evidence than in the previous cases, and one area for debate 
amongst students of Decembrist philosophical views is not so much the 
?*!■£*£*?££ as the extent of materialism and atheism. Naturally, Soviet 
proponents of the tradition of materialism as the world-view of progressive 
thinkers have been motivated to maximise the extent, and have on the one 
side ushered 'materialistic sensualists' into the fold, and on the other, 
excused the relatively meagre evidence by allusions to the number of 
freethinking and materialistic papers either destroyed, whether by the 
rebels prior to their arrest, or subsequently by the Investigating 
Commission and the Third Department, or lost, whether by the rebels 
themselves or in the state archives. But although the direct evidence
is meagre, it is, I think, conclusive, at anv rate .. ,I til. any raxe as far as the
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existence of materialism and atheism is concerned. Since the evidence 
comes from reminiscences, and moreover reminiscences about the period of 
exile after the abortive rebellion and the trial, it is far from ideal, 
and it can only be inferred that the views referred to were a continuation 
of those held before December 1825*
The most important source material is to be found in the memoirs of
A.P. Belyaev, published in 1882. Belyaev was far from being a typical
Decembrist. He was the son of a government official, and was not in fact
a member of any of the secret societies, lie was born in 1803, and
therefore still very young at the time of the rebellion; his only part in
those events was as a soldier of the ranks in the army which mutinied in
Senate Square on December l4. llis isolation from the developments which
surrounded the formation of the secret societies might be argued to have
afforded him relative objectivity in relation to his fellow exiles, but it
should be borne in mind that with regard to the division between believers
and non-believers which he described as follows, both he and his brother
were firmly committed to the former (their faith having been confirmed by
13reading Gibbon, of all people :
"Without a doubt, in the intellectual clashes of serious people,
pride of place almost always went to religious and philosophical ideas,
since there were many unbelievers there, who rejected any kind of
religion; there were modest sceptics, and systematically ardent materialists
(yarye materialisty), who had studied this subject in all the then known
and already widely distributed philosophical works.
On the other side stood people with pure Christian convictions, also
well versed in all the sources of a materialist character, and who
possessed philosophical knowledge, and knowledge of both ecclesiastical
14and secular history."
Belyaev's distinction between shades of unbelief, from scepticism to 
outright materialism, suggests that he was not prone to the blanket use
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of the latter terra which has been encountered in the confrontations of, 
on the one hand, representatives of Tsarist ideology from Shishkov 
onwards, and on the other, certain Marxist-Leninist historians of ideas, 
with ideas less than harmonious with Russian Orthodoxy. This is by no 
means to say that he had no axe to grind. He reported that the 
intellectual debates had been provoked by the mocking of religious belief 
and ecclesiastical ritual, but that the opponents had measured each 
other’s strength and recognised that "the religion of Christ has on its 
side not only history, but also sound (zdravuyu) philosophy." The 
outstanding representative of Christianity, P,S. Bobrishchev-Pushkin 
(amongst the other representatives were named N.A. Kryukov and Obolensky) 
was "a true and worthy champion of Christianity, both through his life, 
the strength of his faith, and through the power of his logic."^
According to Belyaev, the intellectual struggle between the two 
groups settled around the question of the origin of human speech:
"The materialists put forward the idea that beast-man (skoto-chelovokl 
who had been produced at that time from clay, but now from the apes,^ by 
the forces of matter, like all other living creatures, invented language 
himself, beginning with sounds of interjection, and building it up from 
monosyllabic sounds, disyllabic, and so on. Puslilcin without doubt upheld 
the creation of man by an immediate divine act, a necessary consequence of 
which was that man received the gift of language together with his 
rational soul at the moment when the latter was inspired in him by the 
divine spirit." The memoirist then contradicted himself by relating 
that Pushkin wrote a huge article, which was recognised by all, including 
those who were indifferent to the question, as victorious, but that his 
opponents remained unconvinced. Belyaev referred to an article written 
in refutation of Pushkin’s piece by Prince Baryatinsky. In Belyaev’s 
opinion it was weak, and moreover it was written in French "probably 
because he knew French better than his mother tongue"; unfortunately
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neither article has survived, and there is no means of questioning this 
judgment.
Turning to the United Slavs' source of intellectual inspiration,
Belyaev wrote that "... in Borisov, the ruling thought was that it was 
possible to be virtuous, while rejecting God.« He takes Borisov and I.V. 
Kireev to task for characterising Christianity as a "timid" religion, and, 
it seems, cannot resist a wry comparison between the Christian end in Tula 
of Kireev, who was eventually converted to Christianity, and the fate of 
the Borisov brothers, whom he described as having been unfortunately 
burned to death in Siberia. 18 Much of what Belyaev remembered about the 
opposing metaphysical groups was corroborated in Yakushkin's memoirs, 
though from amarkedly-different point of view. In an attempt to categorise 
the Decembrist exiles amongst whom he found himself in Chita, in South­
east Siberia, he had this to say:
"One of these circles,jokingly called the 'Congregation*, consisted 
of men whose circumstances during their imprisonment had turned them 
to piety. Among their various other occupations, they often met together 
to read edifying books and to discuss the subject which was closest to them. 
Pushkin, formerly an officer of a retinue, and possessing 
remarkable intellectual powers, stood at the head of this circle. Pushkin 
had come to value the beauty of the Gospels during his imprisonment, and at 
the same time, returned to the superstitions of his childhood, trying 
in every way to give them meaning. The members of the »Congregation' were very 
gentle,meek men who bullied nobody, and who were therefore on the best of 
terms with all our other comrades."1^
The interesting implication of Yakushkin's recollection is that the 
flowering of Christianity amongst the Decembrists was a result of the 
spiritual crisis which many of the insurgents underwent at the time of 
their trial, and during their imprisonment in the Fortress of St. Peter
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and St. Paul, and was not a characteristic of the period during which 
the secret societies were active, despite what wo know of the religious 
mysticism which alienated A.N. Murav'ev from the Decembrist cause, and of 
the conversion to Catholicism of the strong-minded M.S. Lunin. According 
to one of the first Marxist historians of the Decembrist movement, B.E. 
Syroechkovsky, Bobrishchev-Pushkin himself was an atheist before his 
arrest; though since he also describes P.I. Borisov as a deist, his 
judgment in this respect may be a little suspect. A further implication 
of the quotation touches upon a subject which I have already disqualified 
myself from speculating on, namely, the role of individual personality in 
the selection of philosophical standpoints. Clearly, however, revolutionary 
movements embrace people with a variety of motives, and even though in 
general terms one might expect a group of people totally opposed to the 
existing political order, and moreover one actively supported by the 
national Church, to adopt a range of views from anticlericalisra to 
outright atheism, this might not be so in the case of the "gentle, meek men", 
who, to speculate even further, might in their radical political views bo 
motivated more by a feeling of compassion for those seen to suffer as a 
result of the political order, than by anger or bitterness towards the 
representatives of that order. This would hardly help us to understand 
the volte-face which Bobrishchev-Pushkin may have undergone, but it brings 
to mind E.P. Obolensky, another member of the ’Congregation', who even 
though he discovered the Gospels during his incarceration, had before his 
arrest, as we have seen, acquired a predilection for Kant, Schelling and 
the Zend-Avesta,and served as an obvious counterexample to any ono-to-ono 
correlation of republicanism and materialism. It would be easy to envisage 
Obolensky as a bloodthirsty enemy of Tsarism in view of the fact that he 
assumed the leadership of the Senate Square mutiny, but in fact he was 
very much as Yakushkm described the members of the Congregation, a man 
of gentle disposition and high principle. His eventual leadership of
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the revolt in the north was an inadvertent result of the chaos which 
surrounded those events, and did little to prevent the chaos from 
continuing.
Yalcushlczn’s portrait of Borisov was infinitely more sympathetic 
them Belyaev*s remarks, but was quite consistent with them:
"Having entered the artillery as a junker at the age of eighteen, he 
was stationed for some time on the estate of a wealthy Polls], landowner who 
possessed a library. Knowing some French, and taking advantage of the 
books which had fallen into his hands, Borisov read Voltaire,
Uelvetius, d'Holbach and other eighteenth-century writers of
that type ., and became a dogmatic atheist (dogmaticheskim bczboshniloml.
But although he preached unbelief to his comrades amongst the Slavs, many of 
whom took his word for it, he was of the most modest and gentle . 
disposition? no-one had heard of his ever having raised his voice, and, \ 
of course, no-one noticed vanity in him. 1,22
Yakushkin then gave examples of Borisov's benevolence and altruism, as if 
to establish the truth of the »ruling thought* attributed to him by 
Belyaev, and arrived at the following conclusion:
"Following' all his actions very closely, it occurred to one 
involuntarily that this man, unreasonably for himself, was, imbued 
with the true spirit of Christianity."2-^
If Yakushkin's picture seems to render redundant what has just been said 
about Obolensky (which was in any case a speculative aside), it would bo 
worth malting the point that his memories may have been unduly glowing.
For example, Borisov's fellow United Slav Gorbachevsky mentioned in his 
own memoirs his comrade's "cold scepticism" and the "caution and suspicion 
of his character". He also reported Bestuzhev-Kyumin's initiai objection 
to Borisov's admission to the secret ranks of the conspirators because ho 
was too cold, and lacked the enthusiasm for such a decisive undertaking.3*
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Before discussing in further detail the beliefs of Borisov, 
Yakushlcin, Gorbachevsky and others, we shall take a brief look at the 
views of two outstanding Decembrists who, perhaps like the majority of 
their fellows, occupied the middle ground between the theists and the 
materialists, but who nevertheless took the materialist or atheist 
standpoint seriously, like Radishchev, and hovered on the edge of 
unbelief. In this respect they are representative of what I take to be 
a somewhat better phrase to cover the whole span of political opposition 
in Imperial Russia, which is the metaphysical tradition of Russian dissent 
rather than simply the materialist tradition. This tells us more about a 
wider range of alternatives to the status quo (including, for example, the 
reactionary radicalism of the Slavophiles) that they were so often 
nurtured by, or at any rate accompanied by, deliberations about the 
ultimate nature of existence. To be sure, as radical opposition sharpened 
against an increasingly embattled autocracy, it became in general terms 
more exclusively identifiable with materialism. Be that as it may, the 
two Decembrists I had in mind were N.I. Turgenev and P.I. Pestel’. 
Turgenev’s diaries are of great value as a fresh and articulate reflection 
of his times, unmuted by censorship, and undimmed by the frailty of 
memory. They show his preoccupation with the plight of the serfs and the 
question of emancipation, and the need for a Russian constitution; they 
manifest his consuming interest in the revolutionary events talcing place 
in Spain and Greece, and advocacy of laissez-faire economics. Perhaps the 
most abiding impression they leave is of his hatred of egoism, and his 
invocation of the ideal of patriotism, and selfless service of the 
fatherland, which for Turgenev had a seemingly religious significance: 
"People have for a long time sought the end of their existence and 
will seek it for a long time yet. But there will eventually come a time — 
if, that is, it is possible to hope for the perfection of man - there 
will come a time when people will realise their true purpose and find it
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in love of the fatherland, in striving for its welfare, in sacrificing 
themselves and everything in its service. The feeling of this love is 
an innate feeling in man. It is the spark of divinity; by its actions 
alone are we transported, and our souls elevated."2"^
The last night of 1819 found the diarist in a gloomy state of mind in 
which to greet the New Year. The barbarism, egoism and hypocrisy by 
which he felt himself surrounded, "the abyss and chaos of calamities 
from which Russia is persisting" had led him to question his hopes for 
his native land, and consider emigration. Nevertheless, he was moved to 
exclaim:
"And so, with thoughts of you, 0 Russia, my beloved and unfortunate 
Fatherland, I see out the old, and meet the now year. You are my only 
god, which I comprehend and which I carry in my heart. You alone can 
inspire powerful feelings in my heartl What are people? Where are they?
I do not know them. I know only your sonsI But where are your sonsI 
Where can I look for them amidst triumphant vice and oppressed virtue?"26 
This extract says much for the importance of patriotism for Turgenev*s 
psychological well-being, and also says a lot about its highly abstract 
nature, but it would be far-fetched indeed to deduce atheism from the 
literal meaning of such a fulsome outburst. Quite the opposite conclusion 
is to be drawn from an earlier passage which comes at the end of one of 
several attacks on the cruelty and obscurantism of Magnitsky (about 
whom he wrote in 1821: "And really, it is impossible to think about this 
man without loathing! It is a pity that it is necessary to call him a 
man"27):
"Is this a truly religious man? No, true Christians will say. is 
this a man who loves his country and mankind? No, not they will say who 
desire the welfare of mankind, and who have received from heaven the 
sacred feeling of patriot ism."'"'
But Turgenev's rather pious version of patriotism, and the fact 
that he attended Orthodox services, 29 should not conceal the extent to 
which his mind was exercised concerning the truth of religion. This is 
particularly apparent from a number of entries in his diary for the year 
1817, by which time he was in his late twenties. It is interesting that 
two of the Western philosophers who stimulated his thoughts about religion, 
Kant and Rousseau, presented in their different ways what might be termed 
a minimalist version of religious truth. The influence of Kant may be 
evidenced in his estimation of theology:
"If in philosophy there are things i„ which we believe, without 
knowing them, then the cause of our belief is the fact that we see their 
effects (dejstvija). The same cannot be said about theology: in theology 
effects are untrustworthy, consequently here there is no basis for belief" 30 
This smacks of Kant's rejection of speculative theology, and Turgenev 
specifically declares his agreement with the former in his belief that no 
positive religion would arise if Christianity ceased to be observed. 31 lie 
may also have shared Kant's view that ecclesiastical institutions in 
general, and the particular historical circumstances of Christianity were 
unimportant; in any case, there seems to be an affinity between Kant's 
interpretation of the Incarnation as the triumph of the good principle 
over the bad, and Turgenev's balance sheet of Christianity's history:
"The spread of Christianity is greatly to the credit of mankind, and 
proves despite the people's enemies, that it consists more of good than of 
evil; if it had been otherwise, then the spread of the Christian religion, 
based on good and love, would not have been anything like so successful" 32 
Rousseau is well-known for his advocacy in The Social Contract of a civil 
religion, involving belief in a retributive God and afterlife, to which 
all citizens should subscribe in order to be deemed trustworthy. It was, 
however, his Emile which triggered some of Turgenev's religious thoughts, 
and since the latter found Rousseau's version of Christianity "admirable
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and convincing", it might reasonably be surmised that he was attracted
to the utilitarian, undogmatic and undemanding Christianity preached by
the Savoyard Vicar. He wrote this after reading Emile;
"The thought came to me that religion originated, because of the
fact that people, sensing a deficiency in everything that surrounded
them in this world with regard to their moral existence, strove to fill
this spiritual void and turned to what was beyond this world, to tlvo
supernatural, and attempted to appropriate the supernatural to themselves,
or to merge themselves with the supernatural. Little by little, they
created out of it an ideal, out of the ideal a system, and living by it
or within it, attempted to embellish it with all the delights of the
imagination, with everything that could make it more attractive, more
captivating to them, like a man who decorates his home, in order to make
33it more pleasant and charming to live in" .
Turgenev's "thought" is neutral with regard to the truth of religion,
though as we saw in Anichkov's case in the eighteenth century, any
speculation about the natural origins of religion would risk the odium
of the Orthodox prelates. The diaries show a consistent anti-clericalism,
whether towards those unnamed priests who were cruel and scornful to the
people, and indulged in flattery and imitation for their own gain, or
towards lay defenders of the Church such as Shishkov, or above all
Magnitsky,at one time governor of Simbirsk, Turgenev's (and Lenin's)
birthplace."^ He did not, however, generalise these antipathies into
a rejection of religion, of Christianity, or even, like Speransky and
Labzin, of the external Church, but instead compared the onslaught on
science of the Magnitsky era with "those venerable Christian-hormits,
monies, who in the depth of their cells preserved the light of learning
35amidst universal barbarism."
244
Whatever his own views, Turgenev made it clear where he stood when 
it came to a choice between atheists and between the contemporary lay 
preachers of Christianity, "the governors, officials of departments, 
directors, - knowing no science, but knowing what was to their own 
advantage." Their advantage was that their own ignorance was justified 
by their obscurantist policies:
"They cry, like Omar, »Let's burn all the books!' If they are 
similar to the Bible, they are unnecessary; if they are against it, 
then they are h a r m f u l . I n  an earlier passage, he asked:
"... aren't those who with a good heart, do not believe in the 
existence of God usually honourable people, whose conscience is clear, 
who are not afraid of doomsday, and consequently do not think about the 
Judgment? ... they do not fear God , but if they have no special reasons 
to love him, then faith will not be born in them. If they neither fear 
nor love, then all that is left to them is reason and wonder, which lead 
them to the idea of a Creator; but not to the idea of Providence, which 
is what is understood here by the name of God ... such atheists are no 
worse than today’s religious people, who are covering the whole of 
Europe like a tidal wave (morskoy pesok) . God knows what in the end will 
come of the spread of mysticism, which has now swept Europe like a fever"^ 
It is ironic to note Turgenev's choice of the same kind of aquatic 
metaphor to describe the contemporary flood of religious mysticism as 
that used by Magnitsky, referring to materialism and atheism. It would 
also not be unreasonable to infer from Turgenev's defence of atheists 
on moral grounds that some at least of his friends and like-minded 
liberals were of this persuasion, though it should be borne in mind that 
he includes deism within the compass of the term 'atheism'. As far as 
the diarist himself is concerned, it is difficult to judge whether the 
passage betrays any attraction towards atheism, or whether he is simply 
either attempting to portray his friends' beliefs as morally acceptable,
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or perhaps explaining to himself why he personally rejects them.
Whatever the case may be, he is evidently not without his own doubts, 
as is indicated in an extract from his diary of 1822 written after he 
had read about the Sultan's atrocities in the Greek War of Independence* 
"My Godt My Godl What are these horrors for? Can it be that in the 
final analysis life and fate must all depend on the caprice of the 
warped mind of a despicable tyrant? There are moments when one 
involuntarily thinks that faith was invented by some benefactor of the 
poor human race; where, if not in faith, can one look, if not for 
consolation, then at least for some obstacle to the imagination when 
thinking about the acts of tyranny, injustice and arbitrariness to which 
millions of people are subjected by a few despicable villains? It was 
always sol And that is some kind of consolation. But it is not 
consoling to think that it will always be sol When one doesn't 
understand that the only way to save oneself from oneself is to believe."-5®
The conclusion suggested by Turgenev's diaries is that although he
was sceptical on rational grounds, he needed his faith for emotional and
psychological reasons, exactly opposite to the implications of the dictum
attributed by the poet A.S. Pushkin to Pestel's "Mon eoeur est
39matérialiste, mais ma raison s'y refuse." It is naturally harder in 
Pestel's case to make a judgment about his metaphysical stance, since 
unlike Turgenev, so little on the subject comes from his own pen. If it 
is agreed that the appeals to Christianity, which were part of the 
underpinning of the prescriptions of Russkaya Pravda, are an unreliable 
source for Pestel's private metaphysical leanings, we have to rely to a 
considerable extent on the judgments of others, like Pushkin, though as 
can be seen from the following remark by N.P. Ogarev, no conclusive 
picture emerges. Ogarev shared with Herzen a childhood oath on the 
Sparrow Hills outside Moscow to continue the Decembrists' struggle, after
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the news of the execution of Pestel•, Kakhovsky, Ryleev, Murav'ev- 
Apostol and Bestuzhev-Ryumin. In an article entitled "In memory of the
men of l4 December 1825", he commented on the first-named of those five 
martyrs:
"Before the execution, they all took communion, except Pestel', who 
remained true to his own sensible cast of mind. Official reports and 
even unofficial memoirs try to establish that this was because Pestel' 
was a Lutheran; we are convinced that this was because Pestel» was a
4ostrong man"
Ogarev's verdict is corroborated by the reminiscences of P.N. Myslovsky, 
Archpriest of Kazan' Cathedral, who was midwife to a number of Decembrist 
recantations and conversions in the Fortress of St. Peter and St. Paul, 
but who found his efforts wasted on the strong-minded Pestel'i
"Pastor Reinboth ... a man of excellent mind, stayed with Pestel' 
for several hours and came away from him with nothing. The criminal did 
not wish to hear about the secrets of faith; he would only engage in
debates with his priest and would never cease to argue the correctness of 
his thoughts and actions ...
On the evening of July 12, Reinboth went to see him in the casemate, 
in order to prepare him for his death. Once again, the debates began 
about the dogmata of faith, and about political matters. The pastor with 
tears in his eyes left the cruel-hearted man."/:tl
Although atheism cannot be formally deduced from Myslovsky«s 
account, it may be that by that time Pestel' had resolved for himself 
the dilemma which he expressed so succinctly to Pushkin in 1 8 2 1. por tho 
intervening years, we possess the nearest to Pestel's own statements on 
religious questions i„ the fo™ or replios to his lotto™ f™, his „other. 
It is clear that in so„. instate, she was guoting hls own words, for
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example, in a letter dated 15 April 1825:
»You say, my good friend, that God is not omnipotent, if he has not 
made us happy- This is exactly the same as in the case of children, who 
do not understand why their parents do not give them all the sweets they 
want to eat ... However, the secrets of religion seem to you more 
consoling, than ideas about inescapable, or, so to speak, material 
necessity. You say that this is more consoling, but you doubt whether it 
is true. The answer to that doubt is contained in that doubt itself. 
Since you ask whether it is true, that means that you cannot prove to me 
the non-existence of God, and everything that relates to God| and so, 
even if it were supposed that it were also impossible to prove the 
existence of God, you must agree that the unproven opinion which consoles 
me, upholds me and guides me must be preferable to the also unproven 
opinion which grieves me, makes me lonely, deprives me of everything and 
gives me nothing. Here already is one great advantage to be derived 
from faith.
And how is it that pride and the human heart have not found it more
advantageous for themselves to stick to the infinitely supreme being, to
submit to the all-powerful and all-good Father, than to ascribe the whole
of their existence to the arbitrary motion of atoms, which chance, a
whirlwind or I know not what else, has united, moreover with a wonderful
and inconceivable forml How is it that the mind and soul of man has not
been stirred up by this meaningless verbiage, which must replace the words
•Father* and ’Creator', - words which nature has drawn in the hearts even 
42of savages1"
It seems likely that as well as suggesting that the existence of 
God is doubtful, doubts which were met with an earthbound version of 
pascal’s wager, Pestel’ may also have proposed an Epicurean explanation of 
the universe, and in response to it his mother was able to supply the easy
248.
and justifiable invective which such theories attracted in the absence 
of any convincing theories of evolution. Pestel may have thought better 
of these objections than of her rather motherly attempt to resolve the 
problem of evil} in any case, he had evidently returned to the latter 
problem, and asked why evil existed in a world which God could have
constructed as he wished, to judge from his mother’s reply written in 
September, 1825:
"I do not know why, and do not try to find this out. Instead of
wasting time on indignation as to why I do not understand why tho little
grains placed in the ground produce so many different plants, I use my
own and others’ experience to cultivate my flowers, and when my garden,
decorated by a thousand colours, and fragrant with the most pleasant
odours, manifests the wonders of nature and brightens my senses, I
prostrate myself before the All-highest, and convey to him my gratitude,
without asking him for an »account* either regarding the scarlet colour
or sweet smell of the rose, or concerning the thorns with which its stem 
43is studded."
She went on to warn her son of the dangers of forbidden fruit in his 
vain desire to understand everything, and in a subtler kind of warning 
explained that she wished him to follow the teaching of Christ to ensure
his happiness in this world, and his eternal happiness in the world to 
come. She ended thus:
"I will be sorry if I have bored you, but will be very happy if I
have been able to answer some doubts or to replace them with religious 
44feeling."
Although the indirect evidence is far more suggestive of atheism than in 
the case of Turgenev, it cannot be stated with certainty that Pestel's 
position hardened after his statement of indecision to Pushkin. The 
uncertainty lies in the respective values as evidence of Myslovsky’s 
recollections and the letters of Pestel’s mother. It could of course be
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argued that Pestel* was unlikely to state his unbelief with full force 
to his mother in the knowledge of her deep religious convictions; on the 
other hand, Pestel's stand on his political views was such that ho was 
unlikely to reveal his doubts about the irreligious standpoint to a priest 
sent to him by the authorities. Which is the more reliable source of 
Pestel*s views, what he said or wrote to his friends or family, or his 
behaviour in a Tsarist dungeon?
Pestel and Turgenev are by no means the only Decembrists whose views
can be located on the boundary of belief and unbelief, as will be seen to
some extent when those figures considered by Soviet writers as open
materialists and atheists come to be considered. Before that, it is
worth mentioning briefly certain conspirators not normally quite so highly
honoured. Syroechkovsky distinguished between those sceptics who had
arrived at "full atheism" (Baryatinsky, Kryukov, Bobrishchev-Pushkin, and
M.D. Lappa) and those who "stood on the borders on unbelief", including
Yakushlcin, A.V. Poggio, I.A. Annenkov and, questionably, most of the
45leading members of the Society of United Slavs. In the latter group he 
named N.P. Repin, who according to Yakushkin's memoirs shared many 
discussions with him on Buhle's history of philosophy. Yakushkin recorded 
that Repin, who never read the Bible, had a poor view of Christianity, but 
on being persuaded by Yakushkin to read the New Testament, found, much to 
the memoirist's amazement, on affinity between Christians and 
Neoplatonists. Yakushkin, incidentally, also told how Repin and a fellow 
exile Andreev met a similar end to the Borisov brothers by being burned 
to death in a house.Shchipanov claims Repin for the materialist and 
atheist camp* hut stops at deism in the case of K.F. Ryleev and A.A. 
Bestuzhev-Marlinsky, whose anticlerical propaganda songs have already 
been discussed, and S.N. Kashkin, all three of whom are given as 
disputing with Obolensky over Christian doctrine. 47 Their opposition to 
Obolensky's idealism is clearly referred to in a letter written by him
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to his cousin Kashkin (a marginal Decembrist figure) which offers some 
insight into not only his philosophical views, but also his rather 
distinctive personality. This is where he presented an idealised picture 
of the perfection of the feminine personality, alongside a horrified 
portrayal of a life, stained by the '»illicit desires of men", observed 
in St. Petersburg. His own desire for a woman who could respond to him 
with her purity and her feelings may have been fulfilled later by his 
marriage to a plain peasant girl in Siberia. But to return to his 
idealism, he defended himself to Kashkin, and perhaps to Bestuzhev, who 
was also an opponent of Spelling's philosophy, in the following terms;
"You and the others scold me for my occupations, are indignant at 
my partiality for Schelling, and so far have not wanted to see the aim of 
my occupations. My reply to you, dear friend, will be very simple. There 
are certain spiritual needs which man cannot push aside. There is a 
certain thirst for knowledge which demands satisfaction, in order to 
satiate the soul with everything lofty and moral. So far the sciences 
have not given me satisfaction; they presented me with separate ideas, 
which wandered in my head without a plan and without a goal; Spelling's 
system has united into one these different ideas, and partially 
satisfied my demands. I am trying to bring into order what I had in 
disorder, and you, my friends, upbraid me for that!"**8
The final figure I shall deal with under this borderline heading is 
a slightly bizarre member of the Slavic Union, the runaway peasant from 
Volhynia who, as recounted in the earlier section on Education, succeeded 
in exchanging his family name Duntsov for the documents of a dvorynnin 
P.F. Vygodovsky. After the completion of his sentence to hard labour, 
Vygodovsky had more than one recorded brush with the authorities during 
his exile, end on one of these occasions, in 1854, „hen he was eventually 
arrested and imprisoned in Tomsk for "disobedience and insolence" tovards 
the local authorities in the course of an investigation into "outrageous
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expressions" he was reported to have used, a voluminous manuscript of 
3588 pages was confiscated. It contained Vygodovsky's thoughts of some 
twenty years, and according to the authorities in Tomsk, the pages were 
"filled with the most insolent and extravagant ideas about the government and 
social institutions, with false interpretations of certain passages of 
Holy Scripture and even the basic truths of the Christian religion.»49 
The manuscript was sent to St. Petersburg, where it was apparently lost 
in the archives of the Third Section of liis Majesty's Own Chancery,
Nicholas I*a censors and secret police, but not before an official had 
made a short summary (in fact, completed after Nicholas' death) including 
quotations from the original. Although reference has been made to 
"philosophical reasoning of materialistic content» ,50 it is evident from 
the summary that underlying Vygodovsky's colourful invective against 
the monarchy, the nobility and the Church, was a belief, presumably 
originating from his peasant background, that the temporal and spiritual 
authorities in liussia were the representatives of the Antichrist, and 
that the truth lay "in the God-word, that is in the peasants who constitute 
the church of the suffering Christ.» 51 It cannot be denied that on to his 
peasant Christianity had been grafted the eighteenth-century freethought 
of his fellow-conspirators in the Slavic Union, and it is no doubt to 
these heresies that the Tomsk authorities were alluding. For example, he 
argued that the "truths" of the Old Testament were unnecessary for 
"enlightened" people, and fit only for »beggars and rabble"; moreover, if 
an enlightened government were to banish poverty by prosecuting the 
beggars and idlers, and by obliging the landowners, factory-owners and 
speculators to feed the peasants, the "the Bible would become quite 
superfluous.»52 But even though the runaway peasant shocked the provincial 
officials by his comparison of Biblical events and Christian doctrines 
with the legends of mythology, for instance, his comparisons of the 
birth of Christ with the appearance of Apollo, and the Trinity with the
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Roman gods Saturn, Jupiter and Juno, his opposition to the status quo is 
framed in terms of true and false religion:
"*** -•°-fliye out-?.s- decorations the image of the Cross to the 
wh-?-^rve_the Antichrist as a despicable instrument of the e n s l a v e *  
i-QZPie.nt. QtthB poor people spread out under the Cross of Christ, is 
exacte. the_s.am_e as if the Cross of the Saviour had been transformed 
the power o_f_.the Lord into the murderous cudgel of Cain Thfl r W ^  
religion are on lease to the most wicked Jewish-Chrxst-betrayers of th» 
^nod, who trade in all the sacred things in the churches, and practise 
bribery and predation just like the earthly powers, not to mention 
ey.Îndlingjnjraculous icons, doors, powers, because this Is pure nodless 
charlatanry and the abuse of truth ... The rich - that retinue of the 
Antichrist - worship only Mammon ... The Church of Christ has no need of 
rich loafers, thieves and slaughterers; Christ and the Apostles have 
pronounced anathema on them ... The king of the world Is onff God. th.
earthly,I<ings_are almost always the power and instrument o-f t h .__
Devil.»53
Although Vygodovsky’s world-view was singular amongst the Decembrists, 
it is nevertheless interesting to note the similarity of his own 
characterisation of the origin of freethought in Alexandrine Russia with 
some of the views put forward by myself in this Part, or even with 
Bertrand Russell's observations about the motivation of materialists in 
general, included in the section on Education (however unlikely a trio 
this may appear):
-The powers of the world, at the end of the eighteenth century, 
alarmed by the freethinkers, in order to avoid this evil in the future, 
compelled everyone to occupy themselves with the reading of Roly 
Scripture, supposing through this to suppress freethought in them, but 
the reading of the Bible and theological „orks by tho freethinkers, 
confession and communion, did not in fact give the results that the
powers had promised themselves, and the freethinkers became even more 
convinced that the powers, lost in godless and brutal politics, as in 
mortal darkness, must surely perish from their own actions, for the most 
freethinlcing conspiracies against them are the product of the powers, and 
do not originate from the freethinkers. The sceptres and thrones of the 
earthly powers rule not in God and the word of Ilis wisdom, but in the Devil 
and the word of his earthly-political darkness of unreason; this is the 
abuse of the Cross and power, and of the divine wisdom and truth given by
54the Son of Kan."
I have already referred to the scorn which I.D. Yakushlcin heaped on 
the part played by freemasons in a meeting of the Union of Welfare, and 
to his sympathetic account of the atheist Borisov*s conduct and personality. 
This might be taken as evidence pointing towards Yalcushkin’s own atheism, 
and yet it should be remembered that he was also very generous in his 
estimation of the members of the "Congregation"; furthermore to speak of 
Borisov as a "dogmatic" atheist, and to remark upon his benevolence and 
altruism almost in spite of his metaphysical beliefs, suggests at any 
rate that at the time this part of his memoirs was being dictated, he 
would have wished to distance himself from Borisov’s extreme views. This 
is by no means to say that he wished to portray himself as a religious 
man, as can easily be judged from his comment upon Bobrishchev-Pushkin's 
return to the "superstitions of his childhood." Again, Yakushkin made 
his antagonism towards Christianity quite clear in his account of his 
confinement in the Fortress of St. Peter and St. Paul, for example, in 
the following conversation begun by Archpriest Stalchy of the Cathedral of 
St. Peter and St. Paul:
"' Have you been to confession and holy communion every year?•
»1 have not been to confession or to communion for fifteen years.*
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»Of course, that was because you were occupied by the duties of 
service, and did not have enough time to fulfill this Christian duty?»
»1 have already been in retirement for eight years a„d have not
confessed or taken communion because I did not wish to fulfill that duty 
as a ritual, knowing that there*is more toleration of religious beliefs 
in Russia than anywhere else. In a word, I am not a Christian.»«55
The difficulty which we face in interpreting Yakushkin»s world-view is 
encapsulated in his dealings with a cleric rather more complex than the 
simple-hearted Stakhy, the aforementioned Archpriest P.N. Myslovsky of 
Kazan' Cathedral. Myslovsky appears to have taken an entrepreneurial 
interest in the minds of the captive conspirators, and although he had
given up Pestel', he was seemingly more hopeful in the case of Yakushkin, 
despite the latter's initial brush-off:
"A. a priest you can bring me no «.for«, „hero,s for a number or my 
comrades your visits may be very comforting, and you may alleviate 
their situation h5^
Eventually, though, Yakushkin asked Myslovsky if he could take confession
and communion, though he presented this in his memoirs as the outcome of
a rather academic debate as to whether the observation of this ritual was
required by the government. On hearing Yakushkin's request, the Archpriest
asked if he believed in God, and he replied that he did. With heavy irony
Yakushkin recorded that Myslovsky »could not resist temptation and told
everyone that he had just converted the most stubborn atheist to
Christianity." The problem here is not so much whether Yakushkin is
using his memoirs to recommend himself to posterity over his ecclesiastical
adversary, but rather what was the source of his irony. ne could hardly
take credit for misleading the Archpriest as to his belief . ..oexiei m  a deity, and
so the simplest interpretation is that Myslovsky.s own inferences, that 
Yakushkin was formerly an atheist and now a Christian, were mistaken, and
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that Yakushkin the memoirist wished it to be recorded that throughout his 
confinement he was a consistent deist. This would also conform with his 
apparent neutrality with respect to the "Congregation" and the atheistic 
United Slavs. Whatever his motivation in deciding to observe Orthodox 
ritual, we know that this was not the last time he did so, since a list 
drawn up by the members of the Decembrists» prison artel» has Yakushkin 
amongst those talcing confession and eating lenten fare in 1835, Incident­
ally, in a corresponding list for lent in *834, Gorbachevsky and the 
Borisov brothers indicate that they will not participate. 58
To call Yakushkin a deist would be to swim against the current of 
most Soviet scholarship, and for that matter Mazour's history of the 
Decembrist movement, which, although it scarcely touches upon these 
matters, labels Yakushkin a "positivist" and an "atheist", seemingly 
because of his ridicule of freemason^.59 «  would, though, be consistent 
with Syroechkovsky's location of Yakushkin on the borders of unbelief- 
but one wonders if either he or Mazour were able to consult the essay 
which provides the amplest justification for calling him a materialist, 
since it was not actually published until 1949, well after the first 
appearance of either Syroechkovsky's article or Mazour's book. The fair 
copy of Yakushkin's original manuscript was untitled, and the essay has 
been given more than one title by different scholars, but of the two 
titles on the draft of the manuscript, "What is Man?" and "What is Life?” 
the editors of the three-volume collection of Decembrist philosophical 
works have chosen the title of the second section. This is quite 
reasonable, since 11» opening discussion of the nature of »an guite guicbly 
reaches the conclusion that there is no essential difference betvoen man 
and the animals, and that it is their common property, life, which is * 
need of explanation. To get to this point, Yokushkin had dismissed the 
almost universally held belief that the characteristic which di.ti„sulslMl. 
from the animals is the possession of an immortal soul as -a legend ofman
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deep antiquity." In order to substantiate his point, the author, as
befits a former officer of the Semenovsky regiment, marshalled his forces
and described the pitched battles in which human reason had defeated the
enemy of mediaeval scholasticism. The first battle was won by Descartes,
a "daredevil of French daredevils", who made all of God's creatures, apart
from man, no more than dolls constructed by a special kind of art and set
in motion by external impressions. Human reason had in this way received
"the rights of citizenship in the beautiful divine world," and had become
the "owner of the universe," but the price paid was alienation from the.
whole of nature.^1 But then "Mr. Locke proved that twice two is five, that
all our concepts are obtained only through external impressions", and
reduced man to the level of the animals, bringing to the ground many
62decayed mediaeval buildings. Yakushkin likens the new doctrines to 
"castles of air, like soap bubbles", and by a bizarre coupling of Locke's 
empiricist epistemology with the physiological speculations of Cabanis 
and Saint-Vincent, concludes that the Englishman's contribution carried 
the following implication for the human being:
"The fact that he is a man is compelled by external circumstances 5 
if he had hatched from an egg, he would have been, perhaps, a cock; if he 
had been born in a pool or an ocean, he could have taken on the appearance
63of a mosquito or a whale."
Yakushkin dissociates himself from this extreme environmental determinism 
which surely had little to do with Locke's attempts to set the limits of 
human knowledge. Nevertheless, this brief journey through the history of 
philosophy ends in favour of Kant:
"Human reason, tired after such devastating exploits, and unavailing 
efforts to create something stable out of itself, rested; and the German 
Kant with his cunningly woven categories proved in his turn that twice 
two is four, that pure reason is a great braggart and often takes on 
things which are not its concern and are beyond its powers.
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It seems at this juncture that far from evincing himself a 
materialist, Yakushkin has rejected empiricism as leading to a physiology 
which could identify thoughts with secretions of the brain, and come down 
in favour of a philosophy which denied to the human understanding the 
systematic synthetic a priori knowledge which Kant defined as the 
pretension of ontology. This does not amount to an explicit repudiation 
of materialism, since Yakushkin does not refer to Cabanis as a materialist 
(an appellation which the pupil of Condillac would himself have resisted), 
and in any case may only have been dissociating himself from a 
particular brand of ’'materialistic" physiology, nevertheless, he has 
settled upon the specifically anti-metaphysical implications of Kant’s 
critical philosophy, and if he were to be consistent in his approval of
them, he could not be deemed a materialist. Consistency is, however, 
not obligatory for „„rials, and YakushKin is rot uuduly i„hibited J  
exercise of his speculative powers when he turns his attention from the 
nature of man to the nature of life. He arrives at this point by 
rejecting the notion that man is "the alpha and omega of the world- and 
affirming that "he constitutes only a link in the infinite chain of 
creations" 565 the chain of being is, of course, a notion of some 
longevity, and it is worth remaking that despite its association with 
Iiobinet, it has also served as an expression of a religious world-view, 
not only by conveying the appearance of order and design, but also by
its extension to cover angels and other spiritual beings. Yakushkin 
bases his case for man’s place in the chain on embryological data, in 
particular, the similarity in the stages of development of the chicken 
embryo and the human foetus:
"And so, observations of the embryo clearly prove that the initial 
organization of all animals is in general accomplished in one and the 
same order; but that in spite of this each of them in the details and 
the degree of its development differs infinitely, and that each animal
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exists separately from all the other animals as an individual, and at 
the same time constitutes a link in the unbroken chain of all beings. 
lie does not, however, believe that "positive science" can tell us who or 
what is responsible for the wonders of embryonic development, and feels 
that the question can only be resolved by the application of reason, 
talcing care only to avoid contradictions. Reason, he informs us, infers 
that all bodies are made up of indivisible and invisible "units", which 
constitute the essence of each body, as distinct from its sensible form, 
and that the causes of motion in bodies are invisible forces:
"No mortal has actually seen with his eyes either units or forces, 
in precisely the same way that no mortal has seen with his own eyes his 
ears, whereas each one knows that he has ears, and no-one doubts the 
existence of his self (Ya), as a unit, possessing vital force and the 
force of thought, which are both the same force in different stages of
its development•" ^
It is not clear whether Yalcushkin, in calling the self a unit (edinitsa) . 
is using the term in the sense in which he introduced it, to denote the 
stage of minuteness at which matter ceases to be divisible. In the 
seemingly unlikely event that he wished to identify the self with an 
invisible particle, this at any rate would be consistent with materialism 
whether this was his intention is not established by a number of 
psychological speculations about the role of the self in perception and 
in the formation of concepts of external objects, and so on.
Obviously, to make sense of Yokushkin*s view of the ontological 
status of the self, we need to know more about his units, lie reminds us 
that they constitute the essence of an object, and are inaccessible to 
"our empirical observations"} remembering his earlier dig at the 
innumeracy of empiricism, we should not be surprised that the latter 
property does not discourage the author from giving us a fairly clear
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notion of the entities which we are told are the cause of the appearances 
of objectss
"A unit in a state of rest, like a mathematical point at rest, has 
no extension, and therefore nothing in common with the objects which we 
know about by means of our external impressions, but the former in motion 
becomes accessible to our understanding as the principles which form the 
objects visible to us, A moving line can form a line, a lino a plane, 
a plane a solid, which now has all three dimensions. All the units in 
the world, having no extension, can in no way be differentiated one from 
another, except in their motion, which can vary infinitely in its 
direction and in the velocity with which the motion is effected. Each 
unit in a given time has a particular mode of motion, peculiar to it, by 
means of which it excites a particular motion in units lying nearby, 
peculiar to them in that time, on account of which the units either com© 
together into some kind of order and can form something perceptible to us as 
a whole, or else draw away from one another and remain inperceptible to 
us ... All the phenomena in nature which are the subject of our 
observations, originate from the motion and combination of units in some 
or other order, perceptible to our senses; the cause of every motion is 
called a force, and is contained in the units themselves, which have the 
power to come into motion and to excite motion in nearby units ... The 
cause of phenomena, which always originate in one and the same order, is 
called by a special name; thus we speak of the force of attraction, 
cohesion, heat, light, electricity, magnetism, life, thought, and in all
these instances the word force signifies only a special modo and order of
68the motion of units."
Yakushkin, by designating thought as one of those natural forces which are 
no more than a special kind of motion of his ultimate particles, appears 
to have removed the res cogitans which Descartes placed as a barrier to a 
materialistic and mechanistic account of God's Creation; indeed the
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foregoing extracts could easily be seen as the scientifically up-dated 
offspring of d'Holbach's Sprtfem« de la Nature. This ia by no mGans to fiay 
that the arguments are convincing: it tells us little about the essence 
of a visible object that it is the visible combination of invisible 
particles, and when it transpires that these particles are not contingently 
but necessarily invisible, in that they have no extension, then it 
becomes hard to see how their invisibility can logically be overcome. It 
does not follow from the fact that an unextended point moves in a seCQnd 
dimension that the resultant line is visible, it seems more than usually 
appropriate to say that there are a number of holes in Yakushkin»s 
geometrical argument. More importantly, though, for our purposes, the 
denial of extension to the units makes it a moot point whether his account 
of natural phenomena is strictly materialistic; it brings to mind what
Lange termed in contradist A V> v u e world-view implied by-- -- --- w j  V H u
point-atoms of Ampere, Cauchy and the Jesuit Eoscovich. 69 Thus although 
there appear to be only minute differences between Yakushkin's unextended 
unit, d'Holbach's professed agnosticism about the nature of the ultimate 
constituents of matter, or to choose a later materialist, Buchner's 
belief in infinitely small atoms, in the first place, we are talking about 
degrees of minuteness, and secondly, over these minutiae was fought one 
of the battles beloved of Marxism-Leninism between materialists and 
idealists, of whom in this regard Yakushkin is to be found in the ranks of 
the latter. This is,of course, the argument of an advocatus dinboli. and it 
would be quite inconsistent with the drift of the essay's argument to 
represent the author as seeking to find an alternative to materialism, but 
the fact that there are real difficulties in describing him as a materialist
cannot be overlooked.
Yakushkin illustrates his thesis that the infinite variety of natural 
phenomena is exactly matched by the infinity of possible directions and
26l
rates of motion of units, by allusions to chemical affinity, celestial
motions, the various manifestations of energy, and finally the forms of
life. If the various kinds of chemical and physical properties stem from
variations in the "force of cohesion", the differences in life forms
are to be ascribed to stages in the development of the life force:
"In exactly the same way life in its manifestations, from the
mushroom to man, has its degrees of development, and just as at a high
degree of heat, light appears, so also at the highest develoxnnent of
70life, thought appears."
All the differences between plants and animals, between invertebrate and 
vertebrate animals, and so on, reside in the varying degrees to which 
combinations of units have been "excited to life". The different 
capacities for premeditated movement that exist between the lower and 
higher animals depend upon the degree of development of the nervous 
system:
"Thought, which is immediately dependent upon this organ [the brain]
appears in consequence of the development of life; but the manifestations
of thought themselves are as distinct from the manifestations of life as
the manifestations of light are from the manifestations of heat, although
heat and light can appear together in one and the same object. The very
world life in fact signifies a special mode and order of units, according
to which a plant or an animal is formed. Both the one and the other are
formed from units, from which the force of life, as from a central point,
acts upon neighbouring units and excites them to life. Each unit, excited
to life, receives new force for its combination with the other units from
which it forms the living being and for the counteraction of the destructivo
action of alien units. In this respect, a man, a cock, an oyster and a
mushroom are all subject to one and the same law, and in no way differ
71
amongst themselves." This does not mean that Yakushldn overlooks the 
differences between man and the other animals. The animals act by
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instinct, whereas the human infant must learn his abilities. The 
individual human being is weak, and must unite into families and then 
into nations, whereas even bee-hives function independently of each 
other. Indeed a difference between man and the brutes is, in the author's 
optimistic phraseology, the fact that "all mankind is striving to be 
united in one whole.»72 It is clear, however, that no list of differences 
of this nature could shake his a^riori conviction that all human behaviour 
is reducible to the motion of units, and it would be difficult, 
reservations about the ontological status of units notwithstanding, to 
regard this as other than a materialistic stance. It should, though,be 
remembered that his memoirs suggest that he accepted the existence of 
God* at any rate at the time of his imprisonment, and there is nothing in 
the essay either for or against the standpoint of deism, which banishes 
God to the role of disinterested Creator.
The only outri8ht and forthriBl.t expression of nthois,, by any of tho 
conspirators which has survived is a not always doeipl,arable poo, written
by Prince A.P. Baryatinsky, who, after service as a translator, in the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, joined the array, and eventually, iike pestel' 
became an aide-de-camp to General P. Kh. Wittgenstein, coramandor-in-chief 
of the Second Army. Despite his linguistic abilities, Baryatinsky wrote 
the poem in French, because of his poor knowledge of Russian. We have 
already heard of this from Belyaev, and the poet himself admitted it 'to 
his own shame* in his testimony to the Investigating Commission, and put 
it down to the fact that he had been educated by Jesuits. 73 Short of 
reproducing the work, it will be impossible to convey satisfactorily the 
colourful imagery with which tho Russian anticipated the depiction of 
"nature red in tooth and claw", well-known to readers of Tennyson's 
in Memoriam. The poem can, however, be taken seriously in philosophical 
texm.3, particularly as a rejection of a beneficent God on the grounds of 
the manifest cruelty in the world. Baryatinsky adopts the device of
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addressing God, in order to demonstrate to Him the impossibility of His 
own existence because of the nature of His creation. He points out to 
the angry God, who has drunk the blood of sacrifices, and in whose name 
blood has flowed from the earliest times, His responsibility for the 
sharpening of the lion’s claw, the extension of the black boar's fangs, 
the snake's poison, the teeth of the mad dog, and the hiding of the cat’s 
claw in treacherous velvet. lie describes how the hawk with bloody claws 
tears the dove from the air, and how in its turn the dove crushes an 
insect in its beak, and how the insect destroys a "living atom", and 
after a stomach^turning description of the slow death inflicted on its 
prey by the "disgusting spider", concludes:
"Let the wise man see the Deity in these tissues [of the web)
But my heart rejects him for such cruelty.
In truth, - what glory for the heavenly master,
That a living being can exist only at the cost of another 1 
Baryatinsky is not insensitive to the kind of awesome phenomena that 
inspired, for example, Lomonosov’s Evening Meditation on the Divine 
Majesty, and speaks of the setting sun flooding the universe with an 
ocean of fire, thunder rolling over the trembling mountains, lightning 
illuminating the entire heavens, the multitude of stars in the night sky 
leading him to recognise God’s greatness:
"But the cry of the bird dying under the sharp claw 
Suddenly repels my sinking heart from You.
The cruel instinct of the cat, in spite of all your vast creation,
In denying Your goodness, denies Your existence.
The sense of much of the remainder of the poem is obscured, because 
large chunks are illegible, though one clear passage shows that ho is 
gracious enough to include an opponent of his own views, who argues that 
the destruction of life is justified to preserve the whole of nature," 
especially as God grants eternal life after death. No direct reply to 
this objection can be made out, but subsequent fragments suggest that
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fear, infirmity and suffering make it difficult for many a sage, having 
strained "the finest • fibres of his brain", to remain constant in his 
rejection of fables and erroneous beliefs. Later, Baryatinsky has 
evidently referred to the well-known paradox that the evil and cruelty 
means either that God is not good, or that if He is, then this must 
"diminish His providence and bind His will."76 At the end of the poem 
(which, incidentally, was written on paper with water marks for the year 
1824), Baryatinsky returns to this paradox, and with a final flourish, 
inverts a Voltairean apophthegm:
"Ch', break an altar which I!e has not deserved
Either He is good, but not omnipotent, or omnipotent, but not good 
Consult nature, interrogate history,
You will then understand, that for God’s own glory,
Seeing so much evil covering the entire.! wprld, .
Even if God existed, it would be necessary to reject Him".77
Two other members of the Southern Society claimed by Soviet 
historians as representatives of materialist tradition are N.A. Kryukov 
and V.F. Raevsky. These claims to some extent rest on the fallacy of 
describing sensationalist epistemology, and affirmations of the objective 
existence of perceived objects, as "materialistic", but in Kryukov’s case, 
we also have his own testimony to his materialism and atheism. As he 
wrote for the benefit of the Investigating Commission:
"For a long time I was undecided about whether to reject God; in the 
end, by animating matter (ozhivotvoriv mgteriyu) and attributing all that 
exists in nature to the action of chance, I extinguished the scarcely
78glowing light of pure religion".
Kryukov recanted these views after his arrest, and his name is amongst 
the membership of the Siberian "Congregation". As for the views he later 
regretted, any attempt to systematise them would have to rely upon a 
collection of notebooks filled by Baryatinsky and himself, which are a
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mixture of their personal philosophical views, and notes on works by
philosophes, such as Condillac, d'Holbach and Helvétius. Clearly there
are difficulties inherent in such a source when it comes to deciding
which views contained therein represent the author's own convictions,
and which are simply an aide-memoire, but this is not for our purposes a
distinction of vital importance, since the published extracts do not
necessarily imply a materialist world-view, but present, rather, a
familiar confection of French Enlightenment ethics and epistemology.
Thus we find an optimistic appraisal of the potentiality of the "science
of man" or "social science" in the promotion of personal and public
welfare, faith in the capacity of "enlightenment" to put an end to civil
strife, and to dispel the illusions fostered by tyrants and clerics to
keep the people in bondage, lengthy analysis of the touchstones of
Enlightenment naturalistic ethics, "happiness" and "welfare", and
adherence to the categories of sensationalist psychology and theory of 
79knowledge. Some of this is consistent with materialism, though does 
not entail it. The closest to a materialistic standpoint is a section 
entitled "What thinking means":
"We have now enumerated all the conditions of our sensibility and
have seen that each vibration of one or several nerves leads to motion
in the brain, stimulates our consciousness. If the connection between
the brain and the nerves is interrupted then we cease to have any
feeling ... And so, if we did not have either nerves or a brain, or if
they did not possess the property of rendering us sensitive, then vc
should be insensitive objects, like, for example, stones, metals and
„80so on."
As it happened, Kryukov was not prepared to rule out the possibility that 
plants might feel pain when eaten, or that an acid might experience 
pleasure on combining with alkali, on the grounds that w*e could not know 
one way or another. Be that as it may, to postulate that sensation is
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a P ^ * * * * * . ™ ? ^ ™  of mental activity, and that sensation is entirely 
dependent upon the nervous system, is not formally to make mental activity 
a function of the nervous system (though since it makes mental activity 
logic«*.*/, dependent upon the nervous system, this could at least bo 
regarded as a plank in a broadly-defined materialist platform). This is 
what Kryukov noted elsewhere on the relationship between the spirit and 
the senses:
"All spiritual faculties are contained in the faculty of sensation.
The spirit does not act independently in us, but acts only by means of 
the senses, and we do not know, and cannot know, the actions which are 
proper to the spirit as such."^1
These pronouncements could be taken either as an affirmation of 
materialism, or of the existence 6f an essentially inaccessible soul or 
spirit. This might seem a false dilemma, since Krylov has left us in 
no doubt as to his beliefs when a member of the Southern Society, it is 
however, by no means unlikely that a person who considered himself a 
materialist at one time should not at that time have thought through his 
metaphysical standpoint; it is perhaps less than surprising to detect 
idealist elements in the freethought of one who would later take to religion
The fairest conclusion • would be that from what we know of
it, certain aspects of Kryukov's avowed materialism are unclear. Wvxt is 
clear, though, is that he was dissatisfied with conventional religion and 
wished to replace it with a more satisfactory philosophical system. He 
had this to say about Russian society's reaction to talk of philosophy
and politics:
"And the hypocrites will take up arms against you with all their 
might, to try to convince everyone that you are a dangerous man, that 
you are riddled with vice, that you do not - to use their expression - 
giv. a fig for faith and th. law, finally, that you ar(J a ^  ^
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needs to be avoided, in order to escape such a dangerous example, 
because, they say, freethought fascinates most of all by the fact that 
it gives full rein to the passions. People, they say, for no other 
reason than to give themselves up to vice, reject all religion, the only 
support we have in our weakness, - as if religious rites were sufficient
to point us along the path of virtue, as if virtue consisted only in
02blind beliefs."
lie later defended the value of adherence to a philosophical system
against the sceptical standpoint that all such systems contained some 
errors:
"In my opinion, it is better to have some system (of one's thoughts),
than none. And so, I always prefer, after investigating as far ns I can
several different systems, to choose the best one of them and to follow it
in my judgements, rather than have none. Even if I did not have time to
get to know more than one, I would even then agree that it was better to
adhere to one than none, for ih the latter event I would not have a firm
8"5basis to vrhich I could relate all my thoughts."
This is perhaps too personal a statement to permit any generalisations to 
be induced from it regarding the propensity of Russian radicals to indulge 
in metaphysics; perhaps at most its rather pragmatic attitude towards the 
value of a world-view is an important element in Kryukov’s eventual 
metaphysical about-turn.
It is harder than in Kryukov's case to establish V.F. Raevsky’s 
commitment in such matters. I mentioned in the section on Edneation that 
he was the first member of any of the secret societies to be arrested, 
almost four years before the rebellion took place, and because he was 
forewarned of his impending fate by the poet Pushkin, with whom he was on 
good terms in Kishinev, he in all probability took the opportunity to 
destroy incriminating papers. Arriving at a judgment about his metaphysical
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stance is thus a question of balancing relevant fragments of those 
poems, lecture notes and letters which have come down to us. In the 
poem he wrote after his arrest, Singer in the Dungeon (Pnvets v Tomnitso) 
in which with characteristic use of classical metaphor, he described 
himself as having opened the book of Clio, and found the pages covered 
with blood, he gave this characterisation of the role of religion in 
the oppression of the people:
"Like an idol, the mute people 
Dozes beneath the yoke in silent fear:
Above them the bloody family of whips
Places vision and thought on the dhopping-block,
And faith,the steel shield of kings,
A bridle for the superstitious masses,
Before the anointed head,
04Subdues daring reason."
In two earlier poems, he questioned the immortality of the soul. One of 
these, an Elegy, was written in 1818-19, on the death of his brother. 
Having raised the question whether his spirit would be reborn after death, 
or whether his thought and reason would be destroyed by worms, ho admits 
that the order and grandeur of nature and the universe reveal a God, and 
that life in general leads to the coffin, but nevertheless asks why 
mankind is afflicted with sorrow, suffering, persecution, poverty and 
destruction, why a young man's life is cut short by a savage death, why 
corruption, greed and tyranny triumph over goodness and innocence, why the 
blood of the unfortunate victims flows like a river and the wailing of 
widows and orphans does not subside:
"The murderer is sheltered by the Government's hand,
And superstition, awash with blood,
Lures the innocent to a death by a bloody path,
Reading a hymn of reconciliation and lovel...
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Earthquakes, murders and fires
Sickness, poverty, and the sores of severe punishment
Who in the world could produce such an arrangement?
Can it be a creator of good, can it be a powerful God?"^
Strictly speaking, Raevsky does not supply the answer to this question in 
the remainder of his poem, though his scepticism is underlined by a 
comparison between a river entering the sea, and the thoughts of man 
leaving the earthly ashes. He envies his brother his deliverance from 
this abyss of evil, vice, envy and venomous opinions, and with heavy 
irony remarks that only a villain would tremble at his survival, since
O/T•»the immortality of the soul is an execution for a crime!"
Raevsky returns to this theme in his Satire on Morals (Satira na 
Nravy), a poem written between the years 1817-22 notable for its 
excoriating denunciation of the superficiality and immorality of Russian 
society, and anticipation of the great debate of the l820s and l830si 
"Of all the civic evils, the most dangerous evil of all 
For the spirit of a nation is the imitation of foreign things."®^ 
Subsequently the poet’s target is German idealism and the immortality of 
the soul;
"I would in vain have begun to create for you a system 
Following Kant, Schelling and many like them 
Its subject - downright nonsense. The object demands silence 
About all the rich foolishness of all the creatures of the earth.
I know my goal, and this insignificant gift,
The gift of life, the link of the soul with the source of destruction,
And my feeble talent and enthusiasm for singing
Grow weaker with the thought of a momentary existence.
No-one has explained what awaits us beyond the grave,
Neither thousands of magicians, nor the books of Moses,
* Nor the miracle-workers, speaking to the noisy rabble,
Nor the genius of Leibniz on the pages of the Theodicy.
And the worm, and I, and you, and the whole of the human race 
Will pass on for future times, like the brilliance of Eida 
Tell me, where are the people of vast Atlantis ?..
And the stupid human race, letting out its stupid moan,
In fetters of avarice, villainy, murder, treachery,
Howls every day at the altar of the Chimaera ...
And expects by this empty entreaty to secure its salvation
It awaits immortality now here, now there in the unknown
And perishes a victim of sorrows and evil
The madmen, defending themselves with rites, with prayer
And with faith - the consequence of the fetters of prejudices,
The nearer they come to the roof of the tomb
The stronger their wickedness, the more frequent their punishments ...
• Oh how many times do I take fright and flee society and the judges, 
Where I hear the threatening, ape-like opinion,
The words of meaningless speeches,
Where everyone cries out against me with bitterness,
He does not believe in cats, he does not believe in garlic,
He does not believe in the omnipotent mummy,
He dared not to believe in the saviour-ox,
And has forgotten the sacred temples of Memphis.1,88
It is to the detriment of neither that poetic erpres.ion .„d philosophic.! 
rigour do not easily cohabit, and even though these ertract. from Haevsky's 
poetry might speak volumes of atheism to those more adept at literary 
criticism, I for my part must be consistent in applying the same mundane 
scepticism to which hitherto considered prose has been subjected, and 
conclude that despite Raevsky*s obvious doubts about the existence of a
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beneficent God because of the evil in the world, we can only be certain 
of his rejection of organised religion, and that in all probability he 
did not believe in the after-life. Admittedly, to talk of faith as •'the 
consequence of the fetters of prejudiced suggests atheism, but whether 
or not it is entailed depends upon whether faith connotes any belief in e 
supernatural being, or denotes the Christian religion or the Orthodox 
denomination. To demonstrate the snares which poetic expression leaves 
for the liberal-minded, it would be worth including an extract from 
Raevsky*s pillorying of Russian society:
"Everything can be permitted in the world
But to be the plaything of fools and monkeys
Is for us in this glorious .go shamsful and godless (besboshno),»89 
I am not seriously suggesting that the poef. rejection of the »orang­
utan'. vorld he found himself in godless f o ^ * .  i. necessarily anything 
other than an emphatic figure of .peach, but there are other place, in hi. 
prose writings which give one pause in deciding the real extent of his 
religious freethought. In hi, essay On the Slaver, of the Pe.s.nt. he 
pointed out the unwanted effects of the serfs» lot:
»Constant and intense work, which overburdens all . man's physical 
strength, exhaust, him prematurely, and opens the way to an early death, 
before this, the failure to observe the Church's regulations and 
ceremonies (for they are often regained to work „„ Sunday, and feast day.) 
weakens the strength of faith, man's only support and consoUti<>n( for
without the time to fulfil hi, Christian duty, he will without ,.U  become 
unused to sacred obligation and, being compelled by hi. fir,t origin., will 
sink into the roost awful position of coarse unbelief-»90 Again  ^ in anotb 
essay On theSoldier, which like the former was written shortly before his 
arrest, he declaimed in tones familiar from the Decembrists' corporate 
manifestoes, that the alleviation of the soldiers» duties was required by
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••religion and the code of honourl”91 Elsewhere in Raevsky*s papers, we 
find a number of definitions of forms of government, notes on geography 
and cosmology, aid the following observations about religions
•'Religion is the acceptance and worship of the supreme being, who 
created the universe.
The existence of the creator is based on the logical truth, that there 
is no effect without a cause, whence since there is a world, then there 
must be a creator of the world. ' '92
It could in this instance be argued that these lines do not necessarily 
represent Raevsky's private views, but were merely notes for a lesson at 
one of the military schools where he taught. Even if this were so, it 
would not render any less remarkable Shchipanov's interpretation that 
Raevsky's categorisation of God's existence as a logical truth only, and 
reference to the differing characteristics of pagan, Judaic, Christian 
and Mahommedan religion, "suggests the conclusion that God is not a 
reality, but only an invention of a dry mind, a logical supposition. " 93
Lest it be thought that Raevsky *-- I
V . I W
" ”1 lecturer .ere completely different people, it cap at leapt be s L I  
that the derision he felt for Kant and Schelling in his verses .as also
prosaically uttered, to judge from some jocular remarks in a letter to 
K.A. Okhotnikov, dated l May 1821:
-Nevertheless, the essence of the evicting in it, unity .ith 
heterogeneous harmony consists in the actual, .hich in it, empirical 
action through the active movement of ancillary organised beings, can both 
subjectively and objectively give all matter that property .hich Newton 
(Nevton ili N'yuton) proved to be central attraction.
However, does the dissolute in relation to the absolute not have its
action in mystical-technical production 
leads to the earth's crust?
as the parabola in its extremity
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From this it can clearly be seen and understood, that Kant ♦
Schelling + Eckartshausen + Fichte + Stilling + Vellansky - constitute that 
single metaphysical-spherical body, which by combining the ellipse with 
the parabola, makes one doubt the understanding, for:
»The doubt of wisdom is the ripest fruit* ... Batyushkov»»94 
Raevsky would no doubt have been surprised at the confusion which his own 
views have engendered. There can be little doubt that his poems cannot be 
ignored in the history of Russian atheism, but if we take what evidence 
there is of his thought as a whole, he was either inconsistent, or at best 
adhered to a poetic esoteric and a prosaic exoteric philosophy.
If we accept Yakushkin’s testimony, atheism was widespread in the 
Society of United Slavs, largely through the personal influence of P.I. 
Borisov. His own rejection of all religion was corroborated by Belyaev, 
who also recorded that I.V. Kireev was a supporter of Borisov before his 
own conversion to Christianity. What Yakushkin remembered of Borisov's 
influence during the Decembrists» exile also held for the period of the 
Slavic Union's activity, as Gorbachevsky testified:
"From the beginning Borisov himself .rote verses end pros, u>
to read his own papers on various matters, but .hieh .ere el.ays freethinking, 
then, having learned French in one year so that he could easily translate 
any book, he gave us to read his translations from Voltaire and some 
articles by Helv^tius.»'95 As for Borisov’s atheism, his own testimony 
could be held to contradict this imputation:
»The general good is the supreme law, this is the maxim which was 
the foundation of my religion and my morality. My parents did not try 
to instil in me extreme piety; they often said to me that it is more 
pleasing to God than all the sacrificial offerings to see that a man is 
honourable and doing good, that God looks not on full, but on pure
hands, and even more on a pure heart, however they did not inspire
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freethought in my soul. For my doubts regarding certain parts of the 
Old Testament, and certain ceremonies established by the Church about 
which Jesus Christ did not speak, I am indebted to certain French 
authors and to my own reason, which in everything has fallen into error.
I was strengthened in my freethought by the oppressive acts which many 
priests of both our own, and the Catholic Church, displayed towards their 
parishioners, and also by the bad morals of some of them. However I am 
not without faith.-96 Borisov went on to say that one of the aims of the 
first predecessor of the Slavic Union, the "Society of the First Accord", 
which was modelled on a Pythagorean sect, was "the purification of 
religion from prejudices". Its successor, the "Society of the Friends of 
Nature", was based on the republic of Plotinus, the Neoplatonist who was 
so far removed from materialism as to be ashamed of his own body, and 
withhold the named of hie Parents.« There is no reason to doubt that 
the United Slave found their origin, in , pas8ion ior clasalc>1 .ntlqulty)
Borisov claims that his liberalism originated from reading the Lives of
Plutarch and Cornelius Nepos, and it might also be noted that of the 
classical names which the United Slavs affected up to the rebellion, 
Borisov chose the sensationalist Protagoras, the name which Voltaire 
applied to the materialist d'Holbach. But as for Borisov's rather 
grudging avowal of faith, the fact that it was accompanied by a penitent 
admission of error makes one reluctant to discard the opinion of the 
memoirists.
A, to whether Borisov was a materialist, it should be mentioned that 
in a letter to P.K. Golovinsky, dated 21 September 1825, he asked for . 
copy of d.Holbach.s SgtSme de la Nature to be sent to Kireev or himself,« 
but the likeliest source of evidence is an essay contained in a notebook 
found amongst his letters from the beginning of 1840. It amounts to a 
review of a geological work passed by the censor in i829, a„d written by
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A.A. Deykhman, a member of the St. Petersburg Mineralogical Society. It 
is not known how Borisov obtained this obscure work, though it may have 
been from Deykhman*s son, who was an acquaintance of Raevsky. The essay 
has been given the title On the Origin of the Planets, and Borisov was 
particularly struck by Deykhman's hypothesis that the earth and similan 
bodies had formed under the "force of attraction" out of "primary atoms" 
originally widely dispersed through space." Borisov mentioned the 
meteorite found by P.S. Pallas near Krasnoyarsk, and argued that such 
bodies were evidence that the process of formation was continuing} he 
speculated that the sun and planets would in time unite with a star from
the constellation u c i L U 1 C 9
100
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they might even have been formed themselves out of the unification of 
heavenly bodies populated with different species of animals and plants.
The idea of the plurality of worlds was a common subject for speculation 
in seventeenth-century non-Catholic Europe, and goes back as far as 
Nicholas of Cusa in the fifteenth century, and Giordano Bruno in the next} 
moreover the evolutionary view of the heavens which so struck Borisov had 
been put forward by Kant as early as 1755, and by Herschel and Laplaee later
on in that century. This is not to say that Borisov relied on eighteenth- 
century science: for example, he mentioned the asteroids discovered 
between l801 and 1807} nevertheless, none of these phenomena in themselves 
entail a materialistic world-view, though they would naturally be of 
interest to a materialist. More suggestive, perhaps, in that respect, is 
Borisov's atomism: he considered the "primary atoms" to be spherical, and
his ideas cannot therefore bo linked with the W o  rial is. of Boscovich, 
as wo saw in rokushkin-s caso. Howovor, it seems „„ the b„ u  of tf)U
assay that tho metaphysical inference which Borisov draw fr™ Beykhsj.,
hypothesis was not so „„eh universe! materiaiity, as univorsai sphericity
a notion which appear, to have less in common with materialism then with ’ 
the Pythagoreanism of the Society the Flrst Acc„rd. „  ^  ^
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be ludicrous to suggest that Borisov was an adherent of number mysticism 
rather than materialism, but the fact that his first love was Greek 
philosophy, and moreover, at any rate initially, the immaterialism of the 
Pythagoreans and Plotinus, may go to explain why he was so enthusiastic 
about the notion that all natural phenomena conformed to the perfection 
of the spheres
"...the spheroid form is the primary form; we encounter it in the 
primary atoms which constitute crystals, and all the bodies so far 
analysed by chemistry} they astonish our gaze in the boundless space of 
the ether, where the planet-spheroids, of greater or lesser density, 
revolve with the speed of a stormy wind around the vast fiery ball. " 101 
For Borisov, the value of Deykhman's theory was that it brought geology 
into line with other sciences, such as chemistry, physiology and anatomy, 
physics and botany which recognised that the elementary bodies with which 
they dealt, such as blood corpuscles and pollen, were spherical. It should 
be noted that Borisov stressed that the theory was only a hypothesis, 
which should be rejected in favour of any more probable}102 it should also 
be noted that even though Borisov was prepared to entertain the hypothesis, 
that fact alone does not make him a materialist any more than it does 
Deykhman. It is however an addition to the weight of evidence, which 
although far from colossal, renders it perverse to deny Borisov's 
probable atheism and materialism. One wonders if Pavlov-Sil'vansky, in 
his pioneering essay on "The Materialists of the Twenties", would have 
been less likely to doubt Yakushkin's description of Borisov as a dogmatic
atheist (on the basis of the latter's testimony to the Investigating
105Commission), had he been able to consult this piece.
One of Yakushkin's other recollections, that „any of the United Slav, 
took Borisov's w r d  on the .object of atheis»,, ls at the yery ^  ^
contradicted by the other evidence, tho„9h ve have already seen that
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Vygodovsky was a believer of an individual kind. Syroechkovsky, who 
placed Vygodovsky on the borders of unbelief alongside the Borisov 
brothers, and Gorbachevsky, also located in that no-being's land the 
Pole Lublinski, whom P.I. Borisov identified as the initial influence in 
the desire of his brother and himself to set up the Society of United 
Slavs. However, in a letter from Borisov to Vygodovsky, in which he refers 
to the fact that Catholic priests were up in arms over Lublinski's 
failure to attend confession for three years, the Pole's belief is 
apparently confirmed: ■*"
"You and I are agreed that this is not good, but it is necessary to 
see what lies behind the actions of the defendant. My friends and I will 
guarantee with all our wordly goods that this L., persecuted by everyone,
is a pious man, worshipping God with all his heart, with all his spirit and 
with all his reason.”
Taken literally, the extract would suggest that Borisov disapproved of 
Lublinski's failure to fulfil his Catholic duties, but would have been 
prepared to vouch for the sincerity of his religious convictions. The tone 
is, however, clearly ironical, and any reference by Borisov to religiosity 
has to be taken in conjunction with his own belief in a secular religion 
of morality, the flavour of which is conveyed in the previously cited
Regulations and Oath of the United Slavs, and which can also be tasted in 
an earlier letter to Vygodovsky:
"We must perfect ourselves In the sacred rules of morality, not of 
false but of true morality, which onslders that the first duty of man Is 
to prefer social utility (gbshch.stvennuvu pel to everything in the
world. " 105
I have already mentioned KireeVs support of Borisov, and also the 
opposition of Gorbachevsky and Spiridov to the religious propaganda of 
Hurav*ev-Apostol and Bestuv.hev-Ryun.in, aa well a, Gorbachevsky.s failure, 
along with the Borisov brothers, to observe Lent in 1834. Further
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circumstantial evidence for Gorbachevsky's atheism is provided by a 
complaint made by Archbishop Nil of Iricutsk to the Governor-General 
of Eastern Siberia V. Ya. Rupert, dated l7 August 1846, with regard to the 
behaviour of Gorbachevsky and A.E. Mozalevsky, a former officer of the 
Chernigov regiment and member of the Southern Society, from the time of 
their installation in Petrovsky Zavod. According to the Archbishop, 
neither during this time had been to church, let alone to confession, and 
moreover »from the lips of Gorbachevsky more than once had been heard 
blasphemous words, exposing his atheism.» 106 Rupert ordered an inquiry, 
but the investigating official Lokhov reported that the »state criminals» 
had a good record of behaviour in the factory, and that there had been no 
reports or complaints about Gorbachevsky's blasphemous words. 107 The
Archbishop responded to these findinas bv . .
03 Dy Maiming the original complaints
had been made to the local priest Kapiton Shergin by some of hi. 
parishioners, but that they did not wish to testify since Gorbachevsky 
enjoyed the patronage of the factory, s director, and they themselves 
were dependent upon the factory officials. Moreover, the priest did not 
feel that he could release the names of the complainants, since they had 
spoken to him as a spiritual father, clearly this confidentiality did not 
extend to the content of the complaint, . 108 Since the Archbishop supported 
Father Shergin.s conscientious refusal to disclose his source, of information 
and since Gorbachevsky himself refused to confess to the blasphemy, the 
matter was closed.
Needless to say, most of the conspirators whose views or at any rate 
some of whose view, are suggestive of materialism, or atheism, have been 
accepted readily by Soviet historians of the "materialist tradition" in 
Russia. Shchipanov enumerates as atheists, with "clearly expressed 
materialistic positions on the explanation of the phenomena of nature and 
knowledge of the world," the following (though the list is open-ended),
iYakushkin, Borisov, Baryatinsky, Kryukov, Raevsky, Gorbachevsky, Repin,
S.M. Semenov, I.A. Annenkov, I.I. Ivanov and V.A. Bechasnov. 109 Although 
I accept the existence, and importance, of atheism and materialism within 
the Decembrist movement, I hope to have shown that it is by no means 
certain in all the instances given that the existence of God was rejected, 
and in some of them, materialistic positions were not only not clearly 
expressed, but indeed not expressed at all. As for the later figures in 
the list, who have not so far been considered, I.I. Ivanov's atheism is 
derived from the testimony of Kostyr a , 110 whom Ivanov introduced into the 
Society of United Slavs. The case for S.M. Semenov's materialism rests on 
an extract from the memoirs of D.N. Sverbeev, who was acquainted with 
several of the Decembrists. Semenov, perhaps more than the members of the 
Society of United Slavs, was a prototype of the raznochinets representative 
of the intelligentsia, having graduated from a theological seminary, and 
spending a number of years both as a student and as a candidate for a 
professorship at Moscow University. Along with I.I. Pushchin, Semenov Was 
one of the principal members of the Moscow section of the Northern Society, 
by which time he had left the University for service in the Department of 
Spiritual Affairs, rather an odd move for a "convinced materialist. " 111 
It was during his time at the University that Sverbeev was struck by 
Semenov, whom be as a student considered the most outstanding of the 
"patricians". His record of Semenov's philosophical preferences is 
doubtless the best evidence for the views attributed to him:
"He devoted his entire spirit to the Encyclopaedists of the 
eighteenth century; Spinoza and Hobbes were his favourite writers. " 112 
It was evidently not Hobbes' political philosophy which appealed to him, 
since much of Sverbeyev's memoir is given to Semenov's part in opposing 
* public dissertation in favour of the notion that monarchy was the most
e^ellent foo, of Oove^ent, and that in Knasia uni ini tod n o n , ^  „a, 
the necessary and only possible form. 1 1 -5
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Whether or not Semenov was
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really a materialist depends upon which of the Encyclopaedists he was
attracted to, and in what light he interpreted Spinoza. Since we do not
know this, it is pinning rather too much on the mention of Hobbes to make
any categorical affirmation of Semenov's materialism. Shchipanov does not
substantiate his inclusion of V.A. Bechasnov and l.A. Annenkov in his
list of atheist-materialists, though it can be assumed that in the latter's
case, the conclusion is based upon a report in the memoirs of A.S.
Gangeblov of a lengthy dispute between Annenkov and M.S. Lunin on the
ll4subject of Lunin's faith. We may infer frx>m this that Annenkov was 
ill-disposed towards Catholicism, or perhaps Christianity in general, but 
since similar views may be attributed to as wide a selection of thinkers 
as Speransky, Labzin, Ryleev (who took a hostile stance towards 
Catholicism in an article on the decline of Papal power115), a .D.
Ulybyshev (a member of the 'Green Lamp' literary society on the 
Decembrist fringes, whose 'Dream' foresaw a religion purified of 
superstitions, and without bishops, priests, monies and idolatry116) and 
A.I. Koshelev (one of the Schellingian ••Wisdom-lovers" who considered 
Christianity adequate only for the masses, and considered Spinoza's works 
far superior to the Gospel and the rest of the Scriptures117) - it is 
perhaps going too far to impute materialism to Annenkov on this basis alone.
Some of the most zealous work i„ the historiography of the Bussian
--materialist tradition-- has been carried out by G.I. Gabov i„ respect of
the Decembrists- philosophical views. Gabov v „  scarcely heterudox in
regarding the Decembrist movement as a reflection nf ,leuecuon of the crisis in the
feudal-servile order, precipitated by Kussia-s embarkation upon industrial 
capitalism in the first Carter of the nineteenth century, or in Interpreting 
the materialist resolution, by the most revolutionary and republican 
Decembrists, the basic question of philosophy concerning the relationship 
of thought to matter, as a weapon in the stnrggle against servile ideoloov
idealistic philosophy and religion, and a continuation of the materialist 
tradition, already firmly established by Lomonosov and Radishchev. 118 
However their outlook was weakened by their class limitations (as Lenin 
had shown), and their materialism failed to recognise subsequent 
discoveries, such as the unity of the infinite and the finite, the law of 
the transition of quantity to quality, or the fact that man was 
differentiated from the animals by labour. 119 Although orthodox, Gabov 
displayed unusual ingenuity in detecting materialist standpoints. Some of 
the evidence for his conclusion that the Decembrists recognised the low of 
motion and development as essential to all matter, consists in observations 
by Turgenev, and even Baten'kov, en historical development, and .„ong.t
the conspirators who came to a correct "materialist" conclusion, that
the objective world is subiect to * + » .s suojecx to its laws, and does not depend on any
supernatural forces, we find Pestel», Turaenev • u* xurgenev, Kornilovich and Puslichin,
of whom the last two did little more than mention the word "cause. " 120
GaboVs judgments are not only extreme, but at timea clearly false, as in 
the following references to German idealism:
"The Decembrist were the first to submit to criticism German Idealism, 
and above all the idealism of Schelling and Kant ... Nebulous German 
philosophy had no success in Russia because it could not express the 
immediate needs of the historical development of the country, and was a 
contradiction to the clear mind of the Russian people. All the attempt, 
of the Tsarist government to spread this philosophy i„ Russlai ^  uao ^
in the struggle against the materialistic, progressive world-view preved
unsuccessful
The first statement is refuted by the example, of Lubkin and Osipovsky, 
the second ignores the all-pervading vogue for Schelling and Hegel in the 
l820s, 30, and 4os, the third leaves out of account the government', 
attempts to extinguish that philosophy.
/It would be pointless to continue to tackle Gabov judgment by 
judgment, or to quote every generali.atlon about Decembrist thought 
derived from the views, or at any rate some of the views, of one or two 
men. Nevertheless, it might be instructive to concentrate upon some 
details of his interpretation of Yakushkin, who, as well as Festal* and 
Bestuzhev-Marlinsky, takes his place with some of the more obvious 
materialist candidates. The inclusion of Bestuzhev is, I believe, an 
unwarranted extension of hi. scientific beliefs (such as his belief in 
the infinity of the universe and the continuing destruction and creation 
of heavenly bodies, and his acceptance of an evolutionary history of the 
earth's crust), as well as of his mockery of Obolensky's idealism.122 Do 
that a, it may, there are clearer instances of error and misrepresentation 
when Yakushkin is considered. In the first place, having been described as 
an atheist, which is at least open to doubt, it i, stated that he refused
all the Archpriest Hyslevsky's attempts to make him observe the ceremonies 
of the Church, which simply is not true 123 ri,a u. .n°* true* Tho case Of misrepresentation
concerns Yakushkin's invocation of the familiar notion of the chain of 
being:
"He considered man ... to be a link in the i tAinK in tne general chain of the
1 o Aevolution of living organisms" .
Apparently, Yakushkin also regarded the appearance of the brain as the
result of a "long process" of development, in consequence of both of which
it was concluded that he had anticipated some of the most important outlines
of evolutionary theory more than twenty year, before the publication of 
Darwin's Origin of Species.1^  Ko„ lt wln be r6mombered ^
case for the inclusion of man in the natural chain was largely based upon 
the similarity of his embryological developaent with that of other animals, 
there is not the smallest hint i„ hi, essay of the theory of speci.tlon 
which is associated with Darwin and A.«. Wallace. I have no desire whatsoever 
t„ defend the originality of those two on chauvinistic gro™d„  b„t leaving
2 8 2 .
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aside the question as to whether Yakushkin is even to be considered as a 
contributor to the history of biology, his attachment to the familiar 
notion of a hierarchy of living things of increasing complexity hardly 
elevates him to the ranks of those naturalists and thinkers, such as 
Maupertius, Buffon, Erasmus Darwin, Lamarck and Lyell, who, however 
debatably, may in some senses be seen as »'precursors" of Darwin's account 
of the transformation of biological species. Gabov's misrepresentation 
lies in the unjustified insertion of the phrases "evolution" and "long 
process" in his summary of Yakushkin's views. A further instance, though 
not of misrepresentation, and of rather more relevance to Yakushkin's 
standing as a materialist, concerns the nature of his elementary edinitsy.
Gabov confronts the fact that he denied them extension, though not in my 
view in a convincing manner:
"Foreseeing the attempts of idealists to present the aforementioned
units in the guise of spiritual substances, Yakushkin gave a detailed
account of his position on the materiality of the units. He wrote that
it is possible to grind any object into a powder, into separate particles
which would be invisible, however in a large quantity these particles can
be perceived by us. Just as not all the vibrations of the air are
perceived by us in our hearing, but only the movement of large masses
becomes perceptible, so bodies perceptible to man's sense organs are
formed from particles inaccessible to the senses."126 t+ :*» perhaps an
exaggeration to say that Gabov confronts the problem of Yakushkin's 
point-atoms, rather he i. war. of the dangers. Thns he content, himself 
with arguing that invisibility does not imply immateriality, whereas it 
could be argued that Yakushkin's case is that immateriality does not imply 
invisibility. The question begged is whether these unextended unit, can 
be counted a, material entities. A fi„,i example from Gabov's analysis 
concerns not so much his inference from Yakushkin's work, as hi, over­
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generalisation on its basis. He was understandably struck by Yakushkin's 
comparison between the appearance of thought, and the manifestation of 
light as being qualitatively different than life and heat respectively, 
••Considering thought as a property of living matter at the highest 
stage of its development, the Decembrists did not identify thought and 
matter. They stressed the specific nature of thought, and came out against 
vulgar materialism, according to which thought is a material product of a 
special kind. The property of matter which is expressed in the ability 
to think is only the phenomenon of life, said the Decembrists, without 
signifying by this equality between matter and thought.''127 
If Yakushkin was a materialist, then it is certainly unlikely that he was 
a vulgar materialist, remembering also his deprecating attitude towards
Cabanis, though he can hardly speak for all his fellow conspirators on 
the matter.
Despite these criticisms of GaboV, methodology, I do not differ 
from him as to the extent of materialist and atheist l..ni„0, Kmono,t th„ 
Decembrists nearly so much as 1 have done with respect to Soviet 
historians of eighteenth-century Russian ideas. Exactly what the extent 
was is, as we have seen, dependent upon philosophical preconceptions as 
well as the availability of evidence, but in any case the latter is 
insufficient to resolve the matter quantitatively, even were such a 
resolution likely to meet with universal agreement. Nevertheless, it can 
he inferred from BeXyaaV, recollection, that a practising commitment to 
Orthodoxy *a, even after the conversion, in the Portress of St. Peter and 
St. Paul a minority pursuit amongst tho conspirators, since of somo 100 
exiles in Chita, he believed the thirteen he named as belonging to 
Bobrishehev-Pushkin*s group to be an exhaustive list.128 It may also be 
inferred that evidence of reiigioua affiliation vould ho much mor. llhaly 
to have survived than affirmations of athaiam, since tho Decembrist, would
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obviously have wished to conceal or destroy any incriminating material 
(as we know to have been the case with Kryukov*s notebooks, Pestel*s 
Russkaya Prayda and the notebook containing Baryatinsky's atheistic poem, 
which were all buried in a bundle near the village of Kirsanovka129), and, 
perhaps more contentiously, since the authorities may have destroyed papers 
they considered to be sacrilegious (Baron Diebitsch assured the Grand 
Duke Constantine that many of the insurgents* papers had been burned by 
him on the orders of Tsar Nicholas130). Thus, even though the hardest 
evidence for religious and idealist ideas on the one hand, and atheism 
and materialism on the other, is in both cases somewhat isolated, it seems 
more likely in the former than in latter case that this approximates to 
reality. We have already seen that Obolensky's idealism was under attack 
from some of his comrades in the Northern Society, and it should also be 
noted that it was not until November 1825, that the idealist co-editor 
of Mnemozina, V.K. Kuchelbecker, joined the Society under the influence 
of Ryleev and Prince A.I.Odoevsky. 131 Furthermore, the Catholic M.S.
Lunin was a peripheral figure in events leading to the rebellion, having 
moved to Warsaw in 1822, and in any case he disapproved of it, 132 whereas 
A.N. Murav*ev complained that he was despised for his conversion by the
other members of the Society, and held up as a hypocrite and a religious
133fanatic. Finally, Nikolay Bobrishchev-Pushkin, »hen informed by hi,
younger brother Pavel of his admission to the Southern Society, commented,
"Yes, God knows whether this society.is good, for the majority of its
134members are atheists'*
This last remark, while not in itself conclusive a. to it. own truth, must 
be added to what we have already learned in this section of the views of 
certain individual members of the Southern Society, »11 „f „hich, I W l w s  
lend, weight to the attempt mad. in the section on The Church end
to deal with the corporate appeals to Christianity favoured by that branch
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of the movement. These, it will be remembered, constituted a prima facie 
counterexample to the suggested correlation between degrees of political 
dissent and the extent of religious heterodoxy, but it was argued that such 
appeals may have been less a reflection of religious conviction, than of 
authoritarianism allied with remoteness from the people. That having been 
said, it may also be remembered that the previous sections were concerned 
with a discussion of the historical factors which surrounded the birth 
and development of a significant wing of atheist and materialist thought 
within the Decembrist movement. It may therefore not come as a complete 
surprise that the conclusion of this final section is that such a wing 
did exist, and was significant; and moreover that, despite my reservations 
about the usefulness of such designations, it can be said that this 
phenomenon constituted the origins of the Russian materialist tradition.
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